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LAW AND THE CONCEPT OF THE CORE
SELF: TOWARD A RECONCILIATION OF
NATURALISM AND HUMANISM
JOHN LAWRENCE HILL, J.D., PH.D*

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,
I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat
or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never
can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can
observe anything but the perception.
-David Hume'
[Law] can assume that a man is a real indivisible entity with body
and soul; it need not busy itself with asking whether a man be
anything more than a phenomenon, or at best, merely a succession of states of consciousness. It can take him as a reality and
work with him, as geometry works with points, lines and planes.
-John Chipman Gray2

I.

INTRODUCTION:

PARADIGMS IN CONFLICT

Bertrand Russell is supposed to have said somewhere that philosophy
is a process by which we reason with flawless logic from undeniable
premises to unbelievable conclusions. The twentieth century intellectual
is condemned to a fate still more curious than that of Russell's philosopher. She must reason by equally flawless logic from metaphysical
premises she finds increasingly difficult to believe-premises that hold
that persons are possessed of a self that is free, rational, and unique in
itself, an entity causally and morally set off from the nomic web that
ensnares the rest of material reality - to normative conclusions she dare
not deny. These are the conclusions that are axiomatic to our legal
system: (1) that persons are morally responsible, (2) that we possess
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University in Miami, Florida. Professor Hill
received his J.D. and Ph.D. from Georgetown University.
1. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. I, pt. IV, § VI at 252 (Oxford
Press, 2d ed. 1978) (1738).
2. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 28 (Beacon Press,
2d ed. 1972) (1909).
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rights in virtue of our nature as autonomous beings, and (3) that this
core, essential self should be placed beyond the reach of the market.
The problem with which we are faced is how to make sense of this
concept of the core self at a time when the world grows increasingly
skeptical of its very existence.
The two apparent alternatives here, as with perhaps many matters
metaphysical and moral, are to hold one's nose and embrace the
premises, pretending to be not at all embarrassed, or to stand firm and
deny the conclusions after all. But which? Even Sisyphus knew in which
direction to push his boulder. Our contemporary hero has not been
accorded this luxury. Upon his descent into the underworld, he is
seemingly confronted with two equally unpalatable options: dogmatism
or nihilism, dualism or materialistic reductionism, the well-worn rut or
the abyss.
It is thus with considerable trepidation that I undertake the following
project. Looking down from the precipice, there is always the temptation to sinash this boulder, this burden, into a hundred thousand pebbles
on the rocks below. I am told that Harvard Yard is strewn with similar
fragments. Taking only modest liberties with Camus, "[t]here is no fate
that cannot be surmounted by [deconstruction]." 3
This piece examines perhaps the most important concept in moral
and legal thought-the idea of the person, or the self. Since at least the
time of Descartes, the modern worldview has been poised between the
two seemingly compelling yet mutually exclusive paradigms of traditional
humanism and scientific naturalism. The traditional humanist paradigm,
as I use the term,4 views persons as free and responsible for their actions
and ultimately for who they are and what they become as persons. As
such, the self stands apart from the world in the most significant way,
morally and metaphysically, originating acts spontaneously, freely, and
independently of the external world. Scientific naturalism, on the other
hand, holds that each individual is fundamentally part and parcel of the

3. The actual quote is, "There is no fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn." ALBERT
CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS 121 (1955). Perhaps both amount to
the same meaning.
4. I use the term "humanism" here in a different sense than its typical philosophical
meaning where it designates the view that all values are human constructions and that social
institutions should reflect human values, rather than the imperatives of divine will. For lack
of a better term, I use the word to designate the idea that human acts cannot all be reduced
in materialistic and deterministic fashion to forces beyond our control. The "humanist"
paradigm is the paradigm of folk psychology, the view that persons have minds, that we make
decisions, and that we are responsible for our actions.
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natural world, the product of material states and processes working
themselves out in mechanistic fashion. On such a view, human action is
the predetermined product of a chain of causes extending backwards in
time indefinitely and again forward in time perpetually. On this account,
the concept of the autonomous self is dismissed as the central fiction of
a prescientific folk psychology.
Our modem view of the person is characterized by a tenuous modus
vivendi between the insights of traditional humanism and those of
scientific naturalism. We need the traditional concept of the core self;
it is the bedrock upon which our entire moral and legal system is based,
yet we do not really believe that there is such a thing. It is a phantasm,
a chimera, at best a reification. It works, but it does not exist. This puts
the modem defender of our moral and political order in something of a
difficult position.
Part II of this Article considers three important functions played by
the concept of the core self in modem legal thought: (1) the self as the
predicate for attributing moral and legal responsibility, (2) the self as the
subject of rights, and (3) the self as noncommodifiable human essence.
Part III surveys the philosophical history of the core self, including an
overview of what we may presume are the necessary constituent
elements of personhood-free will, rationality, functional unity, and
essential uniqueness. Part IV examines the attack on the core self from
the standpoint of deterministic metaphysics, empiricist epistemology, the
mind/body problem, and recent psychological thought. Here the Article
argues that each of these four modes of attack issue from a kind of
reductionism each of which is bom of an unnecessary dualism-i.e.,
between mind and body, world and self or substance and property. A
new ontology is needed to transcend these dichotomies.
Part V seeks to construct such an ontology, a "new naturalism,"
based on the idea of emergent evolutionism. Part V(A) elaborates a
solution to the mind/body problem that reconciles the modern naturalistic worldview with the traditional conception of the person. Part V(B)
examines the problem posed by determinism, offering a conception of
human freedom based upon the idea of self-determination that is
consistent with deterministic assumptions. Part V(C) then investigates
the problem of authenticity, the notion, vitally important to certain
strands of modem liberal thought, that there exists a presocial self.
Part VI discusses the implications of this view of the self to the issues
central to legal thought addressed in Part II. Part VI(A) sketches
general answers to the problem of human identity and to questions
concerning the constitutive aspect of the self. In this section, I elaborate
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upon the idea of self-creation through the process of "internalization."
The issue of commodification as the central jurisprudential problem
connected to the issue of self-identity will be addressed. Part VI(B)
examines the relationship between self-identity and freedom of will by
examining the problems posed by such excuses as duress, brain-washing,
and social conditioning, among others. I distinguish volition, freedom,
and autonomy, and put forth a developmental theory of autonomy.
Finally, Part VI(C) concludes with comments about the relationship
between the developmental conception of the self and the rights of
privacy and equality.
This Article aims to develop a rapprochement between the humanistic and naturalistic paradigms. The piece attempts to demonstrate that
determinism does not preclude a robust sense of personal freedom, and
that "physicalism," in an expanded sense of the term, does not exclude
the realm of the mental, and suggests that modern psychology has much
to contribute to our traditional concepts of authenticity, autonomy and
personal identity. This expanded understanding of the self will then
serve as a basis for moral and legal judgments concerning questions of
moral and legal responsibility, for our conception of rights, and for issues
of personal identity central to recent jurisprudential debate.
II.

THE CORE SELF IN LEGAL THOUGHT

The concept of the core self has played a central role in traditional
Anglo-American legal and jurisprudential thought. Most generally, the
concept of the self has performed three distinct functions in legal
thought. First, it has had an essential role in the attribution of personal
responsibility, particularly in criminal and contract law. Second, in
jurisprudential and constitutional theory, it has served as the subject of,
and justification for, certain kinds of rights. Finally, the core self has
been traditionally used as a conceptual device in a variety of miscellaneous situations that require legal theory to determine the constitutive
aspects of human identity for purposes of distinguishing between that
which falls "inside" and that which falls "outside" the person. This issue
has been important in discussions of the concept of commodification, and
in recent jurisprudential debates concerning whether the self is antecedent to, or constituted by, its ends, values, goals, and desires.
This Part will consider the problems raised by these three functions,
but will leave for Parts V and VI the attempt to answer some of the
riddles posed by the issues. Let us briefly turn to a consideration of
these issues.
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A. The Self and the Attribution of Moral and Legal Responsibility
Perhaps the oldest and, on a routine basis at least, most important
function played by the idea of the core self is in the attribution of moral
and legal responsibility. Basically, it is virtually a postulate of modem
legal and moral theory that one can only be held responsible for one's
own acts.' It is possible, of course, to have a legal system that rejects
this principle, and that routinely attributes moral and legal responsibility
to those who are not in any way causally responsible for the consequences for which they are to be sanctioned. Historically, one could be held
criminally liable for the acts of one's relatives, and in Medieval England
an entire feudal neighborhood could be held responsible and punished
for the acts of one of their own.6
In the modem American criminal law system, with certain anomalous
exceptions,7 a person can only be punished for her own acts.' Tradi-

5. This is true in the strongest sense on deontological accounts of morality. Even
utilitarians, however, strive to avoid the implications of punishing persons for acts performed
by others, usually by recourse to same form of rule utilitarianism. As one important critic of
the utilitarian theory of punishment has argued:
Punishment which we commonly consider to be just is punishment which is deserved.
To be deserved, punishment must be of an offender who is guilty of an offense in the
morally relevant sense of "offense." For instance, the punishing of a man known to
be innocent of any crime shocks our moral consciousness and is seen as a grave
injustice.
H.J. MCCLOsKEY, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY
UTILITARIANISM

241 (Michael D. Bayles ed., 1968).

For a discussion of the difference between deontological and utilitarian theories of
responsibility, see infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text (arguing that personal
responsibility is a necessary condition of punishment on a deontological account-that persons
must be responsible to be punished-while the order is reversed on a utilitarian account).
Here, if punishment conduces to promoting net utility, the defendant is held responsible. For
the utilitarian, responsibility is a function of the effects of punishment. For the deontologist,
a determination of personal responsibility requires a factual assessment into the actors moralpsychological state at the time of the act.
6. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
7. I have in mind here laws which hold parents responsible for the actions of their minor
children. Id. at 64.
8. The term "act" means a body movement that is precipitated or caused by a conscious
volition. H.L.A. Hart traces this doctrine back to Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence. H.L.A.
HART, Acts of Will and Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS INTHE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 97 (1968). This doctrine assumes a Cartesian duality between mind and
body, an assumption challenged by later thinkers, particularly behaviorists. See B.F. SKINNER,
ABOUT BEHAVIORISM 10-23 (1974) (arguing that we can dispose of mental language in favor
of a behaviorist description). Skinner argues that the dualistic belief that mental states cause
behavior is an example of the post hoc, ergo propterhos fallacy. Id. at 10. He argues that
"mental life and the world in which it is lived are inventions." Id. at 115. For a more
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tional moral and jurisprudential thought has accepted as axiomatic the
proposition that a person should not be held responsible for acts which
emanate from some source external to the self. Legal thought has
struggled, however, with the vexing question as to where to draw the line
between self and world.
Perhaps the simplest, if most Draconian, way to draw the line
between the internal and the external is at the boundary of the body.
We can imagine a system which holds persons liable for all consequences
which flow directly from any bodily act without regard to the defendant's
state of mind. This was in fact the position adopted by common law
courts in early tort cases.9 But the mens rea requirement in criminal
law,10 and various state of mind requirements in contemporary tort
law," are evidence of the law's recognition of the mind/body distinction
and of the general moral proposition that the person should only be held
morally and legally responsible for the acts of the self, rather than those
of the body. The most striking example of this commitment is embodied
in the defense of automatism or unconsciousness.12 To the extent the
criminal law follows the Cartesian mind/body model, which equates the
self or the mind with conscious thought or awareness, 13 an act performed while the agent is unconscious is viewed to be an act that does
not flow from the self and is consequently not punishable. 4 It is

expansive account of Skinner's behaviorism and its implications for modem political and social
thought, see John Lawrence Hill, Mil4 Freud and Skinner: The Concept of the Self and the
Moral Psychology of Liberty, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 92, 154-66 (1995).
9. See, e.g., Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (1616).
10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1962). The Code requires that conduct be
performed purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. Even more convincingly, § 2.01
requires a voluntary act while § 2.01(2) explicitly rules out "no act" situations such as reflex
acts and unconsciousness. Id.
11. In tort law, the concept of intention includes two components: volition and
knowledge of consequences. The concept of volition approximates the criminal law's "act"
requirement; it includes a conscious state of mind and a bodily movement. W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 34-35 (5th ed. 1984).
12. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(b) (1962). See HART & HONROE, supra note 6, at
92-95 (discussing unconsciousness).
13. RENP_ DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (Ronald Rubin, trans.,
1986) (1641). See in particular Meditation VI, entitled "On the Existence of Material Objects
and the Real Distinction of Mind From Body." Descartes' equation of mind with the
conscious mind is clearest in his description of the cogito. He appears to view the intellect as
part and parcel of the capacity for consciousness, though the two are analytically distinguishable. DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DESCARTES
(E.S. Haldane & G.T.P. Ross trans., 1955) (1641).
14. See State v. Caddell, 215 S.E.2d 348 (N.C. 1975) (discussing the American treatment
of the defense of unconsciousness).
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interesting to note that a Freudian view of the self, which does not
entirely equate the self with the conscious mind, might lead to a different
conclusion regarding the exculpatory character of this defense. 5
While it appears clear that the self/world dichotomy must be pursued
along psychological, rather than physical lines, this has led to a nest of
metaphysical and moral-psychological quandaries that remain unresolved.
When is an act truly "one's own" in the relevant moral and legal sense?
Two kinds of problems present themselves here. First, how are we to
characterize situations involving "mixed" motivations-where it can be
argued that certain behavior may be a result of both internal and
external factors? Second, how should certain factors which influence
behavior be characterized in the first place?
The defense of duress in criminal and contract law provides a
preliminary example of the first difficulty. On one hand, an act
performed under duress is voluntary and so internal in the sense that it
is the product of a choice.' 6 On the other hand, the choice is precipitated by some unwarranted external state of affairs, typically the use or
threat of force, such that the person would not have made the choice but
for the coercive influence.' 7 How are such acts to be evaluated?

The traditional explanation, embodied in the MODEL PENAL CODE
and in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, given for the
exculpatory nature of duress is that the impetus of the action is indeed

15. A central tenet of Freud's psychodynamic theory was that the great mass of human
personality is unconscious. SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID (W.W. Norton & Co.
1989) (1923). Consciousness occurs only in the ego, while the id and superego are completely
unconscious. Id. at 8. Note that Freud takes issue with the prevailing (Cartesian) view which
equates mind with the conscious mind. Id. at 3. Insofar as acts may be precipitated by unconscious desires and purposes, it could be argued that they are culpable. This, however, would
raise fundamental problems, particularly from a deontological perspective on moral responsibility. See MICHAEL MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 31049 (1984) (arguing that the presence of unconscious mental states does not increase
responsibility); id. at 350-81 (arguing that the unconscious does not decrease responsibility
either). See MORRIS N. EAGLE, Responsibility, Unconscious Motivation and Social Order 6
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY, 263 (1983) (arguing that the existence of unconscious motivations
does not undermine personal responsibility).
16. Michael D. Bayles, A Concept of Coercion,in COERCION 17 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1972). Bayles writes that "coercion involves . . . the voluntary
action of the person coerced." Id. Bayles makes clear that this applies only in cases of what
he calls "dispositioned coercion," which amounts to the same thing as duress. Id. at 18. The
other type, "occurrent coercion," is really a form of physical compulsion, as when one person
squeezes another person's fingers on the trigger of a gun. Id. at 17.
17. Id. at 18. In sum, the coercive influence is a necessary condition of the victim's
choice and action.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:289

external to the self. 8 The moral-psychological model employed by the
law holds that an influence is coercive when the person is not able to
resist the external influence, when his "will is overcome" by the external
influence in such a way as to render the self passive, an instrument of
another's will.' 9 In this manner, the law enshrines the fiction that acts

resulting from duress are not, properly speaking, the result of any real
choice on the part of the agent. In sum, coerced acts are the result of

the external factors that create the coercive exigency and are not viewed
to flow from the self in that the individual would not normally choose to
act as he has under these circumstances.2
Aristotle originated the idea that acts that result from compulsion are
involuntary. He further defined compulsion in this same sense by
reference to conditions such that "the moving principle is outside, being
a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is
acting."'" Yet Aristotle had great difficulty in describing as compelling
situations which today would be classified as instances of duress.2 2 The

reason for this is that he held, with some ambivalence, that even
constrained choices are, nevertheless, choices which arise from internal
sources. Thus, he argued that coerced acts "are mixed, but are more like
voluntary actions, for they are worthy of choice at the time when they
are done."' For Aristotle, any act in which the person has a choice is
voluntary and so should be characterized as arising at least partially from

18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1962). The Code provides: "It is an affirmative
defense that the actor engaged in the conduct.., because he was coerced ... which a person
of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist." (emphasis added).
The Restatement (SECOND) of Contracts § 175(1) simply requires that, for there to be
duress, an improper threat must leave the victim with no reasonable alternative. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1977). Comment (b) notes that "[i]t is sometimes
said that the threat must arouse such fear as precludes a party from exercising free will and
judgement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) cmt. b (1977).
19. Again, the standard for duress is an objective one, measured from the standpoint of
the reasonable person. State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 765 (N.J. 1977).
20. See Bernard Gert, Coercion and Freedom, in COERCION, supra note 16, at 31-33, for
a discussion of the issue as to whether coercion necessarily limits freedom. Gert examines the
idea of coercion as enticement where the actor appears to act from internal motives after all.
This, in turn, raises questions concerning whether all desires and motives are internal, properly
"our own" in the relevant sense. See infra part VI.B.4., for a discussion of the social
construction of the will.
21. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in TEE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 964 (W.D.
Ross trans., Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
22. For example, he cites acts performed when the actors' parents or children are under
some threat, or instances of necessity, as when someone throws cargo overboard in a storm.
Id.
23. Id. at 965.
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internal sources. The philosopher draws the more conservative
conclusion because of his fear of the slippery slope entailed by adopting
the position that choices precipitated by external factors are to be
excused. 4 Everything would be excused, on this account, in that human
choices are always, in some ultimate way, made in response to external
factors. The more lenient, modern American view requires that a line
be drawn between external factors that, for a variety of reasons,
"overcome the will," and those that do not.
Similar problems arise with mixed internal/external motivations with
respect to such concepts as exploitation,'

seduction,26 inducement,2 7

and brain-washing. 2 In all of these situations there is both an external
impetus to action and what may or may not be characterized as a
meaningful internal choice. As with duress, it might be argued that the
will of the individual has been overcome by the external stimulus (e.g.,
the seducer) leaving no genuine choice on the part of the victim. What
is perhaps most troubling about these cases is that they can be described
in equally compelling terms from either the internal or the external
standpoint. The party seeking the excuse will objectify his behavior by
adverting to what appear to be compelling or deterministic factors which
deprive the agent of choice, while the party seeking to lay blame will
emphasize that the agent could still have chosen otherwise-that she
possessed the ability to choose in a way that the victim of true physical
compulsion does not. 9
An even more intriguing example of this problem is posed by the

24. Aristotle argues that most everything is, in this sense, externally motivated, including
acts motivated by desire for pleasure or fear of pain. Id. at 965-66.
25. See John Lawrence Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 631 (1994), for an
overview and analysis of the concept of exploitation. Exploitation is distinguished from
coercion in that the former involves an offer, while the latter requires a threat. Id. at 683.
26. Jane E. Larson, Women UnderstoodSo Little: They Call My Good Nature "Deceit":
A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1993).
27. Inducement is similar to exploitation in that it involves an offer, not a threat. But
it is distinguished from exploitation in that it involves a highly attractive, "compelling" offer,
while exploitation requires an offer that is unattractive, but which the offeree accepts because
of her circumstances. Thus, the migrant farm worker is exploited while the starlet is induced
to have sexual relations with a Hollywood producer in return for a starring role. See Hill,
supra note 25, at 685-87 (discussing enticement as a form of exploitation).
28. See Michael S. Moore, Causationand the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1136 (1985)
(discussing brainwashing and the problem of "integrating" influences into the self); Joshua
Dressier, ProfessorDelgado's "Brainwashing"Defense: Courtinga DeterministLegal System,
63 MINN. L. REV. 335 (1979) (providing a skeptical look at the brainwashing defense).
29. See Joel Feinberg, What's So Special About Mental Illness, in DOING AND
DESERVING 282-83 (J. Feinberg ed., 1970), for some interesting examples of true compulsion.
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defense of brain-washing, as in the Patty Hearst case.30 As with duress,
the victim of brain-washing voluntarily engages in some course of
conduct in which, but for the external influence (the brain-washing), she
would not otherwise have engaged. From the standpoint of a crude
theory of causation viewed as a necessary condition-as cause-in-fact was
once understood in tort law 31 -duress and brain-washing are similar.
In both cases, the defendant-victim commits an act which, but for the
external influence, he would not otherwise have committed. Yet there
is definitely a psychological, and possibly a moral, difference between the
two situations. Unlike the situation involving duress, the victim of brainwashing comes to own her actions in a manner that the victim of duress
does not. She owns her acts in the sense that she comes to affirm them
as good, rather than as with duress merely as a means of escaping some
greater evil. The successful brain-washer is effective in reconditioning
the personality of the victim such that the victim comes to adopt and
integrate into her own personality entirely new values and goals, and
may even adopt a completely new worldview.32
Whether we believe that the victim of brain-washing should be
excused for her acts-and our intuitions may vary on a case-by-case
basis-will often depend upon our judgment that the person was not a
mere passive tool of the brain-washer, but an active participant in the
incident. Such factors as the duration and intensity of the brain-washing,
the prior condition of the victim-defendant (whether their character was
easily malleable and led astray by almost any influence), the period of
time between the brain-washing, and the act and the level of involvement
on the part of the defendant are ways of gauging whether the person has
come to own the act as their own. But in order for the law to make this
determination in some systematic manner, there must be some set of
criteria for concluding whether the influence was, in some relevant moral
and psychological sense, internalized by the person.33
If brain-washing is deemed to excuse persons for certain acts, then
30. See Lunde Wilson, Brainwashing as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Patty Hearst
Revisited, 13 CRIM. L. BULL. 341-42 (1977), for an overview of the facts in the Patty Hearst
case. See also J. Michael Davis, Comment, Brainwashing: Fact, Fictionand CriminalDefense,
44 UMKC L. REv. 438 (1976).
31. This is the familiar "but for" test; it asks whether an act would have occurred but for
the cause. If not, then the element of cause-in-fact is satisfied.
32. Davis, supra note 30, at 440-46.
33. A theoretical exploration of the process of internalization requires both a way to
distinguish between the internal and the external and an understanding of what it means to
make something internal, psychologically speaking. See Part VI.A.2., for a discussion of the
process.
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what about the type of character formation that occurs on a day-to-day
basis as the result of regular environmental or cultural influences?34
Again, we have the issue of influences that initially appear external, but
which arguably are internalized by the person at some point in the
process of self-formation." Arguably, the steady formative influence
of a poor social background is not different in kind from the tumultuous,
short-term effect of brain-washing. Yet intuitions may vary regarding
these two types of cases. Part VI examines the process of internalization
and its moral and legal implications.
The second problem raised by a psychological interpretation of the
internal/external distinction is even more fundamental than the first. It
concerns how particular factors ought to be classified-as internal or
external-in the first place. For example, should the law treat genetic
conditions such as those marked by the presence of the XYY chromosome, now believed by some to be a cause of violent criminal behavior
on the part of those afflicted with the condition, as internal to the self or
as an external influence upon behavior? 6 And what of the panoply of
hormonal imbalances such as those evident in post-partum psychosis or
the PMS defense?37 On one hand, these conditions are internal in the
sense that they are a product of the agent's own physiological system.
We hold the alcoholic (at least partially) responsible for her drinking,
just as we require the person with a fiery temper, itself a likely product
of hormonal influences, to control himself. On the other hand, we
34. Brain-washing is different form long-term character formation through social
conditioning only in two respects. First, brainwashing typically occurs in a more coercive
context and, second, it occurs over a shorter period of time. It is not clear, however, that
these should make a difference morally. Indeed, it might be argued that the short-term
duration of brainwashing makes it resistible in a way that long-term character formation is not.
Further, insofar as brainwashing characteristically takes place with an adult victim of fully
formed beliefs and values, while character formation takes place with the nascent personality,
this cuts in favor of treating long-term conditioning more favorably than brainwashing,
contrary to common-sense intuitions. See Delgado, Ascription of CriminalState of Mind: Toward a Defense Theory for the Coercively Persuaded ("Brainwashed") Defendant, 63 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1978) (arguing that the guilty mind is not his own); see also Joshua Dressier,
ProfessorDelgado'sBrainwashingDefense: Courtinga DeterministicSystem, 63 MINN L. REV.
353 (1979) (arguing that brainwashing is indistinguishable from normal social conditioning in
that all beliefs, values and goals came from outside the person).
35. This raises a question which goes to the heart of philosophical psychology: Is the
self discovered or created? See infra Part V.C., for a discussion of the problem of the
authentic self.
36. See People v. Yukl, 83 Misc. 2d 364, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)
(attempting to interpose the XYY defense).
37. Aleta Wallach & Larry Rubin, The Premenstrual Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility, 19 UCLA L. REV. 209 (1971).
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generally do not blame the person for illness or for physical conditions
such as handicaps. As argued in Part VI, our view on these respective
cases will depend upon a variety of other factors, including whether the
individual has had a role in bringing the condition upon himself and
whether it is the kind of thing that can be controlled through exertion of
what, on the traditionalist paradigm, will be characterized as will power.
Psychological influences upon behavior are intuitively even more
difficult to place within the internal/external dichotomy. On one hand,
a person's psychological state appears closer to the core self in the sense
that they seem to characterize the self at its most basic. Aspects of
personality, character traits, and the like are who we are most fundamentally. To characterize bad temper, for example, as an external influence
upon behavior is to sever and objectify a most integral aspect of
personality from itself. A similar deconstruction of every other
personality trait would leave an empty void at the center of the self.
On the other hand, where human character traits are viewed as the
psychological effects of physiological influences-where, for example, a
bad temper can be explained as a psychological manifestation of
hormonal influences over which the agent has no control, or where
substance abuse problems are viewed as a function of genetic factors-even the most intimate aspects of human personality come to
appear as the result of external influences upon behavior. Similarly,
where some personality trait is an obvious effect of an environmental
influence, we may be intuitively unclear as to how it should be classified.
This problem presents itself in contemporary debate concerning the
exculpatory status of posttraumatic stress disorder,38 urban rage
syndrome," and perhaps less persuasively, the influence of a bad
environment.4 °
Where the problem of mixed influences raises fundamental questions
about personal freedom (as in freedom of the will), the problem of
classification is essentially the result of our inability to draw a neat line
between mind and body and conceptual unclearness about the causal
relationship between mind and body. This problem has cast its shadow
on modern law even in relatively more prosaic contexts, such as whether
38. See Krista L. Duncan, Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics? Psychological Syndrome
Evidence in the Courtroom After Daubert, 71 IND. L.J. 753, 757 (1996). The American
Psychiatric Association first included PTSD in its diagnostic model in 1980. Id. at 758.
39. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE (1994) (discussing urban rage
syndrome).
40. For a discussion of social conditioning, see infra Part VI.B.4. and accompanying notes
309-12 which argue that social conditioning sometimes limits autonomy, but not freedom.
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certain injuries should be characterized as physical or mental for
purposes of tort recovery.41 We will return to these issues at greater
length in Parts IV through VI.
The concept of the core self stands as a kind of moral placeholder in
traditional moral and legal thought. If human behavior is viewed as the
passive product of the world's influences, as determinists and others
maintain, 42 then the concept of the core self may have some psychological importance, but it can have little moral relevance.43 If human
personality is conceptualized as a kind of mediating receptacle through
which causal influences flow inevitably and inexorably, then in the
morally relevant sense at least, there is no internal realm. If this view
is accurate, then the human self is, to paraphrase Santayana, merely the
wave through which the force of the ocean flows; it is nothing but a
temporary configuration of the external world. The alternative view, of
course, and the view upon which traditional notions of personal
responsibility depend, is that the boundaries of the self are a kind of
causal buffer to the cause-and-effect influences of the external world. As
such, the self is self-contained and self-moving; it is its own author and
is the ultimate cause of its own acts under normal circumstances.
B. The Self as the Subject of Rights
The second function played by the concept of the core self in AngloAmerican legal theory is the subject of, and justificatory basis for, certain
kinds of rights. Let us begin by distinguishing between two different
kinds of rights, or to put it slightly differently, two different justificatory
bases for rights, whether these rights are conceived as moral rights or as
constitutional rights. For lack of better terminology, I shall call these

41. All mental injuries might be cognized as physical injuries, insofar as they may affect
the brain or nervous system, or insofar as they can be objectively determined to be real. See
W. PAGE KEATON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 364 n. 56 (5th ed.

1984).
42. See infra Part III.A., for a discussion of determinism.
43. In other words, there may be a qualitative phenomenological or psychological
difference between events which are the product of "internal" versus "external" influences,
but if all influences are likewise causally determined, all actions are similarly unfree. Whether
one is motivated by duress (fear of threat), desire or other stimuli, the result is the same.
This view, however, is dependent upon a particular view of determinism which has been
widely challenged. See infra Part V.B., for discussion of the hard/soft determinism dichotomy.
44. "I believe there is nothing immortal ....
No doubt the spirit and energy of the
world is what is acting in us, as the sea is what rises in every little wave; but it passes through
us; and cry out as we may, it will move on. Our privilege is to have perceived it as it moved."
GEORGE SANTAYANA, SKEPTICISM AND ANIMAL FAITH 271 (1955).
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two kinds of rights "personal" rights and "political" rights, respectively.
Political rights are those that are defensive in nature; they are checks
against tyranny and serve the function of ensuring for their holder a
voice in government. Personal rights, on the other hand, are rights
which are essential to the flourishing or self-direction of the individual
as she desires to live her life and to see it develop. As such, personal
rights are affirmative in nature in that they serve to foster the individual's desired personal ends.45
The distinction between political and personal rights is not a sharp
one, as critics of a similar distinction drawn by Benjamin Constant have
pointed out.4 6 Nevertheless, some examples will serve to clarify: such
rights as (1) the right to vote, (2) the right to petition government, (3)
the right to take part as an officer of government, and (4) the right to
bring suit to enforce the constitutional limitations upon government
power, among others, are examples of political rights. On the other
hand, various rights associated with the fundamental rights and interests
protected by the due process clause, including (1) the right to marry and
raise children,47 (2) the right to travel,48 (3) the right to live with one's

45. It can be argued, of course, that what I am calling "personal rights" are in fact
reducible to political rights. Part of what it is to have political freedom, after all, is the right
to live one's life as one chooses free of government interference. I take it that it is an
important aspect of the feminist case for abortion rights that the right to an abortion is not
simply personal but political in the sense that the right to abortion is a function of the right
to be free from oppressive social and political impositions restricting women's rights. In sum,
all personal rights are political in an ultimate sense.
The distinction I draw between personal and political rights runs parallel to the types of
rights guaranteed by liberalism (freedom from government intrusion as manifest in a personal
zone of privacy) and those assured by democracy (the right to take part in government).
While liberalism and democracy are intimately associated in modern political thought, the
relationship is only a contingent one. See NORBERTO BoBBIo, LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY
(Martin Ryle & Kate Soper trans., 1990) (1988) (examining the relationship between the two
political doctrines).
The point I wish to stress here is that the justificatory basis for political rights, unlike that
of personal rights, need not be predicated upon some nation of individual autonomy or natural
rights. Moreover, to the extent that we view political rights to be a function of individual
freedom, the argument I am making in this section will apply with even greater force to all
moral and constitutional rights. The idea of the core self becomes even more important to our
understanding rights of freedom when it is the basis for political as well as personal rights.
46. BENJAMIN CONSTANT, ANCIENT AND MODERN LIBERTY (1819). See JOHN GRAY,
LIBERALISM 21 (2d ed. 1995) (critiquing the historical claim that the ancients did not possess
a view of liberty which today would be associated with liberalism, rather than self-government).
47. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
48. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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family undisturbed, 9 (4) the right to use contraception50 or to seek an
abortion,5 ' are personal rights.
Note that many other rights, including a number of important
constitutional rights, may serve dual functions. For example, the right
to free speech may be conceived as a right of personal expression or as
a right necessary to ensuring a fair and democratic political process. It
is interesting to note that First Amendment jurisprudence has over the
past thirty years or more increasingly taken on the character of a
personal right as a right of free expression. 2 Similarly, other provisions
of the Bill of'Rights may be construed variously as either political or
personal rights. Thus, the Fourth Amendment right against unlawful
searches and seizures or the various guarantees of a fair trial pursuant to
the Sixth Amendment may serve both the political function of preventing
a tyrannical government from stifling its enemies and the personal
function of preserving the integrity of the home or liberty of the person.
For a number of reasons, the distinction drawn here between political
and personal rights will be objected to by some, just as Constant's
distinction found opposition. To the extent that modem opinion may
collapse the distinction drawn here-in effect, conceiving what are here
called political rights as a species of personal rights-the function of the
core self will be even more important as the basis for rights. In other
words, if even political rights such as the right to vote or to petition
government are viewed as personal in nature in that having a role in
government is an important part of ordering our individual lives, then
the core self becomes even more significant as the predicate for all of
these moral and constitutional rights.
Notwithstanding the distinction drawn here concerning the dual
nature of rights, to the extent that modem personal rights associated

49.
50.
51.
52.
freedom

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
The original philosophical bases for the First Amendment were linked to spiritual
(freedom of conscience to speak one's views) and political freedom (as a defense to

government tyranny).

ARCHIBALD

Cox,

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

2 (1981). As such,

freedom of speech was central to the rationalist pursuit of truth. Increasingly, however,
perhaps as a result of the romantic influence upon modern liberalism, First Amendment
values have emphasized not simply the pursuit of truth, but the emotional dimension of speech
as a form of self-expression. Edward Shils, The Antinomies of Liberalism, in THE RELEVANCE
OF LIBERALISM 135 (Research Institute on International Change ed., 1978). This is exhibited
in application of the First Amendment to nude dancing. See Schad v. Borough of Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-6 (1981) (holding that nude dancing falls within the protection of the
First Amendment).
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with various strains of liberalism53 are predicated upon the sanctity of
individual choice, whether this is cast in broad terms of personal
autonomy 4 or more limited bases for recognized rights," the justificatory basis for personal rights depends upon the concept of the core self as
a juridically recognized entity. Commentators representing differing
moral traditions have clarified the link between the concept of the core
self and the justification for rights. For example, Veatch, a proponent
of neo-Aristotelian natural law theory, argues that the development of
individual freedom and autonomy are necessary in order to actualize our
telos, or natural destiny as human beings. 6 According to this view,
rights can only be justified as a means to this end. 7
Notions of freedom, rationality, and autonomy are even more
obviously pertinent to neo-Kantian or deontological conceptions of
rights. David A.J. Richards, a contemporary advocate of a broad zone
of privacy, elaborates upon the importance of the concept of personal
autonomy to a conception of rights:
Autonomy, in the sense fundamental to the idea of human rights,
begins with the conception that persons have a range of capacities
that enables them to develop, to want to act on, and in fact to act
on higher order plans of action that. .. order their lives according to principles of conduct and canons of ethics to which they
have given their rational assent.5 8
Later, Richards makes explicit the link between autonomy and the moral
justification for rights:

53. Modern liberalism is not reducible to any one philosophical movement. Indeed, it
is a product of natural rights philosophy, utilitarianism, organic collectivism, and nineteenth
century romanticism, as evident in Mill's thought. JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (Penguin
Books 1986) (1859). See L.T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM 30-43 (1911) (discussing the phases

of liberal theory); GRAY, supra note 46, at 3-41 (for an intellectual history of liberalism).
54. IMMANUEL KANT, Groundingfor the Metaphysic of Morals, in IMMANUEL KANT:
ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY 54 (James W. Ellington trans., 1983) (1785) ("Now the idea of freedom
is inseparably connected with the concept of autonomy, and this in turn with the universal
principle of morality, which ideally is the ground of all actions of rational beings.").
Autonomous moral choice, for Kant, meant choice in accord with pure reason, independent
of the heteronomous influence of desire.
55. Modern constitutional rights have not been cast in terms of absolute notions of
Kantian autonomy or Mill's inviolable sphere of private action. As the Supreme Court stated
in Roe v. Wade, "The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact,
it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to
do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy." Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 154.
56. HENRY B. VEATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS: FACT OR FANCY? 85-93 (1985).
57. Id. at 156-66.
58. DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW 8 (1982).
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The substantive criminal law and cognate principles of constitutional law rest on... the fundamental ethical imperative that
each person should extend to others the same respect and
concern that one demands for oneself as a free and rational being
with the higher-order capacities
to take responsibility for and
59
revise the form of one's life.
It should be noted that the term "autonomy" as utilized by rights
theorists, is employed not in the loose, modern sense of "getting what
one desires" but in the stricter original, Kantian sense of rational
autonomy, i.e., of guiding one's own behavior by following the dictates
of the law of reason, where reason itself is an intrinsic aspect of the
subject.60
Elsewhere I have made the argument for the necessary link in liberal
political theory between the core self and the zone of privacy.61 Briefly
summarized, the argument proceeds as follows: when the defender of
personal liberties is asked why the choices of the individual (which
otherwise fall within the "self-regarding" domain62 ) should not be
overridden by the government on paternalistic or moralistic grounds, the
answer typically proffered is that there is something sacrosanct about
these choices. What makes them sacrosanct-and here there are
different strains of justification-is that these choices are the product of
the autonomous person, or are an expression of the authentic sel 63 or
are the natural right of all free persons to make.' 4 Whether the
justification is predicated upon neo-Kantian notions of autonomy,
romantic expressivism or natural rights theory, the core self as a free,
rational or authentic entity is presupposed.65
To put the matter differently, if all human actions are a passive

59. Id. at 15.
60. ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY

138 (1978).

61. Hill, supra note 8, at 177-82.
62. This phrase is used to designate acts that are private in the sense that they do not
directly harm others. Obviously, other senses of privacy persist.
63. See infra Part V.C., for a discussion of the authentic self.
64. Natural rights philosophy was the first strain of liberal thought. JOHN LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 69-77 (C.B. MacPhearson ed., Hackett Publishing 1980)
(1690).
65. The core self theory gives a kind of moral primacy to acts and choices which spring
ab initio from the person. On the other hand, if human acts are viewed to be merely the
product of a confluence of external causes, why should the government not be able to
"correct" those acts or choices which are disruptive of social order, maximum happiness, or
whatever the goal of society is viewed to be? If we are not free in the sense required by the

libertarian, what reason can one give for repelling government intervention into the private
domain, particularly if it leads to the maximization of happiness?
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product of external (e.g., environmental) influences, they are neither free,
rational, nor authentic to the person in the sense required in order to
justify these rights.66 The radical behaviorist cannot be a committed
defender of the zone of privacy because the behaviorist holds that
human choices and actions are the product of accidental social or
environmental influences which in no way uarantee that the act is
autonomous or authentic to the self in the manner required by the
liberal defender of privacy. This is not to say that the behaviorist is
"antiliberty," at least in the limited sense they hold liberty to be
possible.67 However, from a behaviorist standpoint, it makes little sense
to permit the individual to do whatever he wishes from self-destructive
use of dangerous drugs to risky sexual behavior, for example, simply
because it does not harm anyone else. To put it bluntly, the behaviorist
shares neither the belief in human freedom and dignity essential to the
liberal ethic of choice, 6' nor the faith in the self-corrective nature of
human conduct which is the underpinning of classical liberalism.69
Similarly, those from other theoretical orientations who view human
behavior as a product of the external world and the self as a reification70 cannot adduce any plausible claim as to why these externally
produced choices and acts should be regarded as sacrosanct and
preserved free of government interference and redirection. In sum, the
66. If freedom is defined as contrary to causation and if all behavior is causally
determined by environmental influences, then human behavior is not free. Nor is it rational
in the traditional sense. For the behaviorist, for example, acts are not the product of conscious
reflection or rationality; they are a product of environmental stimuli. See infra Part IV.C., for
a discussion of behaviorism's dismissal of mental constructs including the core self.
67. B.F. Skinner, for example, argues in favor of permitting diverse life experiments in
Millian fashion. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 145-183 (1971). This
appears to overlook the central tenet of behaviorism-that, except for true (unconditional)
operant behavior, all life experiments must themselves be a function of environmental
contingencies.
68. SKINNER, supra note 8, at 54 (all behavior is causally determined). Skinner's
rejection of the idea of freedom of the will is evident in the title of his 1971 classic, B.F.
SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971). While Skinner apparently overlooked the
soft determinist strategy by which to reconcile freedom and determinism, he would
undoubtedly have rejected it. The soft determinist solution holds that behavior, even causally
determined behavior, is free if the person could have acted otherwise had he so chosen. See
infra Part V.B.1., for a discussion of soft determinism. Skinner rejected not only the casual
efficacy of desires, choices, and similar mental language, but their very existence as well. Thus,
to say someone is free if they could have chosen otherwise would be similar to saying a person
is free in the event Pegasus returns. It is an illusory counterfactual proposition.
69. See generally MILL, supra note 53, at 163-65 (arguing that progress depends on the
self-correcting nature of human action).
70. This includes not only behaviorists and social learning theorists, but those influenced
by a reductionist model of human personality.
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case for personal liberty crucially depends upon the core self of classic
liberal thought.7
C The Core Self and the Constitutive Aspects of Human Identity
In addition to the core self as the basis for the ascription of moral
and legal responsibility, and as the subject of personal rights, there is yet
a third function played by the concept of selfhood. In a variety of
different contexts, legal theory must make assessments regarding
substantive aspects of human identity, or what we might call questions
concerning the contents of the self. Again, as with the responsibilityattribution function, the issue concerns what we regard as internal to the
self versus that which we regard as external.
Within the last decade and a ha4 feminists, among others, have
become increasingly interested in the concept of commodification. This term is used to designate a class of arguments which conclude that
certain putatively personal qualities, capacities, or body products (e.g.
sexuality, procreation, human organs) are so fundamental to human
identity that they should not be marketable, or commodified. Proponents of the argument of commodification maintain that current
prohibitions against prostitution,73 surrogate mother arrangements, 74
and the sale of human organs,75 among other transactions, can be
justified on these grounds.
The argument from commodification theory depends upon its
proponents being able to make a principled distinction between those
attributes and capacities which are, in some significant moral and
to human nature, and which should thus be
psychological sense, internal
'
"market-inalienable,"76
and those which are external and properly

71.

Hill, supra note 8, at 180-82.

72.

GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 219 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-

Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
73. Carole Pateman, Defending Prostitution: Charges Against Ericsson, 93 ETHICS 561
(1983); Evelina Giobbe, Confronting the Liberal Lies About Prostitution, in THE SEXUAL
LIBERALS AND THE ATrACK ON FEMINISM (Dorchen Leidhold & Janice G. Raymonds eds.,
1990).
74. Radin, supra note 72, at 1928-36; COREA, supra note 72, at 219; Shari O'Brien,
Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L. REv. 127, 143-44
(1986).
75. Compare Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28
(Oct., 1986) (quasi-property approach to organ sales), with O'Brien, supranote 74, at 143-144
(organs should not be commodified).
76. The term comes from Radin's article, which provides the most expansive recent
analysis of the idea of commodification. Radin, supra note 72.
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commodifiable. In essence, it requires our being able to make a
determination regarding that which is part of the subject or self, and that
which belongs to the objective world.
This argument can be cast in both idealist and consequentialist terms.
The idealist argument holds that, for every commodity in which there is
a property right, there must be some subject who holds that right.
Where the object of the property right is the subject itself, however,
there is no residual subject by whom this right is possessed. In essence,
the subject dispossesses itself as the holder of the property right by
objectifying itself.77 The consequentialist strain of the argument warns
of the untoward psychological effects of commodifying an identity aspect
of one's personhood78 and the social implications of living in a society
where anything can be purchased. 9 In sum, this second line of
argument looks not to the abstract philosophical implications of
commodification for our concept of freedom, but to the possible realworld psychological effects (e.g., depression, alienation, de-sensitization,
etc.) that arguably might result from selling an essential aspect of our
selves.
Varying philosophers, of course, have tendered diverse answers to the
question as to how to draw the line between subject and object. At one
extreme, Marx argued that no human product, much less any human
capacity or personal attribute, should be objectified; at the other polar
extreme, Kant's equation of the self with the noumenal, unknowable
realm in contrast to the objective, phenomenal world, appears to have
the implication of universal commodification. 80 Between these two
extremes are "pluralists" of various stripes, thinkers who hold that some
things may rightfully be commodified while other things should not.8 '
The pluralist, of course, is faced with the question as to where, and by
what principle, to draw the line.
Consider the case posed by prostitution. Proponents of the argument
from commodification must distinguish human sexuality from, for
example, intelligence in a manner that leaves sexuality inside the
personal realm while intelligence, which is routinely commodified, fals

outside. Ironically, this appears to conflict with the prevailing social

77. This is the Hegelian argument discussed in Radin, supra note 72, at 1896.
78. Id. at 1905-06.
79. The fear is that this would lead to a general devaluing of humanity itself. Margaret
S. Radin, Property and Personhood,34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
80. Radin, supra note 72, at 1897.
81. Id. at 1887.
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understanding that holds that such attributes as personality, intelligence,
and character are more fundamental to our individual being than
external physical characteristics and capacities, such as sexuality.'
Thus, it appears that we are, as a culture, ambivalent both about the
principle for, and application of, the argument from commodification.
The attempt to arrive at a coherent principle by which to apply the
commodification argument raises a fundamental question regarding our
understanding of the self: when we speak of one attribute or capacity
being internal to our sense of selt in what sense is it internal? The self
is not a physical thing. Consequently, we obviously do not mean that
our values, goals, personal attributes, and capacities, etc., are "in" the
self in some physical sense. The solution to be proposed here is that
certain values, attributes, or capacities are a part of the self in the sense
that the self identifies with them psychologically. 3 We come to think
about our values and desires and attributes as a part of who we are. We
distinguish ourselves from the objective world by reference to our state
of identification with and internalization of these other things. This is
one picture of the self.
An alternative view of the self has an equally venerable philosophical
lineage. It holds that the self is essentially empty-independent of, and
antecedent to, the objective world. It makes choices, but it stands apart
from its ends. It values, but these values are also objective, separable
and, in some sense, arbitrary, from the standpoint of the self. This
picture of the self is central not only to Eastern philosophy, particularly
Buddhism, where the self is viewed to be completely empty, 4 but also
to various schools of Western thought, including the Kantian tradition,
which equates the self with rational will. 5 The Kantian tradition has,
82. This social understanding may follow the mind/body distinction in holding that
physical attributes are external and transitory, while mental capacities and moral dispositions,
character, etc., are essential to the person inside.
83. Internalization may be thought of as the first step in the process of self-integration.
Psychologically, the self first "identifies" with some object, giving the self some goal, value, or
predicate around which to orient itself. Then this predicate is integrated into the psychic structure. See infra Part VI.B.3. and accompanying text, for a discussion of self-integration.
84. In this respect, Buddhism is in complete accord with Humean empiricism. The
doctrine of anatman "points to perhaps the most profound discovery that can be made in
meditation: that, search as hard as we will, we can never point to anything in ourselves that
we can definitely say is the self." JOHN SNELLING, THE BUDDHIST HANDBOOK 53 (1991).
Some schools of Buddhist thought adopt a view reminiscent of Kantian idealism that the self
exists, but stands outside the phenomenal world. Id. Other schools appear to embrace
skepticism on the question of the self, holding that there is no self.
85. IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (F. Max MUller trans., 1966)
(1781).
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in turn, been a central influence upon the moral psychology of modern
liberalism.86 This view of the self is predicated upon epistemological,
rather than psychological, grounds.'
These two views of the self, identified as the "psychological" and
"idealist" theories, continue to vie with each other in philosophical
thought. 8 Recently, they have been the basis for renewed debate
between the communitarian, Michael Sandel, and the liberal, John
Rawls.8 9 Not surprisingly, the disparate political philosophies of modern
welfare liberalism and communitarianism, respectively, may be at least
partially a function of the respective views each holds concerning the
nature of the self.
In Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Sandel argues that the
Kantian-Rawlsian, or idealist view of the self as prior to and independent
of its ends, values, choices, and goals parallels "deontological liberalism's" commitment to according priority to the right over the good.'
Sandel argues that this unencumbered self, distinct from all that it values,
is devoid of character and incapable of moral self-knowledge: "To

imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments... is not to
conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person
wholly without character, without moral depth." 91 Further, "the
deontological self, being wholly without character, is incapable of selfknowledge in any morally serious sense. Where the self is unencumbered and essentially dispossessed, no person is left for self-reflection to
reflect upon."92
86. Michael Sandel coined the term "deontological liberalism" to describe the liberal
tradition running from Kant to Rawls. MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF
JUSTICE 2-7 (1982).
87. Id. at 7-8.
88. These views of the self underlie contrasting traditions concerning the question of the
relationship between freedom and desire. Wright Neeley, Freedom and Desire,83 PHIL. REV.
32 (1974) (contrasting Schopenhauer's idealism, parallel in this respect to deontological
liberalism, with Hobbes's view, which holds that one can only be free with respect to satisfying
one's desires). Thus, in parallel fashion, deontological liberalism may be predicated upon an
idealism which views the self as separate from its desires and goals. Other views, such as
Sandel's communitarinism, are closer to Hobbes in this respect: the self is constituted by, and
its freedom is manifest in, one's desires.
89. Sandel's work is an extended attack on the Rawlsian notion of the self as distinct
from its ends. SANDEL, supra note 86. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
90. See RAwLS, supra note 89, at 22-24, for teleological theories such as utilitarianism,
the good is primary, the right is derivative, defined in terms of the good. This order is
reversed for deontological theories, where the right is logically prior to the good.
91. SANDEL, supra note 86, at 179.
92. Id. at 180. It is interesting to note the parallel between this idea and the Hegelian
argument regarding commodification that, by objectifying itself, there is no subject left to
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The parallel between the problem of commodification and the notion
of the unencumbered self is striking. Both require that we have some
basis for distinguishing between what we have or do, on one hand, and
what we are, on the other. This issue, in turn, raises absolutely
foundational questions concerning whether the distinction between self
and world is to be defined in epistemological, psychological, or moral
terms. In other words, is what we are, as distinguished from what we
have, to be defined by reference to some philosophical principle that
picks out certain things as subjective and others as objective, thereby
distinguishing self and world in terms of the way in which it is known?
Or, are we to define the self in terms of an individual's level of
psychological attachment such that the self-world divide becomes a
function of whether one identifies with or internalizes some formerly
objective item. Or, is the distinction to be drawn normatively, by
reference to some moral principle?93
In Part VI, this Article returns to the question as to how the self is
to be defined and delimited in a way which assists us in answering the
questions posed by the problems of responsibility attribution, the
justificatory basis for personal rights, and issues regarding the constitutive aspect of human identity.
D. The Role of the Core Self in Utilitarianand DeontologicalMoral
Argument
An important objection to the use of the core self as the justificatory
basis for legal (and moral) claims regarding responsibility attribution,
rights, or questions involving the constitutive aspects of human identity,
is that recourse to the self is unnecessary. It is unnecessary because
there exist alternative moral grounds for these conclusions that do not
require positing the existence of so untenable a metaphysical entity as
the core self.
By way of example, let us begin with the attribution of responsibility.
It is possible, the objection runs, to hold a subject responsible for an act
independent of considerations of whether the act springs from internal
or external sources. A utilitarian justification for holding the agent
criminally or civilly responsible looks not to the genesis of the act, but

possess the property right in the objectified subject. See Radin, supra note 72.
93. See infra Part VI.A.1., for an analysis of different methods for defining and
understanding the self.
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to the likely consequences of holding the agent responsible.94 Put
simply, the agent is punished (if it is a criminal violation at issue) not
because he performed the act, but because punishment will serve the
utilitarian functions of prevention and deterrence, among others.
Similarly, a utilitarian argument for personal rights will be justified not
on the basis of the moral inviolability of the autonomous sel, but
because it is the surest way of maximizing net social utility, whether cast
in terms of happiness, preferences, or other values.95 Finally, as we saw
previously, even the argument from commodification had a utilitarian
justification: in this case, certain personal attributes or capacities would
be placed beyond the reach of the market not because they fall into
some metaphysically-defined domain of the subjective, but because
permitting their sale would lead to adverse consequences on balance.
These consequences might include the long-term psychological effects of
relinquishing a child to another couple, as in the surrogate arrangement,
the desensitization of sexual feelings or social stigma associated with
prostitution, or the resultant adverse physical effects from having parted
with a kidney.
This objection evinces an important point regarding the two
prevailing modes of moral reasoning, deontological (or non- consequentialist) thought, on one hand, and utilitarianism, on the other.96 The
core self plays a direct role only in deontological modes of justification.
This is because deontological thought looks backward to the causes and
motives of acts. It asks, "Is the agent responsible?" rather than, "Can
we maximize utility by holding her (criminally or civilly) responsible?"
Similarly, the deontological justification for personal rights predicates
these rights on the sanctity of the autonomous self. The moralpsychological condition of persons as free and rational beings is relevant
to the deontological defense of rights in a way that it is not for the
utilitarian justification. Indeed, it is this difference which gives the
deontological defense of rights their character as absolute trumps against

94. These consequences include the effects on others of punishing the accused. This has
resulted in strong criticism of the utilitarian case for punishment. MCCLoSKEY, supra note 5,
at 242 (criticizing the implication of utilitarianism insofar as it appears to require punishment
of the innocent and imposition of overly severe sentences to further deterrence purposes).
95. Mill, for example, claimed that the harm principle he defended was predicated upon
utilitarian principles: "I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from
the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate
appeal on all ethical questions .... ." MILL, supra note 53, at 69-70.
96. The third and older moral realist approach is represented by Aristotle's virtue ethics.
See ARISTOTLE, supra note 21.
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infringement, 97 as compared with the merely contingent utilitarian basis
for rights.9"

The response to the objection that we need not seek jurisprudential
refuge in the metaphysics of the self is two-fold: First, there are
important reasons for rejecting the utilitarian approach to attribution of
responsibility, as well as the utilitarian basis for rights. These concerns
highlight a number of fundamental problems with utilitarian moral
theory99 and may explain the resurgence of deontological approaches to
moral °° and legal" 1 philosophy over the past quarter century.
Historically, for good reason, the Anglo-American legal system is
predominantly deontological in its approach to the issues discussed here.
We do not ask whether convicting someone will maximize net social
utility; we ask whether they were morally responsible when they
committed the act. We do not trade off important legal rights simply
because doing so would increase social utility; rights have a basis and
justification independent of their consequences. And while utilitarian
justifications may play a greater role in issues such as that of commodification, we still take questions of human identity seriously enough to seek
to protect, in a variety of ways, one's private self from the vicissitudes of
public life.
Second, utilitarian moral reasoning requires assessment of similar
issues as that of deontology. For example, asking whether a particular
act is deterrable is simply another way of inquiring into whether the
actor could have done other than he did-i.e. whether the agent acted
freely. Thus, utilitarian reasoning is often pleonastic on deontological
analysis. In sum, the self remains a necessary-indeed, a fundamental-postulate in moral and jurisprudential thought.

97. Dworkin popularized the idea of rights as "trumps."

See RONALD DWORKIN,

TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).

98. A utilitarian argument for any course of action depends upon the empirical
circumstances, which may vary from one context to another. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 5,
at 248-54 (considering and rejecting utilitarian responses to this in the context of punishment);
RAWLS, supra note 89, at 449-50 (utilitarian theory leads to indeterminacy and injustice
because of contingent nature of the good).
99. Perhaps the most important of these is that utilitarianism fails to take differences
between individuals seriously. Happiness can be traded off in interpersonal situations in a way
that might lead to serious injustice. The problem is a familiar one, and well exploited by
Rawls. RAWLS, supra note 89, at 26.
100. Id.; see generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (1972).
101. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 97; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
(1985); RICHARDS, supra note 58; CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978).
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORE SELF IN PHILOSOPHICAL

THOUGHT
A.

Philosophy or Psychology?: A Note on Method

Because the idea of the self has evolved over the course of various
intellectual epochs-different periods when the dominant modes of
explication were, respectively, religious, metaphysical and positivist-our
current understanding of the self stands as a kind of sedimentary record
of these past approaches and understandings. As such, the contemporary
notion of the self is essentially a multileveled patchwork quilt of issues
which make different assumptions and that may even have different
referents. l02
In contemporary thought, three prevailing modes of analysis make
their appearance in discussions of the self. These are the philosophical,
the psychological and the phenomenological approaches.0 3 The former
two modes are most dominant in Anglo-American intellectual culture."°4 Yet there is at best only a rough correspondence between the
philosophical and the psychological concepts of the self. The psychologist may talk in terms of instincts, needs, psychodynamic structures or
conditioned responses. The metaphysician or moral philosopher uses
older terms, often cast in dichotomous pairs-mind and body, rationality
and desire, freedom and determinism, or reason and experience. In
some cases, psychological constructs may replace philosophical concepts
in describing essentially similar phenomena. 05 In others, psychology

102. See infra Part VI.A.I., for a discussion of three distinct views of the self.
103. While neat lines cannot be drawn between those three approaches, by "philosophical" I mean attempts to understand the self in terms of general metaphysical and epistemological categories. It includes a concern with such issues as whether we are free or determined
and whether mind exists independently of the brain, etc. Psychology, on the other hand,
attempts to explain human behavior in terms of lawlike regularities from observable causes
to observable effects. Finally, the phenomenological approach seeks knowledge of the self
introspectively. See WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY chs. IX, X (Dover
Books 1950) (1890) (providing an example of the phenomenological approach to the self).
104. This is because phenomenological approaches have been rejected both by science,
which can only examine reality objectively in a manner which permits of inter-subjective
verification, and by analytic philosophy, the dominant school of philosophical thought in
England and America. Phenomenology is thus associated with the post-Husserlian continental
tradition.
105. For example, the stimulus-response theories of modern behaviorism are
sophisticated versions of the old empiricist associational psychology. See, e.g., DAVID HUME,
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE BOOK I (D.G.C. MacNabb ed., 1962) (1738) (discussing the
connection or association of ideas and the causes of belief, respectively in Book I, Part I. § IV;
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may simply appropriate older concepts, explicating them in terms more
consistent with the scientific worldview.' ° And in most cases, whether
the psychologist will admit it or not, ancient metaphysical and epistemological assumptions remain hidden just below the surface of even the
most scientific psychology."
The point here is that contemporary dialogue regarding the concept
of the self largely talks past itself. Rawls's explication of the selfl"
appears to be different from Abraham Maslow's,"° for example, not
simply by virtue of the different methodological assumptions made by
each thinker, but in terms of exactly to what each is referring. In turn,
legal thought is typically left betwixt and bewildered. From a jurisprudential standpoint, much of the analysis of the self appears to straddle
a vast gulf between traditional philosophical discourse and the quasiscientific language of psychology."0
These considerations make it clear that it is crucial to elucidate in
advance at what level the following discussion will proceed, and what its
assumptions and methods will be. This piece attempts to integrate the
philosophical and psychological modes of analysis relevant to an
examination of the concept of the self. In doing so, this Article seeks to
sketch a concept of the self that goes some way toward reconciling the
paradigmatic standpoints of philosophy and psychology, respectively.
This is necessary for a number of reasons. First, as previously
mentioned, modern psychology is in large part built upon the metaphysical and epistemological foundations laid by centuries of rationalist and
and Part III. § VII). See also JAMES, supra note 103 at 350-60 (discussing the associationist
theory of human identity).
106. Thus, Freud's theory of the unconscious follows and develops a concept with a
venerable philosophical lineage. LANCELOT V.WHITE, THE UNCONSCIOUS BEFORE FREUD
(1960). Similarly, Freud's concept of sublimation is traceable at least to Rousseau. Compare
SIGMUND FREUD, MOSES AND MONOTHEISM 148-56 (Katherine Jones trans., 1939) with JEAN
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE OR ON EDUCATION (Allen Bloom trans., 1979) (1762). Even
Maslow's overarching idea of self-actualization is a development of the Aristotelian idea of
self-perfection. See MASLOW, supra note 19. Compare ABRAHAM MASLOW, TOWARD A
PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (1968), with ARISTOTLE, supra note 21.
107. All science, even science grounded on the most positivistic foundations, makes
metaphysical assumptions (eg. regarding the nature of causality). Humanistic psychology is
grounded on older metaphysical and epistemological conceptions, from issues concerning the
way in which knowledge is attained, to ideas concerning freedom, rationality and health, etc.
Even "pure" positivistic behaviorism makes such assumptions.
108. See RAWLS, supra note 89, at 490-96 (discussing the principle of moral psychology);
id at 560-67 (on the unity of the self).
109. MASLOW, supra note 106, at 308 (describing his view of the self).
110. See MOORE, supra note 15 (attempting to reconcile modem science with the
traditional conception of the person).
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empiricist philosophy. One cannot truly understand modem psychology
without understanding the older philosophical questions inherent in
psychological issues. Indeed, the three main movements of modem
psychology can be viewed as recent extensions of three older, conflicting
philosophical traditions.'11 Second, jurisprudential thought concerning
the concept of the self is cast largely in the older, philosophical language;
yet, modern psychology has been increasingly influential in the law's
understanding of the causes of human behavior. 1

2

Thus, it is impor-

tant to develop a conception that is consonant with both modes of
discourse. Finally, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between
philosophical and psychological issues. For example, the concept of
authenticity has been developed both by existential philosophers and
humanistic psychologists.13 As such, it should be possible to work
toward certain truths from both an empirical and a philosophical
standpoint.
The concept of the core self is essentially a philosophical construct
that has been adopted by certain movements of modern psychology
while being rejected by others."' Insofar as the concept has its origin
in philosophical thought, and whereas the older philosophical tradition
continues to exert its influence in modem psychology, the discussion will
utilize the language of philosophy while attempting to incorporate the
insights and findings of modern psychology.
B. A Short History of the Core Self

The idea of the self has its roots deep in the pre-history of modern
religious and philosophical thought. The core self of traditional folk
psychology is represented by the common-sense notion that a person is,
in the most important sense, an entity who is causally and morally

111. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
112. This is particularly true in the criminal law where the deterministic paradigm of
modern psychology clashes, sometimes violently, with the voluntaristic notions of folk
psychology. See generally MOORE, supra note 28 (examining the deterministic conception of
exculpation in the criminal law).
113. See MASLOW, supra note 106, at 9-17 (discussing what psychologists can learn from
the existentialists). See id. at 11-13 (discussing the authentic self); See generally ERICH
FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941) (examining the ways in which persons attempt to
escape their freedom and authenticity by conforming to preexisting socially constructed
identities).
114. Humanistic psychology accepts the core self while behavioristic psychology rejects
it.
The third school of modern psychology, Freudian psychoanalytic theory, takes an
intermediate position by arguing that an ego develops which is largely at the mercy of
unconscious forces.
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independent of the world, a functional unity under its own control who
is the author of its own actions and who is, therefore, morally and legally
responsible for its actions.
The earliest precursors to our contemporary conception of the self
were closely associated with various religious notions of the spirit central
to animistic and pantheistic traditions. Nevertheless, these diverse
spiritual and cultural traditions generally did not draw the line between
inwardness and externality, subject and object, as we would today in the
West."' Even during the Golden Age of Greece there was no concept
of the self in the modern psychologized sense such that the Greeks
would have attached an indefinite article to the term." 6 Plato, for
example, argued that there was a kind of impersonal force animating all
living things, including human beings."7 His treatment of the faculty
of reason was the closest he came in his theory of human personality to
a concept approximating the modern sell"' Even this, however, left
out certain attributes essential to the modern idea of the self."9
Other traditions placed correspondingly greater emphasis on freedom
of will as a central aspect of human personality. The notion that each
person possesses a core self characterized by a kind of indivisible unity,
which is closely tied to the idea freedom of will," derives from other
philosophical sources. Stoicism, for example, placed great emphasis upon
the moral dimensions of the self, the inviolability of the human will, and
the pursuit of virtue.'' Stoicism was incorporated into the Christian
tradition through the thought of St. Augustine, particularly his emphasis
upon the perversity of the will and his otherworldly asceticism."

115.

CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY

111-12 (1989).
116. Id. at 113.
117. PLATO, Phaedo, in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns, eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1961).
118. See PLATO, The Republic, in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra note 117
(discussing the three elements of human personality); see TAYLOR, supra note 115, at 115-126
(describing Plato's view of reason and its significance for our own conception of the self).
119. Most particularly, the idea that each human being is essentially unique. See infra
Part III.C.4., for a discussion of this element of the core self.
120. See infra Part III.C.3., for a discussion of the concept of the indivisible nature of
the self.
121. See, e.g., Epictetus, Enchiridion,in 12 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD
105, 105-245 (George Lang trans., Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc. 1952) (providing a classic
statement on the issue and general philosophy of life by a later stoic).
122. On these issues I highly recommend Taylor's work. TAYLOR, supra note 115 at 14849. See also CHARLES KAHN, The Discovery of the Wilk From Aristotle to Aquinas, in THE
QUESTION OF ECLECTICISM (J.M. Dillon & A.A. Cong. eds., 1988).
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Western thought was also influenced by highly refined philosophical
conceptions of the self central to certain strains of early Indian philosophy as manifest in the Vedas."2 These influences distinguished the self
from human personality in the empirical sense (i.e., from an individual's
particular psychological dispositions, qualities, habits, and desires, etc.),
associating it with what we would today call pure consciousness without
an object. 24 Such conceptions presaged modem idealist conceptions,
such as Kant's noumenal self, developed some twenty-five hundred years
later. " This anti-individualistic tradition, which was transmitted to preAugustinian Christianity via the philosophical mysticism of Plotinus,
among others, embraced a thorough-going monism which rejected the
dichotomy between subject and object, self and world."2
These diverse intellectual currents eventually coalesced into the still
vague notion of the immortal soul inherited by early Christianity. It was
only with the thought of St. Augustine that the religious conception of
the immortal soul began to be transformed into the more familiar
philosophical idea of the person as a psychological entity, a form of
subjectivity distinct from the objective world with all the moral and
epistemological implications of such a view.127 Descartes completed the
transition to the modern conception of the self by linking soul, mind, and
consciousness, and by characterizing these as aspects of a single
substance distinct from the body and the material world." This set
the stage for modem psychology by laying the12 9philosophical foundation
for the study of the mind as a discrete entity.
123. See SWAMI AJAYA, PH.D., PSYCHOTHERAPY EAST AND WEST: A UNIFYING
PARADIGM 11-18 (1983) (discussing the reductionistic, humanistic, dualistic, and monistic
paradigms of human personality). See id. at 17-18 (giving an overview of the monistic
Vedantic view, which holds that all creation is a manifestation of one consciousness).
124. For an intriguing intellectual and personal account of the recent experiences of a
western philosopher with this idea, see FRANKLIN MERRELL-WOLFF, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT AN OBJECr (1983).

See also W.T. STACE, MYSTICISM AND

PHILOSOPHY 161-178 (providing a thorough-going philosophical assessment of mysticism and
the idea of the transcendental self). It should be observed that this tradition is diametrically
in contrast with another school of thought in the West, originating with Franz Brentano, which
holds that all consciousness must be "intentional," i.e. that it must have an object. For this
school of thought, consciousness without an object is a philosophical impossibility.
125. KANT, supra note 85.
126.

WILLIAM INGE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINUS (2 vols. 1929).

127. SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 272-73 (Vernon J. Bourke trans., Fathers of the
Church 1953).
128. RENP_ DESCARTES, supra note 13, at 27-33.
129. See infra notes 131-134 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the philosophical
origins of the three movements of modern psychology. Descartes was the first truly modern
philosopher and established not only the modern rationalist tradition, but set the stage for the
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During the two and a half centuries between the death of Descartes
in 1650 and the rise of modern psychology, two opposed philosophical
movements vied with one another and together laid the groundwork for
modem psychology. First, the rise of empiricism, particularly in the
thought of David Hume, challenged the earlier rationalist assumptions
of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, among others.'30 The empiricist
attack on the self followed from its more general rejection of the notion
of substance. Second, from the end of the eighteenth and through the
nineteenth century, various strains of modem romanticism, idealism, and
transcendentalism reasserted the defense of the self, placing greater
emphasis than ever before upon the emotional, aesthetic, and spiritual
(as opposed to religious) aspects of human identity.'
Modem
existentialism, with its affirmation of the self as the basis of all norms
and standards, is perhaps the most well-endowed heir to nineteenth
century romanticism and idealism.
In a significant way, the three movements of modem psychology are
continuations of these older intellectual traditions. Twentieth century
behaviorism is the direct descendant of empiricism, from Locke's tabula
rasa theory of human personality 33 to recent empiricist atiacks on the
concept of mind as an unobservable entity." Freudian thought, on the
other hand, draws heavily from the romantic and rationalist tradi'
tions. 35
Finally, humanistic psychology draws its inspiration from a
combination of sources ranging from romantic and existentialist thought,
to the humanistic philosophy of the Renaissance, to the moral psycholo-

empiricist response.
130. See infra Part IV.B., for an examination of the empiricist attack on the notions of
substance and self.
131. See, e.g., RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self Reliance, in SELECTED ESSAYS, LECTURES
AND POEMS (Robert D. Richardson ed., 1990) (providing a classic statement of American
transcendentalism); see also TAYLOR, supranote 115, at 355-67 (discussing the romantic return
to the natural) and 368-90 (examining the "radical individuation of expressivism"). The
romantic element in Mill's liberalism is most evident in the third chapter of On Liberty. MILL,
supra note 53, at 119-40.
132. Maslow, among others, draws this connection. See MASLOW, supra note 106, at 10
(discussing the collapse of external sources of value). Camus's "absurd man" illustrates well
the predicament of the agent who cannot draw the basis for choice outside of himself.
CAMUS, supra note 3, at 49-68.
133.

JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Richard Taylor

ed., 1974) (1689).
134. See generally GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949) (arguing that mental
language is a kind of "category mistake").
135. ERICH FROMM, SIGMUND FREUD'S MISSION: AN ANALYSIS OF HIS PERSONALITY
AND INFLUENCE 115 (1959).
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gy of John Stuart Mill.136

The core self which emerged from this eclectic intellectual lineage
became the moral-psychological edifice of modern political philosophy
and legal thought. It is the self-reliant individual of the common law and
the autonomous subject of modem liberal thought. And while the
modem psychologized self may no longer be viewed to possess the mark
of immortality, it nevertheless does embody a number of constituent
components, evident throughout the evolution of the concept of the self,
that are essential to contemporary jurisprudential thought.
C The Elements of the Core Self
The core self of traditional folk psychology is free, rational, and a
functional unity that is unique or authentic in its individuality. While all
of these attributes are intimately intertwined as aspects of the core self
such that some or all are interdependent upon one another-for
example, being rational may depend upon being free, and being free may
depend upon being a functional unity137 -each element of the core self
nevertheless has a distinct function and meaning in traditional folk
psychology.
1. Freedom of the Will
The first element of the core self is personal freedom, or what is
popularly known as freedom of the will. Generally, philosophers have
staked out four possible positions regarding the issue of freedom of the
will: (1) metaphysical libertarianism (which holds that persons possess
genuine freedom of the will), (2) hard determinism (which holds that
human actions are causally determined and, thus, unfree), (3) soft
determinism (which attempts to salvage freedom of the will while

136. See Hill, supra note 6, at 174-176 (discussing the links between romanticism,
existentialism, and humanistic psychology); see MASLOW, supra note 106, at 9-17 (arguing that
humanistic psychology has much to learn from existentialism).
137. Being rational depends upon freedom of the will in the sense that our conclusions
must be directed by the logic of our beliefs, thoughts and values, etc., rather than by causal
antecedents. For example, the behaviorist claim that all of our decisions are the product of
a stimulus-response mechanism underlying human behavior is not simply an attack on
traditional ideas of freedom, but of rationality as well insofar as this implies that our choices
and acts are not the result of conscious reflection and deliberation.
Similarly, personal freedom depends upon the psyche being a functional unity in that, if
the subject is fragmented, as Freud would maintain, for example, there is no central core
which is making the decisions. Rather, the psyche is represented by a kind of war among its
constituent components. To put it differently, there must be one undivided will standing
above the tensions of personality which ultimately judges, chooses and acts accordingly.
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conceding the truth of determinism), and (4) indeterminism (a minority
position which maintains that human actions are completely uncaused). 38
Defenders of the core self theory typically adopt either a libertarian
or a soft determinist position regarding the question of personal freedom.
The libertarian position argues that even if the rest of the natural world
falls within the web of causal necessity, human acts are uncaused or,
perhaps more appropriately, caused only by the self.'3 9

Thus, the

boundaries of the self represent a kind of barrier to external causation;
decisions and acts are not the inevitable consequence of a chain
sequence of causes and events reaching back to the beginning of time.
Rather, human choices and acts emanate from the self and the self is, in
some ultimate metaphysical sense, insulated from the world of external
causality.
Other exponents of the core self, particularly those influenced by the
paradigm of scientific naturalism, frequently adopt the soft determinist
stance."1 The soft determinist position, which holds that only constrained, coerced, or compelled acts are unfree, requires its adherents to
distinguish between acts that are merely caused from those that are so
constrained. This line between causation and constraint typically
parallels the line between the internal and the external: soft determinists
hold, following Aristotle, that only external factors can be constraining.141 Thus, the move to soft determinism raises a number of notoriously intractable difficulties with respect to drawing the boundary
line
42
between the internal and the external, the self and the world.
Asserting that a particular act is free is simply another way of

138. See RICHARD TAYLOR, METAPHYSICS 39-57 (2nd ed. 1974) (discussing the various
positions philosophers have taken on this issue); see WILLIAM JAMES, The Dilemma of
Determinism, in THE WRITINGS OF WILLIAM JAMES (John McDermott ed., 1977) (inventing
the terms "hard" and "soft" determinism and arguing for the indeterminist response).
139. C.A. Campbell, Has the Self Free Will?, in REASON AND RESPONSIBILITY (Joel
Feinberg ed., 1971); Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life in FIFTY READINGS
IN PHILOSOPHY (Donald C. Abel ed., 1994).
140. See infra notes 165-169 an accompanying text, for a discussion of soft determinism.
141. Because the soft determinist believes that all actions are determined, he can salvage
freedom only by defining it as opposed to constraint. This was Hobbes', Hume's, and Mill's
solution; among others.
142. If all constraining influences are considered external in the sense that they compel
the subject to do something he really does not choose to do, then even desires, physical
influences, and passions-things which we normally view to be "inside" the person-may be
"external" in the philosophical sense discussed here. Thus, the debate between empiricists
such as Hobbes and idealists such as Schoepenhauer centers around whether desire is
necessary to or antithetical to freedom. Neeley, supra note 88.
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maintaining that it is a product of the self, rather than an effect of the
external world. Consequently, a great deal of contemporary debate
among legal commentators concerns such issues as whether personal
values, beliefs and goals, which are the result of social influences, are
truly part of, or authentic to, the self. Consider the controversy
concerning whether the decision to become a prostitute or a surrogate
mother is truly free (so that such contracts should not be voided on
quasi-paternalistic grounds). Such debates usually boil down to alternate
constructions of the self, with radical feminists construing social
influences, values, and desires as an external imposition, a product of
heteronomous social influences, while libertarians and soft determinists
take the view that they are usually an internal part of the self.14 Thus,
freedom of the will is not only an attribute of the core self of traditional
humanism, but there can be no coherent notion of freedom ' of the will
without a corresponding notion of the self from which this freedom
flows. Moreover, without personal freedom, it is doubtful whether there
is any philosophical basis for political liberty. Free will is the connecting
link between our conception of human personality and political liberty.
2. Rationality
The element of rationality is also central to the concept of the core
self. Since at least the time of Plato, western philosophy has drawn a
distinction between two components of human nature-the rational and
the volitional. 44 The rational side of human nature is characterized by
the capacity for knowing, while the volitional is the propensity to act in
accordance with one's choices. Beginning with Aristotle, most philoso-

143. The feminist analysis of the social construction of the will points up this difference.
See, e.g., COREA, supra note 72; NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING:
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978) (providing examples of the view
that female identity is a product of pervasive social influences in a way that precludes certain
choices as being viewed as free). The libertarian follows the Hobbesian (and ultimately the
Aristotelian) line in viewing desires, beliefs, and values as internal to the person. Radical
feminists such as Catherine MacKinnon appear to hold that insofar as these desires are the
product of social influences, they are external. This view has the ultimate implication that
nothing is authentic to the individual insofar as all desires originate, in some sense, in the
external world. See infra Part IV.C., for an examination of the modern concept of
authenticity.
144. Plato actually divides human personality into three components: (1) reason, (2) the
passions (e.g. courage), and (3) the appetites. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, supra note 117. The
latter two are aspects of our volitional side while reason must control them. Nevertheless, for
Plato, reason also plays a role in our motivational system. See infra Part V.B.1., for a
comparison between Plato and Hume on this point.
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phers have argued that one can act freely without acting rationally.145
Nevertheless, rationality is generally viewed to be essential in acting
effectively in carrying out one's choices, and in determining one's plans
in the first place. Consequently, even those views of the self that exhibit
outright contempt for the classical ideal of rationality, such as those
influenced by nineteenth century romanticism, have nevertheless placed
great emphasis upon self-insight as a means to self-fulfillment in the
broader spiritual sense."
There are a plethora of issues which remain unresolved concerning
the nature of rationality. Perhaps the most important of these is the
debate between followers of Hume and Plato concerning whether reason
is subordinate to the passions, playing merely an instrumental role in
carrying out desires, or whether reason has a role in prioritizing our
values and desires. 47 Defenders of the core self have staked out
various positions on the continuum between Plato and Hume.'8 While
an overview of this problem is beyond the scope of this Article, a few
words about the minimum content of rationality are in order.
The core self theory requires minimally that persons act from reasons
that they understand. This entails two things. First, it requires that
decisions result from conscious reflection or deliberation, rather than as
an automatic response to external conditions. Again, as with personal
freedom, the sine qua non of rationality is that decisions must come from
within and not from without. Second, persons must understand what
their motivations are in acting in a particular way, or in desiring or
valuing a particular thing. For the defender of the core self, rationality
requires not simply that reason operate logically and efficiently from
desire or choice on one hand, to action on the other. In addition, it
requires that the person be clear about what it is that is really motivating
her.

145. ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, bk VII, ch. 3 (insisting that the incontinent man can act
knowingly). Plato's extreme rationalism led him to take the opposite view that no one ever
knowingly does evil.
146. These rationalistic undercurrents are evident in Freud's work, in his claim that a
kind of freedom is gained through self-discovery in the process of psychoanalysis. See FROMM,
SIGMUND FREUD'S MISSION 115 (1959) (discussing the rationalist tendencies in Freud's
thought).
147. Compare PLATO, supra note 117, with HUME, supra note 105, bk.II, pt.III, § II
(stating that reason can never be a moving force in human action).
148. For example, Mill takes a position intermediate to Plato and Hume, describing
personal freedom as requiring a kind of rationalized desire. See RICHARD LINDLEY,
AUTONOMY 44-62 (1986) (describing Mill's view of the relationship between reason and
desire).
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Thus, behaviorism and psychoanalytic thought pose two distinct
threats corresponding to the two minimum requirements of rationality.
Behaviorist theory holds that conscious thought plays no mediating role
in human acts. For the behaviorist, we do not deliberate, reason and
decide; rather, we simply respond by conditioning to certain stimuli. 49
For behaviorists and social learning theorists, among others, conscious
reflection is at best an epiphenomenon, an ephemeral experience which
has no causal significance in the production of behavior.15
Freudian and neo-Freudian psychoanalytic thought challenges the
second minimum requirement for rationality. It holds that the great bulk
of our motivations lie beyond the realm of conscious reflection, a
function of unconscious psychodynamic forces. 51 For this reason
among others, Freudian thought poses a definite rebuke to the pretensions of those who would defend the core self.
3. The Self as a Functional Unity
Yet another element of the core self theory is that the person
embodies a functional unity, that there is only one self, and that this self
is not so hopelessly fragmented that there is at best only a tenuous
connection between the fragments. The notion of functional unity is the
secularized and psychologized descendant of the immortal soul. Just as
the immortal soul represented the moral unity of the person in JudeoChristian theology, so too, the modern psychologized core self is the ego,
the unitary decision-maker who is responsible for the acts of the agent.
This is not to say that the core self theory denies that persons experience
conflict between different desires, goals, plans, and values. It is to say,
however, that there is a unified process of decision-making which sorts
out and weighs which values and goals will take precedence. In sum,
there is a central decision-maker who experiences the conflict between
149. SKINNER, supra note 67, at 1-23 (arguing that mental language is the residue of a
pre-scientific psychology). For the behaviorist, thoughts, beliefs, desires, intentions and
goals-in sum, all mental constructs--can be explained in behavioral terms. There are, minimally, two problems with this view. First no behaviorist has been successful in reducing
mental constructs to behavior. This is evident in Skinner's attempt to describe thinking as
covert behavior. SKINNER, supra note 8, at 114. Second, behaviorism claims that, at best,
mental qualia or "raw feels"-the subjective feeling of thinking, deliberating, and wishing-are
nothing but epiphenomenal side effects of brain processes. They have no causally mediating
role in behavior. Yet this does not comport with experience. See Hill, supra note 8, at 155-61
(discussing these problems in greater detail).
150. SKINNER, supra note 6, at 19.
151. See Hill, supra note 6, at 140-144 (discussing Freud's view of reason and freedom
in light of the importance in psychoanalytic theory played by the unconscious).
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competing choices, who makes the decision, and who is responsible for
the consequences.
The central idea underlying the concept of the unity of the self is the
notion that there is a will that stands over and above one's various, often
conflicting desires. The core self theory holds that the rational will
weighs and evaluates these desires and determines whether and when to
gratify them. Thus, the will is viewed to be separate and independent of
the passions and motivating forces of the appetitive side of human
nature.'52
At least as far back as Hume, this view of the person began to be
challenged. The empiricist attack on the core self theory typically
commences with precisely the observation that there is no abstract will
over and above the passions; there are only the passions themselves.153
Thus, the empiricist criticized traditional rationalist discussions of
freedom of the will as engaging in a deceptive reification.
A telling example of the difference in views is represented by two
competing notions regarding human experience in resisting temptation.
Where proponents of the core self, following a rationalist philosophical
psychology, view the overcoming of temptation as an instance of the will
resisting a powerful desire, and might describe it as not giving in to
desire, the empiricist explains the same outcome by analyzing resistance
to temptation as a conflict between two competing desires-one to have
the desired object and the other to avoid the negative consequences of
giving in. For the empiricist critic of the core self, there is no unified
arbiter standing over and above the warfare of conflicting desires; there
are only conflicting desires. As the behaviorist B.E Skinner argued,
following the empiricist tradition, the concept of the self has led many
to believe in a functional unity of the person which simply does not
exist.'-'
4. The Essential Uniqueness of the Self
Finally, the fourth element of the core self theory is the idea that
each individual is essentially unique. By "essential," I mean not simply
that each individual is different from all other persons with respect to
152. Interestingly, John Stuart Mill is closer to Plato than to Hume and other fellow
empiricists. For Mill, there is a will that deliberates and stands apart from one's desires. This
places him in company with the deontological liberals described by Sandel. See LINDLEY,
supra note 147, at 44-62 (discussing Mill's view of the will).
153. HUME, supra note 106, bk. H, pt. III (examining the relationship between the
passions and the will).
154.

B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 285-86 (1953).
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some relevant personal characteristics, but that this uniqueness is what
makes each person that person. To put it differently, each person's
uniqueness springs from internal sources, rather than external conditions.
One's essence is a function of one's character, quiddity, even one's soul,
and thus has been interpreted alternatively in theological, moral, and
psychological terms by religious, secular, and romantic philosophers,
respectively.155 In sum, this essentially is who we are at our most basic.
A number of modern philosophical movements have given this idea
a central place in their respective notions of personhood, intertwining
this concept of uniqueness with the idea of authenticity. From continental romanticism to German idealism to American transcendentalism to
twentieth century existentialism and psychological humanism, we have
inherited the idea that there is an authentic core to human personality
which must be followed, lived, and nurtured, or else lost forever." 6
Romanticism connects this notion to the idea of the natural (to be
oneself is the only way to be truly natural) while various forms of
idealism, including American transcendentalism, connect authenticity to
epistemological certainty and moral perfection. In Emerson's words:
To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you
in your private heart is true for all men-that is genius. Speak
your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for the
inmost in due time becomes the outmost, and our first thought is

155. While traditional theology locates this essence in one's spiritual nature, modem
notions of "identity" and authenticity locate our uniqueness in a core being separate from, and
not created by, the world. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 51, at 124 (arguing that one whose
impulses are his own is said to have a character, while those who merely parrot social
convention do not).
156. Mill, for example, argued that "society has now got the better of individuality.
." and worried that not following one's own impulses leads to the situation in which, "by
dint of not following their own nature, they have no nature to follow; their human capacities
are withered and starved; they become incapable of any strong wishes or pleasures; and are
generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth. .. " Id. at 125-26. Compare
Maslow, describing our inner nature:
5. Since this inner nature is good or neutral rather than bad, it is best to bring
it out and to encourage it rather than to suppress it. If it is permitted to
guide our life, we grow healthy, fruitful, and happy.
6. If this essential core of the person is denied or suppressed, he gets sick
sometimes in obvious ways, sometimes in subtle ways, sometimes immediately, sometimes later.
7. This inner nature is not strong and overpowering and unmistakable like the
instincts of animals. It is weak and delicate and subtle and easily overcome
by habit, cultural pressure, and wrong attitudes toward it.
MASLOW, supra note 106, at 4. Thus, this represents a psychological turn on the philosophy
of the core self.
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rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment. 57
Finally psychological humanism links the idea of authenticity to health,
happiness, and even self-actualization, which is a kind of psychological
perfection for the humanist. 8 For all of these traditions, the only
noble life is one lived in accordance with one's essential uniqueness.
Authenticity, as a condition of the self in purest contact with itsel
is typically aligned with nature; social influences are the enemy.
Conformity threatens to crush the individual's nascent essence, to
overwhelm and snuff out that "tender plant" that is the authentic self
This view of human nature was central to Mill's defense of liberalism, in
which he fused a curious but compelling combination of romanticism
with Aristotelian notions by equating individuality, self-development, and
genius, and opposing these to conformity, stagnation, and mediocrity."9
One interesting thing to note about this idea of essential uniqueness is
that it appears to embody a kind of oxymoron. Uniqueness is a
condition of particularity while the concept of essence is closely linked
with universalist metaphysics. The apparent contradiction, however,
merely underscores the singular and central importance of the individual
in romanticism and expressivism which have, in turn, influenced
contemporary conceptions of the core self. The point is that each
individual, unique among all others, is not simply unique in virtue of
some accidental confluence of external contingencies. Even the
behaviorist could maintain that we are all unique insofar as we all are
the products of different sets of environmental conditions, though this
uniqueness would not be essential. Rather, who we are at our most
fundamental springs from an internal source; moreover, we must follow
the dictates of this source in order to become who we are.
IV. THE ATrACK ON THE CORE SELF

The attack on the core self is an inevitable consequence of the
modem worldview, which is itself fundamentally deterministic, materialistic, and empiricist in its assumptions. Each of these philosophical
perspectives has led modern thought to its own respective kind of

157. EMERSON, supra note 131, at 148.
158. See generally MASLOW, supra note 106 (providing Maslow's discussion of the
consequences to our health of frustrating this core self).
159. See generally, MILL, supra note 53, at 119-40 (providing Mill's discussion of human
personality as it relates to freedom); G.W. Smith, Social Liberty and Free Agency: Some
Ambiguities in Mill's Conception of Freedom, in J.S. MILL "ON LIBERTY" IN Focus (John
Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991) (surveying Mill's view of the self).
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reductionism. Determinism collapses the internal into the external.
Empiricism reduces the subject to mere objects of thought, leaving an
empty void at the center of the person. Materialism leaves no place for
the realm of the mental at all. Finally, modern behaviorism and social
learning theory, the psychological cornerstones of much recent social
thought, argue that all behavior is a function of external conditioning and
that, again, there is nothing of substance at the center of human
personality. Let us examine each of these modes of reductionism.
A.

Causal Reductionism: The Implications of Determinism

In its essentials, the doctrine of determinism holds that every
occurrence in the world is necessitated by a set of antecedent causal
factors. Determinism holds that only one particular effect can follow
from a particular cause or set of causes, and that this effect follows
necessarily from its causes." The deterministic worldview depicts a
chain of causes moving backward in time indefinitely161 and forward
eternally, such that each natural occurrence is but a necessary link in the
fabric of reality that could not have been other than as it was.
The paradigm of classical science, as in Newtonian physics,
presupposes the truth of determinism insofar as science seeks to explain
and predict natural phenomena by assuming the existence of causal
laws. 62 Today all sciences; with the possible exception of quantum

160. See TAYLOR, supra note 138, at 39-42 (2d ed. 1974) (providing a general overview
of determinism and its implications for human behavior, including its moral implications).
Numerous great philosophers have embraced the doctrine of determinism; these include
Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Jonathan Edwards, Schoepenhauer, and Mill, among others. See
also Richard Taylor, Determinism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY vol. II 359 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1969) (providing a general and historical discussion of the various kinds of
determinism-ethical, logical, theological, physical, and psychological-and the various
positions taken by philosophers on the issue). See generally ROY WEATHERFORD, THE
IMPLICATIONS OF DETERMINISM (1991) (discussing types of determinism and the physical,
psychological, moral, and culturations implications of the doctrine).
161. This raises the issue of whether there is a first cause of the universe. Metaphysicians appear to be confronted with a strong dilemma. Determinism implies that each event
is preceded by a cause which necessitates this event. This appears to entail either that there
was no first cause-that time has no beginning-or that there was a first cause which was not
itself caused.
162. Scientific hypotheses may be evaluated by reference to five criteria: (1) relevance,
(2) testability, (3) "compatibility with previously well-established hypotheses," (4) "predictive
or explanatory power," and (5) simplicity, or elegance of the theory. IRVING M. COPI,
INTRODUCION TO LOGIC 488-92 (7th 1986).

The deterministic assumption is centrally important to the fourth criterion; predictability
requires that the scientist can expect certain results under certain conditions. Deterministic
causality is the necessary component in such an understanding of the universe. The
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physics, are predicated upon deterministic assumptions.' 6' The mode
of causal determinacy may vary from one science to another, or within
different schools of the same science. For example, within psychology,
behaviorists maintain that human behavior is caused by environmental
conditioning; while Freudians hold that human behavior results from a
matrix of biological and psychodynamic factors; while neurobiologists
argue that all behavior is explainable in terms of brain states, which are
in turn reducible to the laws of chemistry and, perhaps, physics. All of
these theories are deterministic, but appeal to different levels of
ontology.164 In general, contemporary determinists are material
reductionists, 16 though again, one can be a determinist without being

assumption that the universe operates in deterministic fashion is also relevant to a number of
the other criteria. For example, for a hypothesis to be testable, the scientist must be able to
expect that any experiment performed under similar conditions will yield similar results. Were
determinism not true, the scientist could not expect this uniformity of result.
It should be noted, finally, that while the deterministic assumption underlies scientific
explanation, determinism is not itself a scientific hypothesis. The reason for this is that
determinism is not a testable hypothesis, at least not in the usual sense. To be testable, some
set of conditions must be specified that would in practice disverify a particular hypothesis. But
disverification of the determinist hypothesis itself is impossible because the defender of
determinism can always claim that some other unknown law or hidden variable accounts for
the apparent failure of the deterministic hypothesis.
163. Quantum physics operates on the basis of complex probabilistic assumptions
concerning the behavior of sub-atomic particles. Einstein rejected this probabilistic account
saying, "God does not play dice [with the universe]." TIMOTHY FERRIS, COMING OF AGE IN
THE MILKY WAY 290 (1988).
164. Thus, different schools of psychology literally have different ontological assumptions-assumptions about what they are studying, and what exists. The humanistic
psychologist may believe that mental states and entities exist as scientifically, though indirectly,
observable phenomena, while behaviorists deny the existence of such states.
165. Materialist reductionism holds that all phenomena are reducible to physical
processes or entities. In the realm of psychology, this means that all mental entities-selves,
consciousness, desires, and beliefs-are reducible to, and explainable by, reference to brain
states. As such, for the reductionist, mental states do not exist. They are at most a shorthand
way of talking about brain states.
For the reductionist, causal laws must be explicated in physicalist terms. For example,
beliefs do not cause intentions, which in turn cause behavior. Rather, certain brain states
(corresponding to beliefs) are causally related to other brain states (intentions) which in turn
cause certain behavior.
In more general fashion, the reductionist believes that the laws of psychology are
reducible to those of biology, while biology again can be reduced to chemistry, and chemistry
to foundational physics. An alternative view, and one that I shall argue for later, is the idea
of ontological emergence, or the idea that each ontological level is not reducible to lower,
more foundational levels, but that each represents a new layer of reality each layer of which
is ontologically distinct and causally non-reducible.
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a reductionist."
It is when applied to persons, of course, that the doctrine of
determinism has its most unsettling implications. The argument is so
familiar to even the most casual student of philosophy as to warrant only
the most cursory overview: if all human actions are the product of
causally antecedent factors and conditions, then ultimately, choice is an
illusion. To have a choice requires that, in any given situation, a person
could have acted differently had he or she so chosen. Since determinism
holds that only the act that did happen could have happened, the
counterfactual nature of choice is illusory. Free will, it seems, must go
the way of the witch.
Libraries are stocked with what has been written by way of response
to this problem. This Article does not presume to provide an overview
of this literature. Rather, it seeks first to demonstrate exactly how
determinism is a challenge to the theory of the core self and, second, to
argue that the compatibilist or soft determinist response may preserve
the concept of the self while raising a host of other questions about the
nature of the internal/external dichotomy.
Determinism does not pose a challenge to the core self simply
because determinism may negate the case for free will, where free will
is itself a basic element of the core self. The determinist worldview
constitutes a much more basic assault on the notion of the self insofar as
determinism plays havoc with any principled distinction which might be
drawn between the internal and the external worlds. Determinism
provides not only that everything we do is a function of antecedent
causes, but that everything we are is a function of these causes, and is
thus a product of the external world. If determinism is true, then there
may be no principled way of including some aspects of our nature as part
of who we are in some essential way, while excluding others.
Let us take an example. In responding to the argument from
determinism, the novice defender of free will will focus on one part of
the causal matrix, for example, the environment, and ignore the others.
She will point out that not everybody who grows up in the ghetto, for
example, becomes a criminal. This must prove, she will argue, that there
is some free will which accounts for the difference between the criminal
and the success story who escapes ghetto life. The response, of course,
is that there are other differences between these two cases-different
166. Indeed, one can be a spiritual or idealistic determinist. This piece will argue for a
kind of non-reductionistic determinism, though we will see that determinism begins to look
very differently at different levels of ontology. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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family situations, disparate levels of ability, even different physiological
influences on behavior. Differences in these other factors as causal
antecedents of human behavior explain the two different denouements.
The novice may object that still more fundamental reasons exist why
one succeeds and the other does not, including superior character traits,
higher motivational levels, and different personalities. It is by virtue of
these presumably internal conditions that one is justifiably more
successful than the next. The determinist will respond by blandly
pointing out that these, too, are products of the matrix of causally
antecedent factors. Personality, motivation, even what we call character
are equally products of a host of still more remote causal antecedents,
including the neuro-physiological conditions responsible for psychological
traits such as intelligence, motivation, and orientation to the world. 167
The more "inside" the defender of free will goes to salvage the internal
standpoint, the more the determinist will persist in pointing out that even
these "subjective" aspects of the self are reducible to the laws of biology,
chemistry, and physics. As a result of the all-consuming nature of
determinism, the internal-at least in one sense of the word "internal"-disappears into a point. It is exactly this scenario which led Kant
to posit a noumenal self beyond the phenomenal world as the only
means of escaping the web of causality and preserving human freedom.
Determinism trumps the claims of the core self precisely by
undermining the distinction on which it depends between the internal
and the external. It is here that the compatibilist or soft determinist
response is relevant. The soft determinist maintains that freedom is
opposed only to constraint, not to causation."6 If a person acts from
167. As Taylor has put it:
By the thesis of determinism, however, everything whatever is caused, and not one
single thing could ever be other than exactly what it is: perhaps one thinks that the
kleptomaniac and the drunkard did not have to become what they are, that they
could have done better at another time and thereby ended up better than they are
now, or that the hero could have done worse and then ended up a coward. But this
only shows an unwillingness to understand what made then become as they are.
Having found that their behavior is caused from within them, we can hardly avoid
asking what caused these inner springs of activity, and then asking what were the
causes of these causes, and so on through the infinite past.
TAYLOR, supra note 138, at 40-41.
168. Taylor observes that the soft determinist makes the following three claims: (1) that
determinism is true and all behavior is causally determined; (2) that behavior is free to the
extent that it is not externally constrained; and (3) that in the absence of external constraints,
the causes of human behavior are internal. Id. at 48. For representative samples of those
who have held this position, see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 127-28 (Penguin ed., 1968)
(1651); DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 90-111 (Charles
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her desires or motivations, values or beliefs, this is all it means to be
free, according to the compatibilist. Indeed, the compatibilist argues that
nothing else could be meant by "freedom" than the ability to act in
accordance with one's desires. 69
The hard determinist responds that acting in accordance with desires
and other internal motives which are themselves causally determined is
a pallid sense of "freedom." They argue that freedom is being salvaged
here only by redefining the term in a manner that leaves little of the
original70 importance of the term as used in the robust libertarian
sense.

1

What is significant about the compatibilist position for our purposes,
however, is the way in which it redefines our understanding of the
boundary between the internal and the external from a causal to a
psychological sense. In essence, though all that we are and do is external
in the sense that each emanates from causal sources outside of the sel,
there is still an "internal" world in the sense that the person adopts
of his
certain values, goals, desires, and beliefs, making them a function
71
or her core identity in some psychologically relevant sense.
To illustrate, let us examine the distinction between the situation in
which one individual commits a crime while under duress, while another
commits the same crime as the direct causal result of having grown up
in a poor environment. Both the hard and soft determinist will agree
that both persons' conduct was the result of causal factors which
necessitated both crimes. The hard determinist will argue, as a result,
that neither person was free in committing the act, and consequently,
that each is not responsible for the crime. The soft determinist, on the
other hand, distinguishes between the two cases not simply because the
victim of the poor environment was not constrained in the morally
relevant sense, but because he acted from internal motives-values,
beliefs, desires, and intentions-which are a part of who he is, notwithstanding the arguably external origin of these motives and beliefs.
Hendel ed., 1955) (1758); JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC: RATIOCINATIVE AND
INDUCTIVE 413 (1843); A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1976).

169.

"For a Voluntary Act is that which proceedeth from the will, and no other."

HOBBES, supra note 168, at 127-28.

170. Taylor attacks the soft determinist position by imagining a scenario where an
"ingenious physiologist" wires a person in such a manner so as to be able to dictate the agent's
desires, goals, and values. Taylor points out that, on the soft determinist account, the person
would be called "free," though intuitively we would not view such behavior as free. TAYLOR,
supra note 138, at 50-51. See infra notes 167-170 and accompanying text, for an examination
of Taylor's objection at greater length.
171. See infra Part VI.A.2., for a discussion of internalization and self-integration.
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Imagine a very different situation. Let us momentarily examine an
important aspect of the feminist case against the enforcement of certain
kinds of agreements (e.g., surrogate mother agreements) on the ground
that women who have entered such agreements have not done so freely.
The argument provides that, because prospective surrogates have made
their choices in accordance with a system of beliefs, values, and goals
which are socially constructed, they are not truly authentic. They have
come to view themselves as limited to roles in which they perform
sexual, procreative, or nurturing services such that their very world of
choices and, more importantly, their identity, is a function of these
traditional social roles. In sum, according to a prevalent feminist critique
of such agreements, the decision to become a surrogate is not free
insofar as it is a result of a socially imposed system of beliefs and
values.'7
Note that the feminist construction of freedom here is essentially
that of the hard determinist; because the surrogate acts from socially
imposed motives which are causally responsible for her decision, her act
cannot really be free. What is significant here is that this argument also
entails that no one else is free insofar as we all act from motives which
are socially imposed. In sum, there appears to be no way to distinguish
the surrogate's decision from anybody else's. It is this consequence of
the hard determinist position that leads the soft determinist to dismiss
arguments based on the social construction of the will, along with the
parallel claim of the defendant from the poor social background.
The soft determinist's intuition that the person who grows up in a
certain environment is free in a way that the victim of duress or
compulsion is not-that the two situations are psychologically and
morally distinguishable-provides an insight as to a new way of
distinguishing the internal from the external. In order to make the
distinction coherent, however, two things must be done. First, we must
find a principle for making this distinction. In other words, how are we
to distinguish the internal from the external? More particularly, under
what conditions do certain values, goals, beliefs, and desires become ours
in the relevant psychological sense? Second, we must show that this
distinction has some moral relevance. If we assume that all human
actions are the product of causally antecedent factors, then on what basis
can we hold that we are responsible for some acts while not being

172. See, eg., CHODOROW, supra,note 143, at 205-09 (providing an in-depth analysis of
the process of surrogate motherhood).
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responsible for others? We will address these questions in Part VI.
B. Epistemic Reductionism: The EmpiricistAttack on the Self as
Substance
In the most basic sense, "empiricism" is a general term used to
designate a variety of related views holding that knowledge is gained
through experience, not reason. 73 From its roots in classical antiquity,
modern empiricism in a weak sense was revived by Locke, and
progressively refined by Berkeley, Hume, Mill, and the logical positivists
of the twentieth century, with increasingly skeptical, often radical,
consequences. 174
The empiricist critique of the concept of the self parallels its attack
on the notion of substance. For the empiricist, both concepts of
substance and of self are reduced to their phenomenal manifestations of
properties and objects of consciousness, respectively. In other words,
property is related to substance as objects of consciousness (thoughts,
feelings, and sensations) are related to the subject or the self. With
respect to both sets of entities, the empiricist program is the same. Just
as the empiricist, following Hume, argues that we can only know the
properties of any particular object and never its substance, he or she will
also claim, as Hume does in the quote that opens this Article, that all we
can know upon introspection are the objects of consciousness, never the
self itself. A brief discussion will make clear how this is so.
The concept of substance has had a vexed philosophical history.
Aristotle was the first to develop the concept, though we see in his
diverse works at least the following six different meanings for the term
"substance": (1) concrete individuals, or objects which exist in the world;
(2) a core of essential properties; (3) anything capable of independent
existence; (4) that which admits of contrary properties while remaining
the same; (5) a substratum in which properties inhere; and (6) a logical
subject."5 Various of these notions have been emphasized by subsequent philosophers. 76 Empiricists have focused upon senses (3), (4),

173. See D.W. Hanlyn, Empiricism, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 499 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1972) (providing a general overview of the topic).
174. See generallySTEPHEN PRIEST, THE BRITISH EMPIRICISTS (1990) (providing a very
readable synopsis of the philosophies of Hobbes, Hume, Mill, and others.
175. See ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 681, 784-86,
789, 791-93 (W.D. Ross trans., Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
176. Aristotle, for example, discounts the first sense of substance as incoherent. Id. at
681, 783-86. Spinoza's conception of substance emphasizes the idea of substance as that which
is capable of independent existence. BARUCH SPINOZA, THE ETHICS 32-40 (Seymour Feldman
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and particularly (5), attacking the idea of substance as an ontological
substratum, a thing-in-itself that "holds together" the properties of the
thing.
At the risk of oversimplification, modern empiricism holds that what
we experience when we sense an object is the confluence of the
properties of the object. For example, we experience a beach ball as
consisting of the properties of roundness, as having various colors in
identifiable patterns, as possessing a certain consistency to the touch, and
as being a specific size and weight. We might even smell the beach ball
to learn that it has a plastic-like scent. Similarly, all things in the world
are describable in similar fashion. In identifying each object, we pick out
the various properties of that object that we sense. Thus, our knowledge
of external objects comes through our sense experience of these
properties.
Yet, we seem to think that these properties are properties of some
thing, a ball in this case, which appears to exist independently of its
properties (sense 3), and is still the same beach ball even if we should
change a property-by painting it a different color, for example (sense
4)-and which constitutes something in which these properties inhere
(sense 5). We can designate this the "pin cushion" conception of
substance 177 in the sense that substance is viewed to be a kind of
ontological pin cushion in which the pins are properties. According to
this view of substance, which has been attacked by empiricists, we do not
alter the pin cushion by changing the pins because the pin cushion has
an existence independent of them. Moreover, the pin cushion "holds
together" the configuration of pins as the beach ball holds together the
confluence of properties in that these properties (e.g., roundness) could
not exist independently of some thing that is round.
Empiricists find the concept of substance problematic precisely
because it cannot be experienced directly; only properties can be sensed.
For this reason, Locke clung to the notion of substance only reluctantly,
probably for religious reasons.178 Berkeley refined (or possibly distorted) empiricism by excising the idea of material.substance from the
ed., Samuel Shirley trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1982) (1677). However, senses 4 and 5
follow from his discussion. Iat Empiricists attacked the more radical sense of the term, the
idea of the substratum underlying properties. The point here is that these various senses of
the term are not analytically equivalent to one another.
177. It is not clear where the "pin cushion" metaphor for substance originated, but the
expression has been a mainstay of modem philosophical discussions of the concept.
178. See PRIEST, supra note 174, at 78-80 (discussing Locke's view of substance and his
ambivalence regarding the concept).
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empiricist program yet continuing to adhere to the notion of a spiritual
substance. 179 Hume's empiricism was more radical still, dismissing
18 °
altogether the idea of substance as "an unintelligible chimera.'
The rationalist interpretation of the concept of sel, and the
interpretation that was subject to the empiricist attack, is the idea of the
self as a kind of spiritual or psychological substratum related to its
mental states (e.g., thoughts, feelings, intentions) as substance is related
to its properties. Descartes enshrined this view of the self by equating
the soul with the mind, and by arguing that mind is a substance distinct
from the body. 1 ' The parallel between the rationalist conception of
substance and of self is evident by considering the three definitions or
criteria of substance discussed earlier. First, on something like a
Cartesian account, the self exists independently of our various mental
states in the same manner that substance exists independently of its
properties. In other words, mind or self is the subject of its mental states
or objects of consciousness; the self is not reducible to these states.
Second, even as these contents or objects of consciousness change (e.g.,
from one idea to the next, from hatred to love, or from pain to pleasure)
the subject having these thoughts and feelings remains the same. Just as
the beach ball does not change upon being painted a different color, so
too, the person remains the same person upon thinking different
thoughts and experiencing myriad feelings. Finally, the rationalist views
mind, consciousness, or self as a kind of container in which these various
objects of consciousness make their evanescent appearance and then give
way to the next such state. On the rationalist account, self is the
metapsychological pin cushion.
It is this idea of the self that Hume rejected in the quote which is
excerpted at the beginning of this Article. This accounts for his
description of the self as nothing but a "bundle

.

.

.

of percep-

tions.""1
The Humean attack on the self is far from decisive. What Hume
established, if anything, is that the subject cannot be directly experienced
through introspection. It does not follow from this that the self does not
exist. First, as Kant argued, we might have strong indirect evidence of

179.

BISHOP

GEORGE BERKELEY, THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN

HYLAS

AND

PHILONOUS 84 (David Hilbert & John Perry eds., 1994) (1713).
180. See HUME, supra note 105, at 182-210 (discussing of the concept of substance).
181. DESCARTES, supra note 13, at 185-99.
182. HUME, supra note 105, at 239.
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the existence of the self even if we cannot directly observe it."8 Hume
equated the self with passive subjectivity, that which stands behind the
objective world and observes the objects of consciousness. He apparently did not consider the idea of the self as personality, as an active agent,
or as an organizer of experience. This Article develops that idea in Part
V. Finally, even committed empiricists have struggled with the problem
of personal identity, the idea that there seems to be something which
strings together our thoughts, beliefs, desires, and values through time,
and which gives us a sense of personal continuity. The problem troubled
Hume"8 and continues to cast additional doubt on the success of the
empiricist attack on the self."
C. OntologicalReductionism: The Mind/Body Problem
A third form of reductionism is perhap- +he most all-embracing in its
implications for the concept of the core self. Twentieth century
philosophical psychology, in its two most potent and prevalent forms,
behaviorism and central state materialism, holds that mental states and
processes either do not exist at all, at least in any philosophically
defensible sense of the term "exist," or are causally insignificant as a
source of behavior. Thus, not only does modern philosophy refuse to
recognize the ontological status of the self, it rejects with it any notions
that thoughts, ideas, desires, purposes, etc., exist or play a part in human
behavior in any scientifically verifiable sense.
To understand why materialist reductionism is such an attractive
position to the modem philosopher or psychologist, notwithstanding its
very counter-intuitive implications, one must first recall the equally
disquieting implications of Cartesian dualism. As discussed in Part III,
Descartes argued that mind and body were two distinct substances, the
mental being characterized by the process of thought, while the material
was characterized by the property of extension (i.e., having a spatial as
well as a temporal dimension). Cartesian dualism reflected the common
sense (and religious) idea that the material body carried out the
imperatives of the mental (or spiritual) core of human personality, but
183. Ascertaining the existence of the self requires a "transcendental deduction." See
KANT, supra note 85, at 70-79.
184. HUME, supra note 105, at 238-49. Hume ultimately argues that our sense of selfidentity depends upon the "smooth and uninterrupted process of thought, along a train of
connected ideas ....
Id. at 309.
185.

See generally GODFREY VESEY, PERSONAL IDENTITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

(critiquing traditional empiricism's approach to personal identity). See also id. at 61-62, 108-09
(critiquing Hume's view).
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also held that the mind was distinct enough from the body to offer the
possibility of personal immortality. Even as philosophers began to
question the prospect of life after death, replacing the spiritual idea of
the soul with the secular notion of the mind, Cartesian dualism persisted
in traditional ideas concerning human action-that physical movements
of the body are the causal effect of mental states such as desires,
intentions, and motives. This traditional and dualistic view of the person
is embodied in our legal concept of volition, which conceives of human
action as the result of both a mental state and a resultant physical
186
movement.
From virtually the time of Descartes, however, this traditional
humanistic view was challenged by those embracing a more naturalistic
paradigm. Scientific naturalism objects to Cartesian dualism on both
epistemological and metaphysical grounds. The epistemological reason
is that mental states are not inter-subjectively observable and verifiable;
as such, they cannot be studied in a scientifically acceptable manner.
Modem psychologists, particularly those of a behaviorist persuasion,
sought to make psychology a respectable science on the order of the
physical sciences by rejecting the introspective methodology and dualistic
ontology of such late nineteenth century psychologists as William
James."8 To be an empirically observable phenomenon in the scientific sense, it is not enough that one can observe one's own mental states;
others have to be able to observe them as well. Modem methodological
behaviorism (behaviorism as actually practiced by psychologists in the
lab) thus gave up the study of the mental, replacing it with the study of
observable behavior. Philosophical behaviorism, itself fundamentally
influenced by logical positivism, went further still. The mental was not
simply given up as unobservable and unstudiable, but was altogether
rejected as a cause of human behavior. Radical behaviorists such as B.E
Skinner argued that mental states have no causal significance whatsoever
in mediating human behavior,' while others, such as the philosopher
Gilbert Ryle, argued that the
mental state does not exist as a distinct
89
ontological category at all.1
The second, metaphysical reason for naturalism's rejection of the
concept of mind was the problem of fitting it into a physicalist concep-

186. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (discussing volition).
187. See generallyJAMES, supra note 103 (providing an example of the phenomenological
approach). See id. at 224-90 (discussing the stream of thought).
188. SKINNER, supra note 8, at 19.
189. RYLE, supra note 134, at 22-23.
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tion of the universe. For three centuries, philosophy sought to escape
what was perhaps the most troubling implication of Cartesian dualism-the problem of mind/body interactionism.'" The problem of
interactionism may be put as follows: For the dualist, mental states such
as thoughts, desires, and volitions occur in time but not in space. Yet
how can a non-spatial entity such as a thought or intention (eg., to raise
my arm) produce a bodily movement which occurs in space? The very
idea of mind/body interactionism not only plays havoc with prevailing
physicalist conceptions of causation, which view cause and effect as
occurring within a spatial continuum, but appears to fly in the face of
mounting evidence that all mental phenomena can be explained in
physical terms.
For its part, twentieth century philosophical psychology has sought
to escape these difficulties implicit in Cartesian dualism and in the
traditional view of the person by reducing mind to matter (thus,
remaining half-Cartesian in its recognition of a material substance).
Central state materialism, sometimes known as the "identity thesis," is
the reductionist's alternative to behaviorism. The identity thesis holds
that what we describe in mental language as thoughts, feelings, and
desires are simply another way of describing brain states, but that the
mental process is one in the same with the brain state. 9 ' For the
behaviorist, mental states are viewed as, at best, mere epiphenomena
(i.e., functionally unimportant by-products of the stimulus-response
connection between environmental conditions and the resulting behavior)
while the defender of the identity thesis places greater emphasis upon
brain states as the cause of behavior and argues that mental phenomena
are merely a first-person way of describing these brain states. What both
behaviorism and the identity thesis share is a profound distaste for what
each views as the decidedly pre-scientific implications of dualism as
embodied in the traditional view of the person.
The implications of these modem modes of material reductionism
would appear to have devastating consequences for the traditional view
of the self; in the most significant sense, on the level of ontology, the
reductionist rejects the notion of the self, along with those of ideas,
thoughts, desires, and the entire panoply of mental entities, as remnants

190. See KEITH CAMPBELL, BODY AND MIND 50-55 (2d ed. 1984) (1970) (discussing
dualistic interactionism); JOHN SEARLE, MINDs, BRAINS AND SCIENCE 25-26 (1984) (discussing

interactionism as one among several related problems).
191. See U.T. Place, Is Consciousnessa Brain Process?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
101, 101-09 (V.C. Chappell ed., 1981) (providing a classic defense of the identity thesis).
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of folk psychology. All that exists are environmental stimuli and
behavior, or brain processes, respectively. Any attempt to resurrect the
notion of mind or self is, for the reductionist, philosophically parallel to
a reversion to describing physical phenomena as the work of spirits.
Nevertheless, as this piece argues in Part V, the naturalistic paradigm can
be redefined in a manner that replaces reductionistic materialism with a
more robust "physicalism," which embraces the material and the mental,
thereby preserving the central assumptions of scientific naturalism.
Simultaneously, it will be made clear that the concepts of self, mind, and
freedom continue to play a central role in our philosophical anthropology.
D. Psychological Reductionism: The Quest for the Authentic Self
The influence of British empiricism, particularly logical positivism,
upon modem psychology cannot be underestimated. Of the three
schools of twentieth century psychology-behaviorism, psychoanalytic
theory, and various forms of humanistic or client-centered psychology-behaviorism has been most influenced by empiricism. Indeed, the
core tenet of behaviorist psychology, the idea that human personality and
action is almost completely the result of environmental conditioning,
essentially applies Locke's theory of tabula rasa, which was originally
developed as an epistemological theory of human knowledge, to the
psychological domain of human personality and behavior. According to
behaviorist theory, not only is all we know a function of external
influences, so too is all we are and do.
Through behaviorism and its close cousin, social learning theory, the
idea that human personality is largely a function of the environment has
greatly influenced modern social theory. Yet there is an equally potent
counter-trend in modern social and political thought with respect to our
fundamental conception of human personality; this is the notion that
each of us possesses a core personality which is, in some important sense,
pre-social.
Part III discussed this idea in the context of considering the essential
uniqueness of the core self. From its origins in Rousseau,"g the idea
of the innate or authentic personality was defended in John Stuart Mill's
On Liberty, and is the moral-psychological edifice for his defense of

192. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 106, at 211-355 (arguing that what we today would
consider the bulk of human vices-pettiness, selfishness, conceit, and malice-are the product
of social influences).
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human diversity and political liberty. 93 A similar theme has been
adopted and defended by various schools of philosophy from German
idealism to American transcendentalism and from existentialism to
humanistic psychology.'94 On this question perhaps more than any
other, modem social thought is genuinely peripatetic. Modem day
liberals particularly feel tom in two opposite directions on the issue of
whether each person is simply a function of our respective environments
on one hand or truly possesses an authentic self on the other."
If the behaviorist view of human personality is even roughly
accurate, there is no real person "in there," covered over by a layering
of social influences, as Mill, some modem liberals, and some recent
feminists appear to argue. 96 There are only the social influences. The
behaviorist view, in turn, implies that those trends in modem social and
political thought which are contingent upon drawing a distinction
between the true self and the false self are baseless. For example, if the
behaviorist hypothesis is correct, the neo-Marxist's concept of "false
consciousness" and the existentialist's "bad faith" are groundless, at least
in the sense that these imply an authentic personality beneath the layers
of social fabric. Similarly, the feminist notion that women's wills are a
social construction of diverse external influences misses the point. If the
behaviorist is correct, everyone's values and beliefs will be socially
constructed, which, in turn, entails that there is no psychological baseline
for determining authentic from inauthentic choices. In sum, there is no
basis on which to decide what a woman (or a man) would have decided
in the absence of distorting social influences. The behaviorist would, of
course, concede that a person might well have had a different preference
had social conditions been different, but there is no way to say that this
different preference would have been more pure, or more genuine, more
authentic than any other.
Most generally, if the behaviorist is correct, there will be no way of
drawing a principled psychological boundary between the internal and

193. MILL, supra note 53, at 119-40.
194. See supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text (discussing the theme of the true
self underlying these philosophies).
195. See infra Part V.C., for a discussion of the authenticity and, in particular, the
modem liberal use of the concept to justify paternalistic intervention and libertarian
nonintervention.
196. For the behaviorist, who we are most fundamentally is a function of the
environment. At most, the behaviorist would admit that we possess certain rudimentary
drives, for example for food and sex. SKINNER, supra,note 154, at 143-146. But certainly no
authentic self exists.
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the external or the self and the world. The behaviorist view has
pernicious implications not only for traditional notions of personal
responsibility, but also for any principled basis for limiting state power
over the individual. After all, if our preferences are simply the
fortuitous result of operant conditioning, then nothing prevents the
individual from being reconditioned to make him fit for a more orderly
society. Indeed, if the behaviorist is correct, it is difficult to see how
there remains anything sacrosanct about human preferences, or even
individual personality. It is the ever-present behaviorist strain in modem
social thought that leads even good liberals to override the self-regarding
preferences of those who appear to be making poor choices, and to opt
for policies of paternalistic benevolence over those predicated upon
libertarian autonomy.197
In the most general sense, liberal principles crucially depend upon
the core self and the subsidiary idea of autonomy. In Part V, this Article
attempts to defend the core self from the four modes of reductionism
discussed here, and to suggest a means for effecting a rapprochement
between traditional humanism and scientific naturalism.
V. RECONCILING NATURALISM AND HUMANISM: TOWARD A NONREDUcTIONIST VIEW OF THE SELF

In the course of responding to the four modes of reductionism-causal, epistemic, ontological, and psychological--discussed in Part
IV, we will begin here to construct an idea of the self which is developmental in nature. The picture of the self that will be offered is one that
seeks to steer a course between the Scylla and Charybdis of the
respective dichotomous pairs: reductionism and dualism, determinism
and metaphysical libertarianism, radical empiricism and idealism, and
social constructive notions of the self and the romantic's quest for
unconditional authenticity. Relying upon the concept of emergent
evolutionism, we will argue that mind is an emergent state from matter;
that personal freedom is a function of causally deterministic processes
that result in a state of self-determination; and that the self develops out
of a confluence of innate needs and dispositions, and social influences.
This picture of the self will be completed in Part VI, which discusses the
concepts of self-integration and self-development in the course of
addressing the jurisprudential issues raised in Part II of this piece.

197. See Hill, supra note 8, at 164-166 (discussing the political implications of a
behaviorist philosophy).
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Emergent Evolutionism as an Alternative to Reductionist
Ontologies
Before we can address the question of the nature of the self, we
must first confront the broader issues raised by the mind/body problem
and materialistic reductionism. Insofar as the self can only be conceived
in any meaningful sense in mentalistic terms, how does this square with
the dictates of scientific naturalism? How are we to fit the concept of
mind into the paradigm of materialism?
The view to be put forth here is that naturalism does not necessarily
entail reductionism. As applied to the mind/body problem, the
naturalistic paradigm holds that mental states and processes have arisen
as the result of the evolutionary process, and are dependent upon the
physical brain in that they cannot exist independently of the brain.
Materialist reductionism, for example, in the form of the identity thesis,
holds not simply that mental states such as thoughts, desires, and
perceptions, are causally dependent upon brain states, but that they are
identical to brain states. As such, mental states have no independent
A.

ontological status.'98 To put it slightly differently, reductionism holds

that all of the causal work in human behavior is performed by brain
states. The subjective impression that it is our desires, intentions, and
perceptions that cause us to act in various ways is an illusion.
Nonreductionistic naturalism, the theory to be propounded here, is
"physicalistic," but not "materialistic" in its ontology. Materialism holds
that reality is ultimately material in nature and that the fundamental
"stuff" is of a material nature (i.e., that it has such properties as
extension, volume, and mass, and that it exists in space and time).
"Physicalism," as the term is to be used here, designates a view that
holds that the "stuff" of reality may take many different forms. It may
manifest in material states, as energy fields, and as mental states and
processes. Physicalism further holds that these various states are related
to one another in that they are all states of one fundamental ontological
entity and that these states follow causal laws that are discoverable by
science. In sum, physicalism is naturalistic without adhering to the
dogma that our ontology must be limited to mass/energy.
This argument runs parallel to modem physics with respect to the
idea that matter and energy are two states of one thing and that matter

198. To hold that mental states have an independent ontological status is to commit what
U.T. Place calls "the phenomenological fallacy." Place, supra note 191, at 106-109.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:289

can be converted into energy and vice versa. This proposed view argues
that nothing should prevent mental states from being recognized as
having an ontological status of their own, independent of material brain
states. Mental states are related to material brain states in roughly the
same manner that mass and energy are related to one another. In other
words, certain configurations of matter will produce mental states,
eventuating in conscious awareness, just as certain material processes
create, or are converted, into energy.
1. Ontological Concerns
Before discussing the concept of emergent evolutionism, a word is
in order concerning modern philosophy's materialist approach to
ontology. How can the reductionist have the audacity to maintain that
mental states do not exist, it might be asked, when they are so obvious
to us? We experience desires, beliefs, intentions, and awareness
generally even more directly than we experience material things. Indeed,
we can only experience material things as the result of mental states. In
light of this, how is reductionist materialism a tenable theory?
The response is that materialist philosophers have followed the
prevalent logical positivist conception of science in imposing certain
metaphysical and epistemological conditions as a prerequisite for a thing
to be recognized as having ontological status, or for it to be viewed to
exist. We discussed these conditions in Part IV. First, philosophy has
imposed an epistemological criterion that a thing be inter-subjectively
observable. As mental states are observable only on a first-person basis,
they do not meet this criterion. A related, metaphysical condition is
that, for a thing to exist, it must have a spatio-temporal location. Again,
however, while mental states exist in time (we have a thought or
perception at a particular point in time) we cannot point to their spatial
coordinates.
We are thus faced with a conflict in our fundamental assumptions
regarding our ontological commitments with respect to the question as
to whether mental states exist. On one hand, we can adhere to the
conditions of observability and spatio-temporal location as requirements
to recognize that a thing exists, which is the road taken by modem
materialists. On the other hand, we can conclude that these conditions
are unnecessarily ontologically limiting, preferring instead to recognize
the existence of an entire class of entities with which we are most
directly familiar-our own awareness-which do not meet these
conditions. The dilemma is similar to the problem faced by science at
points in history of paradigm changes. When a new theory that appears
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to explain certain phenomena appears to require that we abandon longheld fundamental assumptions which undergird our assumptions about
science itself, do we reject the new theory or relinquish the old
underlying assumption?...
Nor can philosophy resolve this dilemma. Contemporary efforts to
clarify the concept as to what it means for a thing to have ontological
status have had limited success. For example, in his paper, "On What
There Is," the contemporary analytic philosopher Willard V. 0. Quine
addresses this most fundamental question. Following Frege's distinction
between sense and reference,2 "0 Quine argues that many things which
have meaning nevertheless do not exist, for example imaginary entities
such as Pegasus or unrealized states of affairs.20' Contemporary
advocates of the identity thesis follow this line in arguing that mental
states have sense or meaning, but not reference, in that there is no thing
to which they refer but physical brain states. Quine states his criterion
for ontological commitment as follows: "To be is to be the value of a
variable."'
Quine's reference to values and variables evinces that he
is simply providing a logic of ontology that is consistent with modem
predicate logic.20 3 He makes clear, however, that he is not purporting
to resolve actual differences among philosophers regarding what does
exist beyond setting forth certain minimum logical requirements.M
So why should one opt for the nonreductionist recognition of the
reality of mental states over the materialist paradigm? The answer is
simple: to deny that mental states exist is to bracket and ultimately reject
the most central aspect of our existence, our mental life. We are aware
of our thoughts and desires; they exist in as certain a way-if not more
certain a way-as material entities. Indeed, as the legacy of empiricism
at its most radical-the tradition running from Hume to Russell-makes
clear, material substance is on no firmer ground epistemologically than
are mental states and processes. 2 5 Materialism is still half-Cartesian
199. The conflict is well-documented in THOMAS S.KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 66-76 (1970) (discussing paradigm changes in science from a
historical and philosophical standpoint).
200. GOTrLIEB FREGE, in TRANSLATIONS FROM THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF
GOTrLIEB FREGE 56-78 (Peter Geatch & Max Black eds., 3rd ed. 1980).
201. WILLIARD V.O. QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 2-3 (1953).
202. Id.at 15.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 15-16.
205. Russell, apparently following Hume, propounded the view that neither mind nor
matter exists. What exists are events. Russell draws from modem quantum theory in making
this claim. BERTRAND RUSSELL, AN OUTLINE OF PHILOSOPHY 289-92 (1970). '
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and, as such, constitutes a partial rejection of the radical implications of
empiricism. There is no reason beyond a kind of ontological parsimoniousness which compels us to reject our experience as unreal, accepting
instead the imposition of what are ultimately the arbitrary, and possibly,
circular criteria of a reductionist ontology.
2. Emergence Theory
"Emergence theory," as the eminent British analytic philosopher C.
D. Broad dubbed it, is the naturalistic alternative to reductionism.'
This view holds that "materiality is a differentiating attribute" and that
"mentality is an emergent characteristic. ' ,2'
By "differentiating
structure," Broad meant what we described above as the central idea of
physicalism: that the fundamental stuff of reality may take many forms,
such as matter, energy, or mind. The basic idea behind emergence
theory is that the reductionistic hierarchy of the sciences is an inaccurate
picture of reality. The reductionist picture holds that all "higher order"
laws can ultimately be reduced, given an adequate understanding of
science, to the "lower order" laws of physics. In other words, the view
holds, with some extrapolation, that the laws of sociology are reducible
to the laws of psychology, that the laws of psychology are reducible to
those of biology, that biology reduces to chemistry, and chemistry to
physics. Reductionism, in the robust sense of the term, holds that the
most complex forms of human interaction are ultimately reducible to the
laws of physics as manifest in the workings of the brains of those
involved in the interaction, along with other external causal influences.
Emergent evolutionism rejects this view. It holds that evolution
progresses not only by producing increasingly complex physical
structures, but that this evolutionary development also brings about
qualitatively distinct entities ontologically, with distinct sets of causal
laws at each level. As Broad put it:
On the emergent theory we have to reconcile ourselves to much
less unity in the external world and a much less intimate connexion between the various sciences. At best[,] the external
world and the various sciences that deal with it will form a kind
of hierarchy. 0
206. C. D. BROAD, THE MIND AND ITS PLACE INNATURE 77 (The Humanities Press,
Inc., 6th ed. 1951) (1925).
207. Id. at 646.
208. Id. at 77. A version of emergence theory has recently been defended by the
eminent philosopher, John Searle, who explains the view by arguing that systems generate
properties which are not predictable based upon the properties of the elements or the compo-
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What is the relationship between mind and matter on this view?
The idea to be proposed here is that each mental event is part and
parcel of a mental-physical state or process which includes the mental
event and the brain process. Thus, interactionism is ruled out because
mind and matter do not interact in the sense that a purely mental event
causes a physical act, either in the form of a brain process or a bodily
movement. Rather, the mental and the physical are two components of
Materialist reductionism is
one complex mental-physical process.'
also avoided in virtue of the premise that mental events have causal and
ontological significance independent of the accompanying brain state. In
other words, not only are mental states recognized as ontologically
distinct from brain states, but thoughts, desires, perceptions, and other
mental events also have causal significance upon behavior in the sense
that, but for the accompanying mental event, the resultant action might
have been different. Mental states, of course, do not exist independently
of material brain states; the physical brain process is necessary to sustain
the mental state, but the mental aspect of the physical-mental event adds
profoundly changes the nature of the event qualitatively
something that
210
and causally.
What, in this view, is the function of mental states? In the broadest
sense, sentience provides the agent with information about the world.
Rudimentary mental states such as perceptual awareness provide an
obvious source of information about the external world. At higher
levels, thoughts, memories, beliefs, and related mental entities provide

nent parts of the system. See generallyJOHN SEARLE,

THE RE-DIsCOVERY OF MIND (1995).
209. John Searle argues that we are inclined to dualism because of an impoverished
conception of causality whereby we assume that, for a mental event to cause a physical act,
there must be two things, the mental event and the physical act, separated in time. In fact,
he argues, mental events are both caused by and at the same time realized in the brain in the
same way that the property of solidity, for example, is caused by and realized in the system
of molecules which constitute solid matter. In short, mind and brain are related in a similar
manner as are physical properties and molecular states. SEARLE, supra note 190, at 20-21.
210. Id.; see also ROGER SPERRY, SCIENCE AND MORAL PRIORrrY 77-103 (Praeger
1985) (1983). Sperry, a Nobel laureate in neurophysiology, also defends emergence theory:
When it comes to brains, remember that the simpler electric, atomic, molecular, and
cellular forces and laws, though still present and operating, have been superseded by
the configurational forces of higher level mechanisms. At the top, in the human
brain, these include the powers of perception, cognition, reason, judgment, and the
like, the operational, causal effects and forces of which are equally or more potent
in brain dynamics than are the outclassed inner chemical forces.
Id. at 88 (quoting Roger Sperry, Problems Outstanding on the Evolution of Brain Function,
James Arthur Lecture at American Museum of Natural History, New York (1961), reprinted
in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IGNORANCE 423-33 (R. Duncan & M. Weston-Smith eds., 1964)).
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the agent with a continuing source of information about himself and the
world. They serve to make available a wide range of information upon
which the agent can draw in pursuing an efficient course of behavior.
Mental structures develop in ever-increasing complexity in parallel
fashion to physical structures. As the brain and nervous system of
various organisms become increasingly complex, so too do the concomitant mental states. As these mental states develop in complexity, the
organism or agent develops a broader range of behavioral responses and
capacities, becoming increasingly less reactive to the external world,
more proactive, and ultimately, capable of action in a manner that befits
the description of "autonomous." The self, this Article argues in Part
VI, is the psychological self-representation of a mental system which has
developed structurally and functionally to the extent that it may be
viewed to possess the attributes described, under the traditional
paradigm of the person, as freedom of the will, self-awareness (of which
rationality is an important aspect), functional unity, and uniqueness.
How does emergent evolutionism answer the fundamental free
will/determinism problem? The next section argues that insofar as
emergence theory is a species of naturalism, it holds that all natural
events, including human behavior, can be understood in law-like terms.
Thus, while determinism is true, it is misleading when applied to human,
and to a great extent animal, behavior. Persons are free in the only
sense that makes sense of the concept of personal freedom.
B.

The Implications of Determinism Reconsidered

1. Emergence Theory and the Concept of Freedom as Self-Determination
Perhaps the central metaphysical riddle regarding human existence
is the free-will/determinism controversy. This Article seeks to vindicate
the common-sense claim that we are indeed free, while at the same time
arguing in defense of determinism. This may appear something of an
impossible compromise insofar as freedom and determinism are usually
viewed as diametrically opposed to each other. As we saw in Part III,
however, the philosophical position alternatively known as soft determinism or compatibilism holds that a reconciliation is possible.2 ' This
section will elaborate an emergent evolutionary version of soft determinism.

211.

Supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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Soft determinism, a position held by such diverse thinkers as
Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill, and Ayer,212 holds that freedom is
opposed to constraint, not to causation. This position provides that all
we can mean by the term "freedom" is that we are able to act in accord
with our desires, intentions, and purposes. We are "free" if we could
have acted differently if we had so chosen. We are not free if we are
constrained-usually by externalfactors-from acting in accordance with
our choices (e.g., by coercive circumstances).21 3 In contrast to what
many philosophers view to be the implausibility of metaphysical
libertarianism-the idea that persons are free in an unconditional way,
i.e., that they are completely undetermined 2 4 -and the apparent
incoherence of indeterminism,215 some form of determinism has been
accepted by most modem thinkers. Moreover, only soft determinism, as
contrasted with hard determinism, preserves the concept of
moral
26
responsibility in anything approaching its traditional meaning.
For the soft determinist, being free is roughly equivalent with one's
being "in control" of one's actions. Yet it is not clear on traditional
accounts of compatibilism what it means to be in control of one's acts.
The soft determinist, for example, has no response to the hard determinist's query: How can one be free when one's desires, choices, and
motives are themselves the product of deterministic forces? The soft
determinist, at least on traditional accounts of the doctrine, does not
have an answer to views such as that offered by the philosopher, Richara
Taylor:
We can suppose that an ingenious physiologist can induce in me
any volition he pleases, simply by pushing various buttons on an
instrument to which, let us suppose, I am attached by numerous
wires. All the volitions I have in that situation are, accordingly,

212. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
213. There is considerable controversy regarding whether internal forces are constraining.
Compare Virginia Held, Coercion and Coercive offers, in COERCION, supra note 16, at 55
(answering affirmatively), with Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in COERCION, supra note 16
at 29 (answering in the negative). See also Hill, supra note 25, at 661-79 (examining the
various meanings of exploitation and its relation to the issue of freedom of will).
214. Metaphysical libertarianism conceives of the boundaries of the self as a kind of
causal buffer as against the forces of the outside world. The agent, on this view, is completely
self-determining. For examples of the defense of this view, see cites supra note 137.
215. Indeterminism does not salvage free will because it entails that human behavior is
completely uncaused; it springs ex nihilo. As such, the self cannot have caused the act. See
SEARLE, supra note 190, at 89 (arguing that indeterminism is no help to the defender of free
will).
216. See supra Part V.B.2. (discussing hard determinism and its implications for our
concept of moral responsibility).
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precisely the ones he gives me .... We can even suppose that
the physiologist puts a rifle in my hands, aims it at some passerby and then, by pushing the proper buttons, evokes in me the
volition to squeeze my finger against the trigger, whereupon the
passer-by falls dead of a bullet wound.217
In order for an individual to be free in any meaningful sense of the
term-to be free in something approximating the idea of having
autonomy-one must have control over one's desires and volitions as
well. And yet this must somehow be compatible with the doctrine of
determinism.
Emergence theory provides part of the answer. As Roger Sperry,
a neurophysicist and Nobel laureate who has defended emergence
theory, puts it:
[T]he flow and timing of impulse traffic through any brain cell, or
even a nucleus of cells in the brain, are governed largely by the
overall encompassing properties of the whole cerebral circuit
system, within which the given cells and fibers are incorporated.
[I]f one keeps climbing upward within the chain of
command within the brain, one finds at the very top those overall
organizational forces and dynamic properties of the large patterns
of cerebral excitation that are correlated with mental states or
psychic activity.21
Sperry elaborates on the implications of this view for the free
will/determinism controversy:
The proposed brain model provides in large measure the mental
forces and abilities to determine one's own actions. It provides
a high degree of freedom from outside forces as well as mastery
over the inner molecular and atomic forces of the body. In other
words[,] it provides plenty of free will as long as we think of free
will as self-determination.219
This model of human action is still deterministic in that all brain/mind
states follow law-like patterns which can be studied and explained in
scientific terms. At the same time, however, these patterns cannot be
explained by reference to reductionistic conceptions whereby mental
processes are reduced to the basic laws of physics. Rather, the causes of
human behavior, at least when this behavior is characterized by
conscious thought, are systemic. They result from overall brain patterns
which accompany global mental states such as desires, intentions, values,

217.
218.

TAYLOR, supra note 138, at 50.
SPERRY, supra note 210, at 33.

219. Id. at 39-40.
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and goals.
This explains why the victim of the ingenious physiologist in Taylor's
example is not really "in control" of his own actions. Though he is not
externally constrained such that he is able to act in accord with his
volitions, the volitions from which he acts are not truly his own. They
are not his own not simply because they originate from an external
source. In an ultimate sense, at least, all volitions spring from external
sources insofar as they arise from causes outside the self. Rather, the
volitions produced by the ingenious physiologist are not those of his
victim because they did not arise from the integrated functioning of the
brain. Stated in mental language, the volitions are not his because they
are not consistent with his normal desire and value patterns. To put it
differently, it always remains possible to short-circuit the hierarchical
ordering of the brain in a way that makes the individual respond to
lower-order brain functions, thereby producing non-integrated behavior.
At such times, however, the individual should not be thought to be "in
control" of his actions.
It should be clearly noted here that we have introduced an
additional component into the concept of human autonomy. To be free
involves not only acting in accordance with one's volitions, but that these
volitions must themselves issue from brain states which are themselves
highly integrated. In mental language, they must issue from conscious
choices which are themselves a function of the agent's ordinary
internalized pattern of values, as these are represented by high-level,
integrated brain states.
Two sorts of problems remain for our concept of freedom. First, the
idea of integrated behavior must be developed. What does it mean for
certain values to be "internalized" and "integrated" into the self? This
problem will be addressed in Parts VI.A. and VI.B., where this article
elaborates upon the connection between self-identity and freedom, and
upon the idea of autonomy as a constructive process. The second and,
in a sense, more foundational problem will be discussed in the following
section.
2. "I Am What I Am": The Hard Determinist's Challenge and the
Problem of Foundational Unfairness
Even if we are able to provide a suitable explanation of selfintegration sufficient to elucidate the notion of "being in control" of
one's actions, there is a more fundamental problem. Put simply, the
hard determinist will argue that even if a person can be said to be free
and in control of her actions in the manner that is required by our
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theory, she still is determined to be exactly what she is, and it is who she
is that has made her do what she has done. In other words, the soft
determinist must take seriously the central tenet of determinism-namely, that the universe could not be one jot different from what
it is if determinism is true. And, if this is so, how fair can it be to hold
an individual responsible for being what he is? In sum, if a person acts
from desires, choices, beliefs, motives, and intentions that are themselves
the product of antecedent deterministic factors, how can we hold that
person morally or legally responsible when she could not have possessed
any desires and motives other than those which she in fact possessed?
It will not do here for the soft determinist to argue that the person
was free to act other than she did-that she was not prevented from
changing herself or making herself better. According to determinism,
any changes that occur must themselves be explained in deterministic
fashion as the product of still other antecedent causal variables. Even
if these variables are "inside" the person in the sense that the person
could have done otherwise had they so desired, the point is that they
were determined to desire what they desired. Thus, even self-re-creation
is, in an ultimate sense, the product of internal motives and desires which
are themselves causally determined. There is no way out of the
deterministic house of mirrors. Each apparent visage of freedom is a
reflection of still other reflections, each reflection a state of self which is
the product of other such states each unfolding in deterministic fashion
from causes that ultimately lie outside the self.
The only response that can be made to this argument is that we are,
each one of us, the complex web of causal factors that make up the self.
We do not own our values, desires, and intentions, we are them insofar
as they make up who we are at our most personal and basic. Free acts
flow from the self, even as the self, as constituted by the world, flows
from origins that are not the self. We determine our acts. Moreover, we
also determine our selves to the extent that we are not internally or
externally constrained from making ourselves over. At some point, of
course, the motivation, values, and character necessary to effect selfchange come from beyond us. But to say that we would not have acted
in a particular manner had the formative conditions that made us who
we are been different is to say that we would not have acted in this
manner if we had been a differentperson. This may be true, but it misses
the central significance of the concept of responsibility.
In the novel, Erewhon, Samuel Butler depicts a mythical land where
the inhabitants hold a peculiar set of beliefs regarding our entry into this
world. The Erewhonians believe that the soul of the child-to-be assumes
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the risk, so to speak, regarding its earthly prospects. Vaguely foreshadowing Rawls' notion of the veil of ignorance, the Erewhonians believe
that the soul signs onto earthly existence without knowing anything
regarding its life circumstances. It does not know whether it will be born
as a male or a female, to rich or to poor parents, sickly or in good
health, etc. Because the soul need not enter the world in the first
place-it does so of its own accord-it does so on condition that it must
accept its lot in life in accordance with the natural lottery.2'
In similar fashion, in our own world, each of us must assume the risk
for who we are and for who we will become. There is, of course, a
foundational unfairness in all of this. It is the same kind of unfairness
that marks the distribution of natural talents, abilities, and conditions.
Through no fault of our own, some are born healthy while others are
born ill or handicapped; some are brilliant and others dull; some are
born to the rich and most to the poor. Similarly, it cannot be denied
that it is simply more difficult for the child of the ghetto to avoid the life
of crime and dereliction that are easily evaded by the middle class child.
The ghetto child is qualitatively as free as the middle class child, but
there are much greater obstacles in his path in attaining the same
measure of success that comes easily for the child of the better-off It is
the responsibility of society to remove these obstacles and to alleviate,
once and for all, the social and economic conditions that tend to produce
the unlucky souls, some of whom will respond in due course by violating
its norms. None of this, however, absolves the person as constituted for
the responsibility of what he has become.
The first condition of continuing on in the world is that we either
change ourselves or we assume the risk for being who we are. If there
is a barren harshness in all this-and, of course, there is-there is,
nevertheless, no other conclusion is consistent with the premise that we
are free.
C. Self-Development and the Problem of Authenticity
Questions of personal freedom and moral responsibility will be
revisited in Part VI.B. For now, we move from the problem of freedom
to questions concerning the nature of the self. We will here examine the
tension between the idea that the self is largely a construction of social
forces and the notion that there is an authentic self which exists, in an

220. SAMUEL BUTLER, EREWHON AND EREWHON REVISITED 182-89 (Random House

rev. ed., 1927) (1872).
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important sense, prior to social influences.
As was explored in Part III, the notion of authenticity has played a
central role in certain strains of modem liberal social and political
thought.2 2 t While Rousseau is generally credited with having originated
the idea insofar as his political philosophy depends upon the distinction
between natural man and man as he is made over by social forces, m
it was for Continental romanticism to give the idea its contemporary
form, with its emphasis upon the irrational, aesthetic, and erotic nature
of the person. Thus, the authentic man was Romanticism's answer to the
rationalized autonomous will of Kantian philosophy. While Kant's view
of the self raises difficult questions concerning how to individuate selves
(i.e. if each person's self is constituted by the same disengaged rational
autonomy, independent of the heteronomous aspects of personality such
as character traits, dispositions, and desires, what makes one self distinct

from the next?21) the romantic view of the self is adamantly individualized. With its emphasis upon uniqueness and difference over the
universalizing implications of idealist philosophy, the quest for authenticity became one with the search for genuine individual identity in the
modern psychological sense.224
Central to the idea of authenticity is the distinction between an
innate, pre-social self, and the (false) self that results from social
influences. The idea rests upon a distinction between desires, impulses,
and feelings which are, in some sense, truly one's own, as opposed to
those which are implanted by cultural forces. This distinction is
important, for example, to Mill's defense of liberty:
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan
of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like
221. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
222. For Rousseau, natural man, the person in his or her natural state, neither hates nor
fears others; he is thoroughly grounded in his own wholesome inclinations; he has no need to
be mendacious, insecure, manipulative or destructive. These states characterize the condition
of socialized man only. Fittingly, the one and only book Rousseau's teacher permits the young
Emile is ROBINSON CRUSOE, a tale of a man in this original state of nature. ROUSSEAU, supra
note 106, at 184-88. It is instructive to compare Hobbes' picture of man in the state of nature.
HOBBES, supra note 168, at 183-88 (providing a considerably darker version of human nature).
223. Individuation of selves is a real problem for any system which is simultaneously
idealistic (in the Kantian sense, at least) and at the same time individualistic. Because the
pure self is devoid of all distinguishing character traits or psychological factors, we are all the
same self, or at least each self is exactly the same in its constitutive aspect. This, of course,
may be of great import to the value of equality, but it is difficult to see how this is reconciled
with individualistic liberalism.
224. The idea of "finding oneself" was the 1960s variant of the quest for authenticity.
The search for one's true nature under the cover of social influences.
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one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself employs
all his faculties. . .. Human nature is not a machine to be
built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for
it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all
sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make
it a living thing.
Even more explicitly, he states:
A person whose desires and impulses are his own-are the
expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and
modified by his own culture-is said to have a character. One
whose desires and impulses are not his own has no character, no
more than a steam engine has a character. 6
Moreover, the forces of social conformity can ultimately overwhelm and
strangle the nascent self, until the person has "no nature [left] to
follow." 7
Twentieth century psychological humanism has picked up on the
theme of the authentic sel tying authenticity to the ideas of health,
naturalness, spontaneity, happiness, self-development, and self-actualization. In the sphere of social and political philosophy, perhaps modem
feminists have traded most heavily on the concept of authenticity.229
Arguments in defense of the concept, however, sometimes flounder on
the rocks of a vicious circularity. As one commentator argues:
I believe that we have an authentic self because assuming that we
do not have an authentic self makes no sense to me. For
example, through our feminist work, we try to peel away social
influences that limit our authenticity or freedom. If we are
successful in our attempts to peel away those influences, what
would be left? It only makes sense for me to assume that what
would be left would be our authentic selves z0 °
With arguments of this tenor, it is not difficult to understand why there
is debate regarding the concept of authenticity among feminists. 3 '
The foregoing makes clear part of what makes the concept of
225. MILL, supra note 53, at 123.
226. Id. at 124.
227. Id. at 126.
228. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the link between
authenticity and various philosophical movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
including existentialism an psychological humanism.
229. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality and Self. A PreliminaryInquiry Into the
Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 217 (1988).
230. Id. at 220.
231. As the same author notes, Catherine MacKinnon, among other feminists, discounts
the value, if not the accuracy, of the concept of authenticity. Id.
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authenticity so conceptually appealing: the alternative, the idea that the
self is completely socially constructed, appears to lead to an "onion peel"
view of the self. If there is no authentic self, the argument runs, then
what lies at the center of the numerous layers of social influence? Surely
there must be something at the core of human personality. The defender
of the notion of the authentic self, on the other hand, appears to hold a
kind of "tootsie pop" view of the self-that there are two qualitatively
different aspects of the self, one innate and the other a function of social
influences. The outer layers must be stripped away in order to gain
access to the innate center of human personality, the authentic self. It
is precisely the apparent emptiness of the socially constructed self that
renders the authentic self a preferable intellectual alternative to some.
The second reason for the popularity of the concept of authenticity
is that is permits a way out of the modem liberal double-bind between
the extremes of traditional libertarianism and authoritarianism. On one
hand, any view of the self that places all choices on the same plane,
affirming all informed, non-coerced decisions equally, as the libertarian
does, precludes any claim that persons should sometimes be relieved of
the responsibility for these choices. If we are totally free, at least under
normal conditions, then we shall be totally responsible. On the other
hand, if all of our choices are the product of external forces which
undercut their value as free or autonomous, then any form of paternalistic intervention can be justified by the state. The concept of authenticity
permits the modern left-liberal to have it both ways, more or less. She
can argue for the right of the individual to engage in private consensual
conduct on the basis of the claim that the desire to do so is a product of
the authentic person, while simultaneously relieving the surrogate
mother, for example, of the contractual burden to relinquish the child
she has borne on the theory that her decision to enter into the contract
was a product of heteronomous social forces which replicate patriarchal
values. 32
Those who reject the notion of authenticity, such as the feminist
Catherine MacKinnon, understand that by relinquishing the tootsie pop
self-covered-over-by-social-influences view of the person, we are left with
little in the way of the moral-psychological baseline for judging the

232. Claims of exploitation are often linked with the idea that the acts of the agent are
inauthentic and, thus, unfree. Unlike coercion, exploitation is the type of excuse that renders
bargains voidable, rather than void, at the discretion of the victim. Like authenticity, it
permits the putatively exploited party to have it both ways. One may decide to affirm a
bargain or act if one so chooses, or to repudiate one's act if this is necessary.
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rightness of human choices. 3 The moral world can no longer be
divided into choices and actions that are natural or socially constructed,
genuine or contrived, the product of choice or the product of convention,
authentic or inauthentic. We are left with only raw values to decide
which socially constructed choices will be affirmed and which will be
disavowed. Of course, this alternative can be not only messy, but
potentially very anti-liberal.
For a number of reasons, the concept of the authentic self as it is
usually understood should be rejected. First, the concept of authenticity
misrepresents, on one hand, the nature of the relationship between our
innate dispositions, desires, and inclinations and, on the other hand,
social influences. While Mill acknowledged that character is a mixture
of the authentic self as it is "developed and modified by [one's]
culture,"'
the prevailing concept of authenticity still appears to be
represented by the tootsie pop metaphor. The idea is that there is some
pre-social self which, with the aid of intense introspection, deconditioning, or perhaps some kind of therapy, can be uncovered intact. This
appears to be the interpretation favored by some of the commentators
who were quoted earlier3 5 The idea seems to be that the authentic
self is a reservoir of original, fully formed choices, values, and desires
which represent the self at its most pure, before the pollution of social
influences takes hold.
Such a view, however, is rejected by most contemporary psychologists3 6 If anything, the self is a multi-leveled layering of influences,
233. In other words, authenticity operates in much the same manner as natural law
arguments. It embodies or represents the natural or right as a function of psychological fact.
Authentic acts carry with them the imprimatur of legitimation insofar as they are expressions
of the natural self. In the absence of a concept of authenticity upon which to base our
normative judgments, we are faced with making naked value preferences.
234. Mill, supra note 53, at 124.
235. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 229, at 220-21 (employing the metaphor of "peeling
away" social influences to access the authentic self).
236. Behaviorists reject the notion of authenticity; indeed they reject the idea of a self
altogether, as we have seen. Those from a Freudian or neo-Freudian psychoanalytic tradition
also would not speak in terms of the concept of authenticity. While the psychoanalytic
tradition recognizes the existence of an ego, the ego is a product of a combination of the
individual's contact with reality, including social reality, and innate psychodynamic factors.
The ego is not pre-social, nor is it the "natural" state of the self in the same sense as the authentic self. The ego is a conflicted, weak, and defensive entity largely at the mercy of the id
and super-ego. See FREUD, supra note 15, at 11-62 (1923) (discussing the development and
dynamics of the ego in Freud's later thought). Only the humanistic tradition accepts the
concept of authenticity. MASLOW, supra note 106, at 3-4 (describing the attributes of the
authentic self). See generally FROMM, supra note 113, at 277-99 (1941) (discussing social
character and the various ways we seek to escape our freedom as authentic selves).
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social and biological, where each layer represents a mixture of the innate
or biological, on one hand, and the social, on the other. We are neither
the onion of the pure social constructionist nor the tootsie pop of the
defender of the authentic self. Rather, the self develops by a kind of
dialectical process wherein each level of interface between the innate and
the social-each level of self-development-assumes the place of the
innate aspect at the succeeding juncture of experience. The self
confronts experience and incorporates this experience into itsel, where
this enhanced and transformed entity becomes the core self which
confronts the next experience, and so on it goes in similar fashion at
each successive point of interaction. In this manner, the innate is
transformed with each experience and, in itself, becomes the baseline for
the next confrontation with the external world. In sum, while there is
something of the innate at each level of self-development, that which is
innate and that which is the product of social influence become
increasingly more difficult to disentangle as the process unfolds.
Nor does the concept of the authentic self perform the kind of
normative work expected of it. As we saw previously, the normative
function of authenticity permits its advocate to move back and forth
between the idea that some choices should not be interfered with
because they are expressions of the authentic sel while others should be
excused as the product of social influences. Nowhere in the analysis,
however, are we given a formula for being able to distinguish in advance
between those choices that are the product of inauthenticity and those
that are genuine. Indeed, it usually appears that authenticity is simply
used as a subterfuge for the proponent's normative preferences. For
example, the woman attorney who chooses to sell her intelligence to the
highest paying law firm is viewed to be responding to the genuine
impulses of the authentic self, while the woman who chooses to sell her
procreative capacity to an infertile couple is the victim of a socially
constructed value structure.
Moreover, it is not clear that the concept of authenticity performs
any conceptual work over and above the idea of freedom. The central
tenet of modern liberalism is that, within the realm of self-regarding
behavior, the authentic choice, like the free or autonomous choice, is
sacrosanct. As such, it should not be interfered with. Either the two
classes of choices, those which are free and those which are authentic,
are coextensive or they are not. If there are some choices that are free
even though they are inauthentic then they should still be affirmed as
sacrosanct in virtue of their being free. And if the two classes are
coterminous, if a given choice is free if and only if it is authentic, then
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it is difficult to see what the concept of authenticity adds over and above
that of freedom, at least from a normative or jurisprudential standpoint.
In conclusion, it is evident that persons do enter the world with
certain innate needs and dispositions. These include not merely physical
needs, but a variety of psychological traits and dispositions, themselves
a function of genetic factors, that will manifest themselves later in life,
depending upon one's experiences and the malleability of the trait itself.
To foist upon this rough hewn array of needs and dispositions the robe
and scepter of the pre-social authentic self however, is to make a
mockery of the concept of authenticity.
D. Does the Self Exist?
Finally, enough has been said in the foregoing sections to make clear
that the Humean challenge to the self-what we called "epistemic
reductionism" in Part IV-is rejected here. Hume was wrong in
assuming that, if the self was not directly observable by introspection,
there was no basis for knowing whether it exists. Epistemic reductionism
in its radical form fails because the self may nonetheless be known by
inference and construction from our experience.
Still, it may be asked, even if the human psyche operates in a
manner similar to that which is described here, cannot all this be
explained by reference to the various mental processes which represent
our mental life? In other words, why must we employ the unifying
notion of a self, with all its metaphysical implications, to a system of
mental processes which can be described independently of one another,
for example, as a network of functions including memory, perception,
and rational thought? What is it that unifies these mental processes into
a self?
The question here is a familiar one to the study of ontology. Since
the world can be cut up in perhaps an infinite number of different ways,
which way is most appropriate? Do cells exist or merely the molecular
processes of which they are comprised? Do bodies exist or only the cells
that make them up? Does society exist or is it simply a collection of
individuals? In what sense is there something more than the collection
of a thing's parts?
From a functional standpoint, a thing is more than the sum of its
parts when it operates as a system, or as a whole. The argument which
this section develops is that the self exists as a (more or less) unified
structure consisting of enduring brain/mind states which represent the
functions of memory, perceptual awareness, rationality, and related
processes which interact with one another and which, under normal
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circumstances, produce coherent, efficient, and well-integrated behavioral
responses. Moreover, it makes sense to speak of the self as a real entity
if there is a sense in which it can be said to build upon itself, to grow
and to develop in some specified qualitative manner. In sum, it makes
sense to use the term "seW' if persons generally act as a functional unity
which evolves and develops over time.
It remains to be seen the extent to which human behavior, at least
under normal circumstances, conforms to these conditions. The next and
last part of the Article explores the concept of the self as a functional
unity that can be said to develop over time by way of examining the
three following issues raised in Part II of this piece: (1) the nature of the
self and the question of self-identity, as raised in the debate over
commodification, (2) the concept of personal autonomy as the predicate
for moral and legal responsibility, and (3) the issue of the self as the
basis for moral and political rights. In examining these issues we will
simultaneously address the concepts of personal identity, self-integration,
and self-actualization.
VI.

RECONSTRUCTING THE SELF: SOME CENTRAL PROBLEMS RECONSIDERED

The three central philosophical problems of the self are arguably the
problem of identity, the problem of free will, and the problem of selfdevelopment. The problem of identity addresses the issue: What is the
self? Of what is it constituted? A related problem is the question of
what makes us the same self over time. The problem of free will, of
course, concerns the issue of what it means to be free or autonomous in
a deterministic world. Finally, the problem of self-development asks the
normative and empirical question of whether there is a sense in which
we have an ultimate purpose, end or telos as persons. If so, what
conditions mark the process of development and how should these
conditions be fostered and preserved by the state? This section will
discuss each of these problems by examining, respectively, the constitutive, volitional, and developmental aspects of the self. It should be noted
at the outset, however, that all three issues are intimately related. For
example, questions of self-realization will have profound import for our
understanding of the constitutive aspect of the self, and our view of the
constitutive aspect has, in turn, important ramifications for our concept
of personal freedom.
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A. The Constitutive Aspect and the Problem of PersonalIdentity
In philosophical discourse, the "problem of identity" addresses the
question as to what makes each person the same over time. 7 In other
words, given that each person changes both physically and mentally with
sometimes remarkable celerity, what makes us the same person now and
then? This is a question which has confounded modem philosophy"3
Furthermore, one may see in this issue more than a superficial resemblance
to the problem of substance and property discussed in Part
39
Iv.

2

In order to have a theory of unity or identity over time, one must
first know what it is that constitutes a person or self in the first place.
Only when we have established the criteria regarding what constitutes
the self at a particular point in time can we turn to the question of
identity over time. It is this more basic question concerning the
constitutive aspect of the self which, as Part II demonstrated, is
fundamental to issues of commodification and related concerns. Thus,
this issue will be the focus here.
1. Three Views of the Self
This section rejects at the outset the idea that the identity of the self
is constituted solely by bodily identity. In other words, an understanding
of individual self-identity requires, perhaps by definition, the idea that
this includes the mental or psychological aspect of the person. This is
reinforced by philosophical thought experiments, such as Locke's story
of the prince and the cobbler,2' and by moral considerations similar to

237. See Terrence Penelhum, PersonalIdentity, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
(Paul Edwards ed., 1969) (providing an excellent treatment of the general issues); HUME,
supra note 105, at 238-49 (providing the classic empiricist statement); see generally VESEY,
supra note 185, at 61-62, 108-09 (providing a response to the Humean treatment of the issue).
238. Not only is this an issue for metaphysics but its ethical implications are also
profound. In what sense, for example, are we justified in continuing to punish an old man
with life imprisonment for a crime committed decades earlier? In what sense is it the same
person as the offender? These are some of the issues that make the question of personal
identity so crucial.
239. Both the problem of personal identity and the issue of substance require that we
answer the question: When the properties of a thing change, in what sense is it the same
thing? See supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text, for a discussion of substance and
property.
240. See JOHN LOCKE, supra note 133. The fable imagines that the mind of the prince
is placed in the body of the cobbler and vice-versa. Locke employs this to argue that
consciousness, and not the body, are central to personal identity.
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those considered in Part II, which militate in favor of the view that the
boundary between the internal and the external domains of the self are
to be drawn along psychological, rather than physical, lines.24'
Given that the self must be defined in mentalistic terms, there have
been three general kinds of answers given to the question "what is the
self?". The first kind of view equates the self with the range of
introspectively observable mental states-with our thoughts, emotions,
desires, and beliefs. On this view, the self is simply the totality of our
mental life; it is the compresence of the objects of consciousness, the
"stream of thought." This concept of the self, typically adopted by those
of a radical empiricist orientation, view the self, with Hume, as nothing
but a "bundle of perceptions." This view generally leads to a total
skepticism concerning the self, as it did for Hume-that there is no
subject, but only the objects of consciousness. This potentially selfnegating idea of the self is designated in this section as the "empiricist"
conception of the self.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the second view of the self,
generally propounded by defenders of various forms of rationalism,
idealism, or spiritualism, holds that the self is a kind of empty subject or
pure ego. The idealist concept of the self may take the form of Kant's
original transcendental synthetic Unity of Apperception, the noumenal,
unknowable ground for empirical experience, or that of the atman or
pure consciousness of various yogic and mystical traditions.242 Indeed,
the parallel between Kant and certain strands of classical Indian
philosophical thought, as in the Vedas, is striking.243 According to the
idealist conception, the self is not equivalent to the stream of thought or
even our personality; the self lies beneath these external psychological
phenomena. It is indeed a very short step from the idealist conception
of the self to the concept of the immortal soul.
The third and intermediate view is the notion of the self as
241. In other words, persons should be held responsible not for any act of the body, but
only for acts that fall within his control. See supra notes 9-40 and accompanying text.
242. See John Lawrence Hill, The Enlightened Society 24-32 (1987) (comparing Eastern
and Western idealist conceptions of the self).
243. As one author has put it:
Kant, like the yogic philosophers, knew perfectly well the utter futility of any attempt
to explore this quality-less soul . . . . Since it is beyond our introspection, Kant
admitted that psychology could gain nothing by this metaphysical entity; instead, the
empirical "Me" should constitute the proper subject matter. . . . [T]he Pure Ego
of Kant and the transcendental purusha [of yoga], both dim, barren abstractions,
look very much like two peas from the same pod.
KOOVOR T. BEHANAN, YOGA: A SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION 59 (1937).
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psychological structure-the latent, dynamic structure upon which
personality depends. This is the view of the self promulgated by Freud
and those who follow any of the plethora of psychodynamic models of
human behavior, including modem ego psychology.2' This type of
theory is similar to the empiricist view in that its proponents hold that
the psychodynamic structure of the self may be studied by empirical
psychology, but owes more than a little to Kantian idealism in virtue of
the claim that internal processes which are not directly observable or
introspectable can nevertheless structure our experience 4 5
Another way to view the difference between these three conceptions
of the self-the empiricist, idealist, and structural views-is with respect
to their various theories as to how the self is created. For the empiricist,
the self is generated by our contact with the external world. In the
broadest sense, the self develops through experience. In its radical
Humean form, the self is simply the totality of our impressions and ideas,
our perceptions, beliefs, and other introspectable mental states. Radical
Skinnerian behaviorism follows closely in this same tradition. 46 More
recent sophisticated cross-over theories include George Herbert Mead's
social interactionist model of self-development. 47 Mead's theory is

244. Modem ego psychology is an offshoot of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Perhaps
the best example of this orientation is in the work of Erik H. Erikson. Erikson expanded and
modified the Freudian paradigm by studying the question of human identity, and by developing eight psychosocial stages of development. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND
CRISIS (1968), for an overview of his developed theory.
245. For Kant, the a priori categories upon which perception depends--space, time,
causality, etc.-are in the mind, not in the external world. These internal aspects of the
human psyche cannot be observed because they are not in the phenomenal world; rather, they
structure our apprehension of the phenomenal world. Freudian and neo-Freudian
psychodynamic models also hold that our experience of the world is molded by (largely
unconscious) psychodynamic factors and processes. For Kant, a transcendental deduction is
necessary to come to understand these categories; for Freud, the array of psychodynamic
techniques-hypnosis, free association, and other devices-are necessary to understand oneself.
246. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing the similarities between
Humean empiricism and Skinnerian behaviorism.)
247. GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY (1934). Mead was a
philosopher-turned-social-scientist. Mead viewed human personality to be developmental nonmechanistic and relational. Mead's "symbolic interactionism" posits that the individual self
develops through social interaction. Thus, there can be no true self without the other. The
individual comes to view herself as she believes others view her. The self was dynamic,
constantly changing and forever assigning meaning to objects in the course of even the most
trivial actions-dressing, personal style, choice of vocation. Through these a sense of self
emerges. Mead also had a great deal to say about the relationship between the self and social
order. His systems leaves room for novelty, and genius, the innovations of the gifted that
change society.

See RANDALL COLLINS & MICHAEL MAKOWSKI, THE DISCOVERY OF

SOCIETY 168-179 (1978) (providing an overview of Mead's thought).
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part empiricist and part structural in that he argues that, while the self
develops as the result of empirical experience, an enduring structure is
set in place as the result of this process.2
Alternatively, for the idealist, the self is not constituted or created at
all. It exists a prioriand precedes our contact with the world. While, on
the empiricist view, the self is built up, developed, and created as a
function of our experience, for the idealist the self just is. It exists
independently of what we think it is, or whether we believe it exists at
all. For the empiricist, on the other hand, the self is reflexive in
nature-the self is a self-representation. We are at least partly what we
think we are. On the empiricist view, we are (at least partially) our
identifications, desires, beliefs, and values. There is no subjective entity
which stands apart from the things with which we identify. In contrast,
the pure self of idealism can only be known, if it can be known at all, by
some form of transcendental deduction (Kant) or, in more spiritual
traditions, by the peeling away of the strata of empirical consciousness,
the "false self", represented by attachments, desires, and similar objects
of consciousness through meditation or similar spiritual exercises.249
The third, structural view, represented by the numerous versions of
modern psychodynamic theory and its offspring, combines the two
pictures of self-development. In Freud's view, for example, human
psychodynamic development is a function of a set of biologically
determined structural processes represented by the tripartite division of
personality into the id, the ego, and the super-ego, where this development is, in turn, affected by an individual's experiences." Freud did
for psychology what Kant did for philosophy, attempting to mesh the
insights of rationalism and empiricism by seeking to demonstrate that
there is indeed a psychological structure lying behind or beneath our
empirical experience. Freud differs from Kant, of course, in maintaining
that this psychological edifice is empirically observable, albeit with some

248. This structure is "enduring" in the sense that changes take place in a steady,
developmental process. In other words, the self is not constituted simply by ephemeral
thoughts, perceptions and desires, as for the empiricist. There is an underlaying structural
edifice that, although dynamic in its development, nevertheless continues to exist as the objects
of consciousness change.
249. In the Eastern, particularly yogic tradition, the ego or false self must be overcome
before one comes to experience the true nondual self. See AJAYA, supra note 123, at 128-135
(discussing the limitations of the ego), and at 147-177 (discussing the process of arriving at the
true Self).
250. See generallyFREUD, supranote 15 (discussing the relationship between id, ego, and
super-ego).
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difficulty
in virtue of the various psychodynamic defense mechan2
isms. 51
It should be observed here that the core self of traditional folk
psychology is most compatible with aspects of both the idealist and
structural conceptions. Kantian and neo-Kantian idealism characteristically place great emphasis upon freedom and rationality as hallmarks of
personhood. More romanticized versions of idealism, such as those
manifest in American transcendentalism, place primary importance upon
each person's uniqueness and authenticity. At the same time, however,
the traditional version of the core self relies upon certain structural ideas,
at least insofar as the self is represented as having an enduring character
structure, which makes us responsible for our actions. 2
2. Identification and Internalization
As we saw in Part II, the debate regarding the issue of commodification and the liberal/communitarian dispute regarding the relationship
of the self to its ends, values, and objects requires that we draw a
boundary line of sorts between the internal domain of the self, and the
external world. This requires that we are capable of specifying exactly
what the "contents" of the self are, exactly. It is on this point that the
three alternative views regarding what constitutes the self diverge
radically. Radin, in her analysis of commodification, takes an essentially
empiricist-structural view of the self. 3 She attempts to draw the line
between the internal and the external in terms of the level of psychological identification which an individual experiences with respect to some
object. In this way, she distinguishes love and sex, for example, from
what one does for a living in a way that permits her to argue that one
may sell her labor, but not her sex.' As Radin herself notes, the ideal
self of Kantian philosophy tends toward universal commodification
because of the way in which Kant draws the boundary line between
subject and object, self and world. The Kantian self cannot be commodi-

251. See supra note 245, for a brief comparison of Kant and Freud on this point.
252. Perhaps the paradigm example of a view which places primary emphasis upon
character is Aristotle's. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, bk. H (discussing the development of
virtue).
253. In other words, her view is similar in a general way to the view of the self put forth
in this Article. Radin specifically repudiates idealism in favor of a view of the self which
places emphasis upon the constituted nature of the self. See Radin, supra note 72, at 1906 ("to
think. . . that the "same" person remains when her moral commitments are subtracted-is
to do violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human.").
254. Id. at 1921-25.
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fled because it is empty; since all empirical attachments are not part of
who we are at our most fundamental, according to the Kantian, the
problem of commodification cannot arise."5
In parallel fashion, Sandel attacks Rawls, and Kant before him, for
a view of the self which tends to exaggerate the cleavage between subject
and object, and which views the self as separable from its choices, values,
commitments, and identifications. 6 According to Sandel, this improperly leads Rawls to conclude that parties in the original position can
reason effectively about the conditions of justice, even though they have
no knowledge of their particular circumstances or those of society
generally. 7
At the same time, there appears to be a structural component
implicit in Radin's and Sandel's views of the self. Not only are there
empirical attachments which form the basis of our identification and
internalization of such objects as our work, our sexual natures, and our
procreative capacities, 8 but permitting the more important of these to
be commodified will have lasting, adverse psychological consequences. 9 In sum, our identification with these objects are not simply
passing fancies; they become part of who we are in some relatively
permanent sense. We come to see ourselves in our work, our love, our
families, the things to which we are attached, and with which we identify.
On this theory, to alienate these objects is to do harm to our innermost
selves.
Though the process of identification, as employed by Radin, among
others, is a promising and potentially fruitful way of describing selfdevelopment, it is not clear exactly how this process of identification
takes place. Radin states simply that "we must recognize. . . that
interaction with physical and social contexts is also integral to personhood. One's surroundings-both people and things-can become part
of who one is, of the self."2" But in what sense do objects, even when
these objects are intangibles such as values and commitments, become

255. This has been described as the "dark side of Kantian personhood." Id. at 1897.
256. SANDEL, supra note 86, at 7-11.
257. Id. at 14.
258. "A better view of personhood should understand many kinds of particulars-one's
politics, work, religion, family, love, sexuality, friendship, altruism, character, experiences,
wisdom, moral commitments, and personal-as integral to the self." Radin, supra note 72, at
1905-06.
259. See, e.g., id. at 1907 (discussing "distortion" of personhood by commodifying the
personal).
260. Id. at 1906.
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part of the self?
Surprisingly little has been written concerning the process of
identification and internalization by contemporary philosophers. Rather,
two very disparate intellectual traditions, psychoanalytic theory and
eastern philosophy, have had the most to say about the concept.2 6'
Interestingly, both have given roughly similar descriptions of the process
as a kind of psychic appropriation of the object. Freud, for example,
discusses the idea of object cathexes and internalization as a process by
which the ego diverts psychic energy toward a particular object and
identifies with that object in a manner that incorporates the object as
part of the psychic structure-the self "internalizes" the object by
replicating its qualities.262 In Freudian thought, this process is typically
a defensive move on the part of the ego as a way to escape anxiety, for
example. Indeed, the formation of the super-ego is viewed to be an
internalization of parental attitudes with which the child identifies in
order to escape external punishment.2"'
In the eastern tradition, identification is the process by which the
pure (ideal) self covers itself over with the ego-the trappings of
empirical consciousness-which occurs as the result of drawing false
distinctions between subject and object, self and world.2" Here, the
process is ultimately viewed as an obstacle to coming to understand the
pure self. 2' The idea of internalization is nevertheless characterized
as a diversion of energy creating an attachment with which we identify

261. Social learning theory might be added to the list but it views what we are here
calling "internalization" as a kind of conditioning. Thus, where the psychoanalytic tradition
conceives of a self internalizing some object, social learning theory, following behaviorism, can
remain uncommitted to the idea that there is a self. Rather, the stimulus-response model of
operant conditioning is employed to explain this process.
262. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO 141-48 (James Straches trans.,
1950) (1913) (discussing the killing of the primordial father, the internalization of him as a
psychological object and the resulting guilt); FREUD, supra note 106, at 160-63, 169-176
(discussing case histories of object internalization of reactions thereto); FREUD, supra note 15,
at 18-29 (discussing the psychodynamic creation of object cathexes, object identifications, and
their influence on the ego and super ego).
263. See FREUD, supra note 106, at 149 (providing the development of the super-ego
from external constraints that have been internalized); FREUD, supra note 13, at 18-29
(discussing the Oedipal complex, and its role in the development in the super-ego).
264. See AJAYA, supra note 123, at 128-35 (in Yogic thought); SNELLING, supra note 84,
at 53-54 (providing insight on Buddhist thought).
265. AMAYA, supra note 123, at 135-46. In traditional Buddhist thought, there is no self
at all. Coming to understand our nature, for the Buddhist, is to understand that there is no
pure self underlying empirical consciousness. SNELLING, supra note 84, at 153-154 (discussing
the doctrine of anatman, or "no self").
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as part of who we mistakenly think we are most fundamentally." 6
The self-constructionist model of self-development that we have
previously sketched in Part V.C. depends upon something like this idea
of the process of identification and internalization, though without the
idealist conviction that there is a pure self from the outset underneath.
The process of self-construction is not a passive one on the part of the
self. Present experience is interpreted and then incorporated, modified
or rejected, in accordance with the existing structure of the self.
Moreover, this entire process can be translated into the language of
brain/mind states by viewing these incorporated, constituent components
of the self as modifying the neural circuitry of the brain and nervous
system.267 Thus, as the self develops by internalizing its experiences,
these relatively more permanent aspects of the self become part of the
physical nervous system. This view of the self is consistent with recent
self as similar to
work in the area of cognitive science, which views the
2
a highly complex, self-modifying computer program. 6
This is the picture of the self which appears to have emerged from
such disparate fields as social learning theory, modern ego psychology
and contemporary cognitive science.269 It is now time to examine the
implications of this view for the jurisprudential issues raised in Part II.
While our self-identity is largely constituted by the things with which
we identify, this picture of the self is more helpful in settling certain
problems central to the attribution of moral and legal responsibility than
to the problem of commodification. Let us begin with the commodification issue.
As Part II discussed, commodification occurs when one sells or
commodifies an aspect of oneself-when one treats as an alienable object

266. AJAYA, supra note 123, at 173-177.
267. Any naturalistic conception of the self, including the view put forth here, must
explain changes in personality, character or the self in terms of physical changes in the nervous
system. Thus, new habits, lifestyle patterns, personality traits, etc. must be manifest in
structures in the brain.
268. See generally BERTRAM RAPHAEL, THE THINKING COMPUTER: MIND INSIDE
MATTER (1976); NILS NILSSON, PRINCIPLES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (1980).

269. What all these diverse theoretical approaches share in common is the idea that
human personality is built up out of experience in a way that leaves some lasting structural
edifice. While social learning theory views this process as a function of stimulus-response
mechanisms, cognitive science approaches the mind as a kind of self-modifying computer
software. While fundamental differences of approach persist between these approaches, all
presuppose a process similar to what we are here calling "internalization" though, again, social
learning theory would not describe it as such.
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that which is part and parcel of the subject or the self.2 70 While the

argument for commodification depends upon our being able to draw a
line between the realm of the self and that of the world, a bright line
cannot even in principle be drawn. Radin makes this point clear in her
piece. She argues persuasively that "the external/internal distinction is
a continuum and not a bright-line dichotomy."'
The reason for this
distinction is that there are degrees of attachment or identification. For
example, one may identify with being male more than he does with being
a law professor, and more with being a law professor than he does with
being a member of the local softball league. Some of our attachments
are qualitatively much more central to our self-identity than are others,
and the question as to where to draw the line between which attachments are central and which are not is somewhat arbitrary.
This in itself is not an insurmountable problem. Arbitrary but
rationally defensible lines are often drawn in law. The problem here,
however, is that Radin introduces a normative element into the analysis
which renders her argument circular and which leaves her open to the
charge that she is merely picking and choosing, in a post hoc fashion, the
things which she would prefer to have placed beyond the scope of the
market while leaving open to commodification the things which she
believes should be alienable. Radin states:
To identify something as personal, it is not enough to observe
that many people seem to identify with some particular kind of
thing, because we may judge such identification to be bad for
people. An example of a justifiable kind of relationship is
people's involvement with their homes. This relationship permits
self-constitution within a stable environment. An example of an
unjustifiable kind of relationship is the involvement of the robber
baron with an empire of "property for power." The latter is
unjustified because it ties into a conception of the person we can
recognize as inferior: the person as self-interested maximizer of
manipulative power. There is no algorithm or abstract formula
to tell us which items are (justifiably) personal. A moral
judgment is required in each case.272

Radin's argument is circular for the following reason: while it
initially appears that she attempts, in an interesting way, to generate a
normative conclusion regarding the things we should permit people to
270. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the philosophy of
commodification.
271. Radin, supra note 72, at 1909.
272. Id. at 1908.
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alienate freely based on a quasi-factual premise about which of these
things falls within the internal domain, in fact, her premise is normative
in the first place. She imports into her premise the same issue she seeks
to provide a conclusion about, namely, which sorts of things we should
permit people to contract about, and to sell on the market. Her
intriguing exposition of the self/world dichotomy turns out to be largely
superfluous. In the end, it appears that she simply chooses certain values
for protection based on other unstated considerations.273
Another problem with using the self/world dichotomy as the
predicate for putting certain (personal) entities off-limits is that there
might be things with which we closely identify that we do think are
properly commodifiable. For example, attributes such as one's intelligence, motivation, industriousness, loyalty, compassion, or other
character attributes are precisely the kinds of things that employers look
for in making hiring decisions. It is difficult to see how intelligence, for
example, is less internal to one's sense of identity than is one's sexuality
or procreative capacity. Given this, how is it that the professor can sell
her mind but the prostitute cannot sell her sex?
We seem intuitively to draw distinctions between what should and
should not be sold based upon considerations other than the level of
personal identification with which they are imbued. These include the
potential social and psychological consequences of alienating certain
things. Thus, while Radin is correct to consider other factors, it appears
that in many cases these other factors may be more relevant to the issue
of market-alienability than is the level of identification. In sum, the issue
is not so much one of commodification as it is one of stigmatization,
discrimination, or other issues.
While understanding the process of identification and internalization
turns out not to be as relevant in the context of contract law, as with the
commodification debate, the next section will argue that it is more
helpful in conceptualizing what it means for a person to act in an
autonomous fashion in a way that makes him subject to the attribution
of moral and legal responsibility. It is to these concerns that we now
turn.

273. These other considerations are normative. Indeed Radin states personhood has a
normative aspect insofar as we must ask whether identifying with something is justified. Id.
at 1908.
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B. Autonomy as a Constructive Process and the Question of Moral
and Legal Responsibility
This section examines a number of problems central to our
understanding of the idea of volition, freedom, and autonomy. The aim
here is twofold: first, to elucidate the way in which self-identity is
related to the issue of personal freedom; secondly, to sketch a developmental conception of autonomy. We will seek to demonstrate in a
general way that the idealist tradition, and Kant in particular, was correct
in claiming that persons should be thought of as autonomous beings, but
incorrect in holding that we are intrinsically autonomous in an a priori
manner. Rather, this section argues that autonomy is a capacity which
is developed through experience and that our sense of identity is itself
gained through the expression of the autonomous will. More specifically,
this section will argue that autonomy can be thought to be a threedimensional construct, built up through the processes of internalization,
self-integration and self-development.
This view of autonomy has two important implications. First,
autonomy is not to be thought of as the exercise of a detached rational
will, as it was for Kant, but as an expression of the integrated network
of values and identifications which constitute the self. Second, autonomy
occurs along a continuum and is a matter of degree; it is not an absolute
or binary construct which either does or does not exist.
The following subsection begins by examining the concept of will
and by comparing two competing philosophical conceptions of human
motivation, the Humean and Platonic views. The subsection argues that
an intermediate construct, roughly analogous to the concept of the ego
in modern psychology, best explains both the developmental nature of
freedom and the relationship between self-identity and freedom. The
succeeding subsections respectively examine the concepts of internalization, self-integration, and self-development by addressing the issue of
duress, the problem of the divided sel, and the question of social
conditioning.
1. The Humean and the Platonic Conceptions of Will
The same divide between empiricist and rationalist views of human
personality is also of fundamental significance with respect to the
question of our capacity to will. At the risk of over-simplification, the
Humean (and, more generally, empiricist) view of human motivation and
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the Platonic (and rationalist) conception will be distinguished.27 4 The
Humean account attempts to explain human motivation without
reference to the concept of will, which would be subject to attack on
empiricist grounds as a dubious, unobservable metaphysical entity. In
place of the capacity known as will, the empiricist holds that human
motivation can be completely explained by reference to our desires. This
view acts in accordance with our strongest desires without having to posit
an entity standing free and clear above the flux of desire or the will. To
put the matter a bit differently, for Hume, reason and desire or, in
modern terms, our cognitive and volitional capacities, are completely
distinct entities with different functions. We are motivated solely by
desires, while reason plays the subordinate role of calculating the most
efficient means to the ends we desire. This purely instrumental
conception of reason explains Hume's oft-quoted claim that "reason is
a slave to the passions." 275
For Plato, on the other hand, reason had an important role in
motivating behavior insofar as it permits us to judge between what is
good and bad, what has value and what does not. On the rationalist
account, reason (or will power) stands as a kind of independent agency
capable of resisting the demands of desire in the interest of what is good.
Far from being subordinate to the passions, reason is the dominant and
unifying aspect of human personality.276 On the Platonic account, in
contrast to the Humean view, human motivation is not entirely desiredriven. The alternative implications of these views can be observed most
clearly in situations involving personal conflict or temptation.2'
The Humean account of motivation is popular today and has
influenced behaviorist views of action.278 In the domain of jurisprudence, the Humean view has found a defender in Richard Posner who
argues that: "we have desires, and we have beliefs-formed with the
help of consciousness-about how to fulfill those desires; and the
274. Gary Watson, Free Agency, 72, J. PHIL. 205, 207 (1975).
275. HUME, supra note 105, bk. II, pt. III, § III.
276. Reason is viewed as a charioteer driving the horses which represent the passions.
PLATO, supra note 118, at 575, 605-630.
277. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the will/desire
distinction as applied to temptation.
278. In a sense, modem behaviorism goes beyond even Humean empiricism. Where
Hume held that action is always desire-motivated and never a function of reason, the
behaviorist rejects ever desires as the cause of actions. On the behaviorist account, desires do
not cause actions, environmental conditioning does.
Nevertheless, the Humean account of action is reflected in the popular idea that a person
only acts from desires. This has troubling implications for any account of altruism.
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conjunction of the desires and the beliefs determines, without need to
posit a faculty of free will, our volitional behavior."' 79
Notwithstanding its current hold in certain circles, there are a
number of problems with this Humean desire-driven motivational
scheme. First, in the realm of moral psychology, this view appears to
entail some form of psychological egoism and to preclude the possibility
of genuine altruistic action; this is because all action must be conceived
of as selfish in the sense that action must invariably be characterized as
being driven by the agent's own desires.'
Second, it does not comport with our common-sense intuition that we do indeed sometimes resist
desires without having a countervailing desire; we sometimes act or
refrain from acting on the basis of judgments and values, for example."~ Third, the Humean account completely undermines any conception of the unity of the self. Skinner clearly recognized this in arguing
that behaviorism precludes the traditional idea of the functional unity of
the person.'
Where, on the rationalist account, will is conceived as
a stable, independent entity standing above the flux of emotion and
desire, giving identity to the person and grounding moral responsibility,
the empiricist picture of human motivations posits a kind of eternal war
of conflicting desires in which the strongest desire prevails over the
others. Nothing remains constant and there is no central "executive
control" making decisions. Finally, the Humean account also has the
consequence of collapsing the distinction between voluntary acts and free
acts. The next section will return to these last two problems.
An alternative to the Platonic and Humean conceptions of will, and
the hypothesis to be defended here, is central to much recent psychology,
particularly the traditions of developmental psychology, ego psychology
and humanistic psychology. 2 In sum, the idea is that there is a (more

279. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 173 (1990).
280. If all action is desire-motivated, then what distinguishes the acts of a Mother Teresa,
for example, from those of the most greedy robber baron? She must, after all, desire to do
what she has done just as the robber baron's acts are motivated by his desires. See generally
THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 3-23 (1970) (attempting to provide a
solution to this problem).
281. The hedonist, of course, will argue that these judgments must be disguised desires
for them to motivate.
282. SKINNER, supra note 154, at 285.
283. By "developmental psychology," I mean a diverse grouping of views including
Freud, Piaget, Erikson, and Kohlberg, among others. All of these theoretical psychologists
argue that the self develops through a series of psychological stages representing the state of
maturity of the person. See generallyPATRICIA H. MILLER, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1983) (providing an overview of the thought of Freud, Piaget, and the others
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or less) stable psychological structure which plays an important role in
motivating human action as the rationalists maintain. This structure is
comprised of our identifications and values, which are themselves the
sources of personal identity and, as such, are the building blocks of the
self. This agency is most typically referred to as the "ego" by diverse
traditions, psychoanalytic, and otherwise.'
The psychological concept of the ego has a number of inherent
advantages over the philosophical construct of will, at least as will is
conceived in the rationalist tradition. First, the ego is not necessarily
rational in the Platonic or Kantian senses because the identifications of
which it is comprised may be established in early childhood, in virtue of
powerful irrational or emotional associations, or as a function of basic
biological needs. Thus, one might come to identify with authority
figures, or with lifestyle patterns or modes of activity in a manner that
is not necessarily detached, objective, or rational in the sense required
by Plato or Kant. At the same time, however, our motivational structure
is dynamic; as it changes over time in the course of self-development we
can come to "rationalize" our identifications in the sense that we can
reject certain identifications or values as injurious to ourselves, replacing
them with others that are more consistent with a more mature value
system. Thus, the ego develops over time while the rational will may be
thought to be static.
Second, the concept of the ego directly links our conception of
personal identity to the concept of freedom. Freedom is the expression
of the entire person in action; it is not the manifestation of a detached,
empty subject. As the distinguished humanistic psychologist Rollo May
put it, "autonomy and freedom cannot be the domain of a special part
of the organism, but must be a quality of the total self-the thinkingfeeling-choosing-acting organism."' 5
Finally, and very importantly, central to the concept of the ego is the
idea that there exists a two-way relationship between self-identity and
freedom. Not only does freedom flow from acts of the constituted self,
but the self is constituted in the process of acting. We gain our identity
in action. It was this idea that moved the psychoanalyst Bruno

mentioned here).
284. The use of the term "ego" does not commit us to any particular conception of the
psychodynamic structure of the self. Thus, though Freud originated the term, we need not
take a position on whether there exists a super ego or id, for example. It is simply used here
to represent that aspect of personhood which is characterized by our self-identity.
285.

ROLLO MAY, LOVE AND WILL 199 (1969).
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Bettelheim to state that "a strong ego is not the cause of decisions but
the result."' 6
There are a number of other important psychological issues
concerning the ego about which we may, for the moment at least, remain
agnostic. Whether the ego is moved by unconscious impulses or what
the particular nature of the structural stages through which the self
develops are important psychological questions. It would be sheer
presumption, however, to attempt to answer these questions here.
Rather, this Article simply seeks to provide a general framework for
understanding the philosophical psychology of self-development.
We can learn more about the relationship between self-development
and personal freedom by examining the exculpatory nature of certain
claims (duress, brain-washing, and related claims) and the more
ambiguous case of social conditioning.
2. The Distinction Between Voluntary Acts and Free Acts: The
Excuse of Duress Examined
The concepts of volition, free action, and autonomous action are
sometimes not well-distinguished; they may appear to overlap each other
or to be coterminous concepts.2 Indeed, on the Humean account,
there can be no principled way of drawing a distinction between these
concepts. The Humean or empiricist account holds that freedom is
simply the ability to act in accordance with desire, and that only desire
can motivate acts. Thus, the distinction between volition, freedom, and
autonomy is collapsed into a single idea: an act is voluntary or free or
autonomous if the agent desired to perform it.288 As this section
argues, not only is this an impoverished account of the psychology of

286. Id.
287. Aristotle distinguishes between voluntary acts and free acts. He states: "Choice,
then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary; the latter extends more
widely." ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, at 967. Thus, chosen acts appear to be a subset of
voluntary acts. See Gert, Coercion and Freedom, in COERCION, supra note 20 at 32 (arguing
that one acting voluntarily but under an unreasonable incentive is not acting freely).
On the other hand, some might argue that actions performed under duress are not even
voluntary, thus collapsing the distinction between freedom and voluntariness. Others have
argued that coercion may or may not be voluntary. For these writers volition and freedom
partially overlap. Virginia held, Coercion and Coercive Offers, in COERCION, supra note 16,
at 53.
288. There is a complication here. Even under duress one desires to do the act which
is performed under duress. The agent would not desire to act in the same manner under
normal circumstances, but on the other hand, all desire arises relative to actual circumstances.
See supra notes 286-88 and accompanying text, for discussion of this problem.
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motivation, it prevents its defenders from elaborating a coherent theory
as to why duress should be treated as a type of excuse.28
The distinction between a voluntary act and a free act is illustrated
by the problem of duress. Acts performed under duress are indeed
voluntary acts in the usual sense of the term "voluntary.""29 The victim
of duress makes a choice, albeit under the threat of force, and carries out
the act accordingly. In this manner, the victim of duress is in a very
different situation than the victim of true compulsion in the strict sense.
The victim of compulsion does not "act" at all; rather, she is acted upon
by some external force or agency.29 1 The person who is carried by
force onto another's property is not a trespasser; nor is the person a
murderer who, against his wishes and intention, has his fingers squeezed
upon a trigger by a third party.92 The point here is to recognize an
important psychological distinction between acting under duress and not
acting at all.
Nevertheless, as Part II revealed, it is common to say that persons
acting under duress are not really free in the usual sense of the word,
though they act voluntarily. Sometimes this is expressed by saying that
their "will is overcome by the coercive influence" or that they "really
didn't have a choice." Again, this is not, strictly speaking, accurate.
Even the victim of duress has a choice in the sense that he could have
chosen to incur the threatened harm rather than commit the act
demanded of him. Nevertheless, we tend to excuse such instances, at
least when the threatened harm is great and the act performed is not as
serious. Why do we excuse such acts, and in what sense are acts
performed under duress not free?
Earlier we argued that those acts are free which flow from the self,
rather than the world. Thus, following Aristotle's view, coerced acts are

289. Duress can only be an excuse if it interferes with the freedom of the agent. But if
all voluntary acts are free, or if acts which are motivated by desire are free, the Humean
cannot account for how this renders the agent unfree in the sense in which they would define
"freedom." At most, the Humean might have to treat duress as a kind of justification, as in
a choice of evils situation. Nor will it help to say that coercion interferes with rationality. The
victim of duress may well act perfectly rationally in obeying the demand of the threatening
party.
290. To act voluntarily is to act from a particular volition. See supra note 11, for a
discussion of the legal definition of volition.
291. The Model Penal Code recognizes that there is no "act" where a person's act is the
result of a reflex, unconsciousness, post-hypnotic suggestion or a bodily movement that is not
"a product of the effort or determination of the actor." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)
(1962).
292. See Hart, supra note 8, at 97 (discussing the act requirement).
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unfree in that they are externally motivated by the threat of force, and
do not arise from internal sources.293 As it stands, however, this is
much too simplistic. After all, it might be argued in response that acts
performed under duress are every bit as motivated by internal factors as
are non-coerced acts. The person with a gun to his head, for example,
acts from the motive of self-preservation, a motive every bit as "internal"
as factors which motivate in more commonplace situations. Conversely,
non-coercive situations may be as marked by the presence of an external
impetus as are coercive situations. How does the fact that one acts
because one has a gun at one's head make the act any more or less free
than when one acts from such external influences as the desire for
material advantage, or even to avoid some commonplace external harm?
Thus, it is not clear how acts performed under duress are less internally
motivated than are acts which are not the product of coercion.
What is needed is a more subtle way of drawing the distinction
between the internal and the external, one consistent with the earlier
discussion of personal identity.294 The solution which this section
proposes requires that a distinction be drawn between two kinds of
motivating factors, what we will call "valuational" and "motivational"
factors.295 Valuational factors are the set of judgments and values,
discussed in the previous section, with which the agent identifies and
which she has internalized and integrated into her psychic structure. In
short, they are the collection of internalized objects from which the ego
is built up. Motivational factors, on the other hand, include a range of
psychological influences over which we have less control, and with which
we may not identify. They include various physiological needs and a
range of instinctual psychological impulses such as the drive for selfpreservation. While our valuational and motivational influences usually
overlap, as when we come to identify with our nature as sexual beings,
they may also be in conflict with each other.
Acts which spring from motivational factors are voluntary, but not
necessarily free. An act is voluntary but not free if two conditions are
met. First, the motivational factors which produce the act must be in
293. Aristotle would define such acts as arising from internal sources; see supra notes
19-21 and accompanying texts, but the line to be drawn here between the internal and the
external falls along psychological lines by employing the concept of internalization. In other
words, the view put forth here requires not simply that the act flow from some mental source,
as all volitions do, but from a source internalto the Self. Thus, an act is only free if it flows
from internalized values.
294. See supra Part VI.A.2, for a discussion of self-identity and internalization.
295. A similar distinction is drawn by Watson. Watson, supra note 274, at 206.
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opposition to one's core values and identifications in a way that makes
satisfying both physically impossible. In other words, one's valuational
system must be in conflict with one's motivational system. Those
addicted to various substances suffer this type of conflict.296 Second,
the motivational influences must be so powerful that we normally do not
expect one to be able to resist them.
Duress is the paradigm example of the situation where both of these
conditions are met. Coercion renders the agent unfree by pitting the
agent's motivational system against his identifications and values by
forcing him to act in contravention of who he is most fundamentally.
For example, the man with the gun to his head is forced to choose
between self-preservation and acting in accordance with his usual values
and identifications. Moreover, the excuse is only permitted in situations
where the threatened harm is great and the action demanded of the
victim is less serious such that we would not expect the victim to resist.
Though it is not my intention to elaborate fully upon the various
implications of the theory developed here, two important qualifications
should be mentioned. First, any person who voluntarily engages in acts
that create the conflict between the motivational and valuational systems
should not be excused for the resulting act.297 Second, voluntary acts
are acts for which the agent is responsible unless they are unfree-unless
they are in contravention of the person's characteristic schema of values.
On the other hand, the person who acts from motivational factors which
neither contradict nor conform
to values and identifications should be
298
held responsible for his acts.
In sum, freedom requires a kind of vertical privity between our
valuational system (our values and identifications) and our motivational
system. The next subsection will argue that freedom also requires a kind
of horizontal privity between our diverse values and identifications.

296. The case of the heroin addict is employed through Watson's article as a paradigm
instance of someone who is not free through they may be able to get what they desire in this
case, heroin. The drug addict is a particularly poignant example because their lack of freedom
arises, in some sense, from within their own physiological system. See id.
297. This explains why we do not excuse the heroin addict for his behavior, notwithstanding the fact that his behavior eventually becomes un-free. See id.
298. In other words a voluntary act is only unfree when it conflicts with internalized
values; where no such values exist, in other words, where a person acts from motivational
sources in the absence of any relevant internalized value, the act is not unfree. In sum, one
need not act from an internalized value to be free, but where an act is in contravention of such
an internalized value, there the act is not free.
This stipulation is necessary to make clarify that persons may be half responsible for acts
which flow from motivational sources unconnected to any value on identification.
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Harmonizing or rationalizing these values and identifications occurs
through the process of self-integration.
3. Freedom and Self-Integration: Split Personality, Brain-Washing,
and the Problem of the Divided Self
There is yet another way in which acts may be unfree though
voluntary. This is where decisions and actions derive from psychic
sources which are not, properly speaking, those of the agent. The idea
of psychic splitting has received a great deal of attention from the
9
diverse standpoints of Freudian psychoanalytic theory,"
Jungian
3
30
psychology, " and other approaches
At the less serious end of the
continuum, this phenomenon may be characterized by the tension one
experiences as the result of conflicting values and identifications. In its
worst manifestations, on the other hand, such conflict may take the form
of various dissociative behaviors, including the phenomenon popularly
known as split personality 2 At this extreme, the personality is aptly
characterized as having splintered off into different selves some of whom
may be totally unaware of the others. 3
This Article does not aim to provide even a general overview of
these psychological phenomena. Rather, it aims to highlight yet another
dimension of the autonomous individual, the relative state of selfintegration. Self-integration is the process by which the person
harmonizes and rationalizes her values and identifications by developing
a kind of internal coherence among the things that one most values and
believes. This is accomplished by modifying or relinquishing past
identifications in a manner that renders the present set of identifications
internally consistent; by reconciling conflicts between one's needs and
drives, on one hand, and one's values and identifications, on the other;

299. SIGMUND FREUD, INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON Psycho ANALYSIS (James
Strachey ed., 1966).
300. C.G. Jung, On The Nature of the Psyche, in 8 THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF
THE PSYCHE, 159,200 (Sir Herbert Read et al. eds., R.F.C. Hull. trans., Princeton Univ. Press
2d ed. 1975) (1960).
301. E.g., ARTHUR JANOV, THE PRIMAL SCREAM 26 (1970) (discussing the splitting of
behavior from feelings); JAMES, supranote 103, at 379-93 (describing what he calls "alternating
personality," including some early case histories of what today would be called "split
personality").
302. See generally CORBETT H. THIGPEN & HERVEY M. CLECKLEY, THE THREE FACES
OF EVE (1957) (providing an autobiographical account of multiple personality).
303. JAMES, supra note 103, at 380 (explaining that, in extreme cases, one personality
may remember the acts of another, while the second may know nothing of the existence of the
first).
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and by internalizing new values and objects of identification in such a
way as to maintain consistency with the old. Obviously, the entire
process is dynamic. As new values and identifications are internalized,
previous values and identifications may give way or be re-interpreted so
as to minimize
conflict. In this way, the self grows, changes, and
3°4
evolves.
There exist a number of excuses which recognize the freedomlimiting aspects of the more serious types of dissociative or nonintegrative mental conditions. The insanity defense and various forms
of diminished capacity defense serve wholly or partially to exculpate
those suffering from severe dissociative disorders such as split personality
syndrome. 315 These cases raise fascinating moral and metaphysical
questions regarding the possibility that there are two or more persons
inhabiting the same body, and how this is to be treated for purposes of
legal responsibility.3"
Brain-washing represents yet a different obstacle to self-integration.
Genuine brain-washing is much more subtle than simple aversive
conditioning of a Clockwork Orange variety. Rather than establishing
a conditioned response to some particular stimulus, brain-washing
techniques serve to alter or supplant, at least temporarily, the victim's
existing values and identifications in a manner that, at a minimum, sets
up another valuational structure that conflicts with the agent's own
previous scheme. Since the experience of brain-washing is typically of
short duration, the previous, long-standing valuational structure may not
be destroyed in the process. Instead, the new, artificially induced scheme
of values and attachments may temporarily co-exist with the previous set
of values and identifications, almost as if part of a second person has
been implanted into the first. Taken to an extreme, on the other hand,
the process may actually be viewed to replace, in some sense, the
previous agent with "somebody else."
Here, the victim of brain-washing is unfree for a different reason

304. The conflict-reduction aspect of self-integrative behavior has been captured by the
concept of "cognitive dissonance," the idea that the person experiences a kind of unpleasant
tension in virtue of harboring inconsistent feelings and/or beliefs. This tension is reduced by
modifying or outright eliminating some of the conflicting feelings outright eliminating some
of the conflicting feelings.
305. See Elyn R. Saks, Multiple PersonalityDisorderand CriminalResponsibility,25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 383 (1992).
306. Should one self be held responsible for the acts of another when it is impossible to
punish only the offending self? No court has addressed this issue as such. See id. at 413-18
(discussing this problem).
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than that of the victim of duress. The victim of brain-washing may
indeed be acting from a valuational system in a way that the victim of
duress is not. This valuational system, however, is not "her own." It is
not her own because the victim has not integrated the new valuational
system into her pre-existing self-structure. In other words, we tend to
excuse the victim of brain-washing not because he has been conditioned
to accept certain values and beliefs not originally his own. Rather, we
excuse because the new values and beliefs are still not his own in the
sense that they have not been integrated into the existing self-structure.
Put differently, while we are justified in holding each person morally and
legally responsible for the person he or she becomes, we are only
justified in doing so when the person has the reasonable opportunity and
the capacity to reflect and decide which values she wishes to embody and
which she wishes to reject. The victim of brain-washing is excused
because the unintegrated and often conflicting nature of the new
implanted values vis-a-vis the previously existing self clearly demonstrates that the victim has not had the opportunity to engage in such selfreflection.
This raises a crucial issue regarding the effects of conditioning or
brain-washing when an entirely new person is built up ex nihilo. In other
words, should the victim of brain-washing be held responsible when the
program of brain-washing is so intensive or long-standing that it succeeds
in creating a new person altogether, with a new, fully-integrated
valuational structure that replaces the old? And, if not, how is this any
different in principle from the case of the child who from birth is socially
conditioned such that the resulting person has internalized a set of values
and identifications that will land him in trouble with the law?
The next subsection considers this problem of social conditioning
and its implications for moral and legal responsibility.
4. The Distinction Between Freedom and Autonomy: The Case of
Social Conditioning
Social conditioning, in itselt is not a freedom-limiting phenomenon.
If it were, we all would be equally unfree insofar as our selves are built
up out of our respective social experiences. Indeed, as paradoxical as it
may sound initially, social conditioning can be freedom-enhancing insofar
as free action is the expression of the self, and the self is largely a selfconstructed product of interpreted and internalized social experience. In
other words, there can be no freedom without a self and no self without
the world from which we construct it. However, while social conditioning does not limit freedom, it can either enhance or limit autonomy,
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depending upon the values that are internalized as a result of the
conditioning.
It is important at this point to distinguish freedom from autonomy.
As this Article has previously argued, freedom is the ability of the self
to express itself in the world of action; an act is free when the agent acts
in accordance with her valuational structure as it is constituted at the
time of action. In this respect, particular acts are free when they reflect
the agent's values and identifications, whether they are carried out by a
villager in the most primitive outpost in the world or by the most
sophisticated cosmopolitan. Nevertheless, we tend to view persons with
limited valuational structures as less "free," in some sense, than others
with broader experiences, backgrounds, or goals and values. There is a
sense of lost potential, of limited horizons, and of a wary narrowness of
vision in life that characterizes the cloistered, the sheltered, and the
socially disadvantaged. Autonomy is the unfoldment of this potential-not simply the achievement of one's present values, but the
progressive unfoldment of future values and, with these, the development
of one's wider range of talents, interests, and capacities such that the self
may be said to be more fully developed."
Social conditioning-and the term here is not meant to connote the
passive, stimulus-response process of the behaviorist-operates via the
processes of identification and internalization. The central point here is
that certain internalized values are life-affirming, self-supporting, and
autonomy-enhancing, while others pose a baleful influence upon selfdevelopment. Beneficial values are those that promote the three
dimensions of human autonomy-self-creation through internalization,
self-integration, and self-development. Self-creation takes place through
the establishment of a valuational structure that is well-connected to
motivational sources. As this Article maintains, the valuational structure
is the basis for human identity and the well-spring of personal freedom.
Self-integration is the harmonization of values and identifications in a
manner that reduces inner conflict and promotes unity of action. Finally,
self-development is the continuous re-creation and expansion of the self
in a manner such that the self may be said to grow, to value, and to
307. The offered conception of autonomy is not that of the pure, empty rational will of
the Kantian subject. The ability to reason in a disengaged Kantian manner is itself a function
of self-development. As the term is used here, "autonomy" means the unfoldment of one's
total capacities and talents in accordance with the nature of the self as it has developed
through experience. Thus, autonomy made be thought of as a relative approximation of selfperfection in the Aristotelian sense, or as Spinoza conceived human freedom. ARISTOTLE,
supra note 21, at 964-66; SPINOZA, supra note 176, at 201-23.
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identify with a wider and a higher quality array of experiences, even to
transcend its previous states in the process. On the other hand, the
internalization of other such values may be anathema to self-development, and to autonomy.
A current example of a situation where commentators have argued
that certain forms of social conditioning diminish the freedom of the
affected parties may help to illustrate this point. Some feminists have
maintained that women who are raised in a male-dominated society are
unfree because they have internalized patriarchal values. This argument
has been made, among other places, in the debate over whether women
who become prostitutes or surrogate mothers are truly free with respect
to their choice of profession." 8 In one sense, of course, any social
system that limits the opportunities available to a particular class of
persons renders them unfree in an external way-in the sense that they
are not able to achieve a desired goal. The woman who wishes to
become an executive but is forced by virtue of unjust social and political
forces to choose between motherhood and prostitution is obviously
unfree in this external, political sense.
This is not, however, the extent of the feminist claim. Instead, the
feminist seeks to demonstrate that the prostitute or the surrogate mother
is not free in the sense which this section has discussed-in the internal
sense, in the sense that she is not personally free. This is clear from the
fact that this genre of argument is typically made in the course of
arguing that the surrogate should be excused from complying with the
contract she has signed, 3" or that the prostitute should not be held
criminally liable for selling sex. In sum, the argument sounds in the
lexicon of exculpation. The victim of this claim is not the would-be
executive frustrated by external obstacles in her career choice. Indeed,
this woman has not internalized patriarchal values at all. It is the woman
who has internalized these values, the woman who believes, in virtue of
them, that she really wants to be a surrogate mother, who is the subject
of the feminist argument here. In what sense, if any, does this person
lack personal freedom?
The answer is that the surrogate mother is free, but may lack
autonomy. She is free in the same sense that everyone else is usually

308. E.g., Giobbe, supra note 73, at 67-81; COREA, supra note 72, at 227, 303.
309. One approach is to argue that surrogates should be free to enter into such contracts
if they wish, but to cancel the contract at any time and retain custody of the baby. This has
the effect of making the contract voidable at the discretion of the surrogate mother. This was
proposed in MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATES MOTHERHOOD 75-83, 97-109 (1990).
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free; she has acted from a set of internalized values which are part of a
more or less integrated character structure. The surrogate is no more
unfree by virtue of having internalized social values which dictate that
women should express themselves in procreational roles than the bully
should be excused of assault and battery because he has internalized
values that hold that men should be aggressive.
Nevertheless, a woman who grows up in a patriarchal society may
suffer a relative lack of autonomy insofar as her internalized values may
have prevented her further self-development. When one's internalized
valuational structure is static and self-limiting in the sense that one
comes to value and identify with attitudes and lifestyle patterns that
preclude one from learning about oneself and one's world-when one's
self-identity stifles any inclination toward education, self-reflection, and
self-development-then one's capacity for autonomy may be justly said
to be impoverished.
Patriarchal values do not stunt autonomy because they provide that
women should find self-identity in the role of wife, mother or care-giver;
they stunt autonomy to the extent that built into the value structure of
these roles is the idea that women are limited to these roles. The roles
themselves preclude the unfoldment of deeper modes of self-identity by
preventing the adoption of alternative values, identifications, and roles;
and by discouraging the self-reflection necessary to continue the process
of self-development. It should be observed here that traditional male
roles, particularly lower-class male roles, may limit their self-development in a similar way though, again, the external constraints upon
women were traditionally greater than were those for men, particularly
among the middle and upper classes.
Lack of autonomy does not exculpate, either in criminal or in
contract law; however, lack of internal freedom does. This is so because
autonomy is a relative concept on the definition proposed by this section;
we are all more or less autonomous. It will not do simply to draw a line
along the continuum and say, for example, that all who fall below a
certain point will be excused for their acts. This would have the
consequence of infantilizing all women, or at least all those who fall
below the line-of rendering them legally incapable of entering into any
contract or of taking responsibility for other acts. To absolve any person
of the responsibility for their decisions on the basis of the claim that, had
social conditions been different they might have made a different choice
is to reiterate, at a different level, the hard determinist's challenge
discussed in Part V. It would be to permit an excuse on the basis of the
fact that, had the surrogate mother or perhaps the inner city gang
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member been a different person, they would have made different
choices301
It should be the primary goal of any humane society to promote the
ultimate self-development of every person, a topic which the remainder
of this Article addresses. Short of this goal being reached, every person
remains morally and legally responsible for who they are and what they
do, as long as the minimum conditions of freedom are met.
Before moving to the final topic, it should be noted that this Article
has not presumed to present a comprehensive treatment of the issues
that concern questions of freedom and moral responsibility. It has not,
for example, examined the ways in which various mental handicaps
interfere with the exercise of freedom by limiting our ability to reason.
The foregoing discussion has simply sought to sketch in broad strokes the
ways in which questions of personal identity are related to the problem
of personal freedom. Undoubtedly, a great deal more work on these
issues remains to be done.
C. Privacy, Equality, and Self-Actualization

This piece will end with a few comments regarding the nature of the
relationship between the self as a developmental entity and two
important rights: privacy and equality. While a strong argument could
be made for a positive right to the primary goods necessary to selfdevelopment-governmentally guaranteed rights to physical sustenance,
shelter, and education-this discussion will focus instead upon what are
perhaps the two most important negative rights: the rights to privacy and
equality.311 This last section concentrates upon these negative rights not
simply because moral and constitutional rights in the Anglo-American
tradition have traditionally been conceived almost wholly in terms of

310. See supra VI.B.2, for a discussion of the problem raised by the relationship between
persons and actions in a causally deterministic universe.
311. According to the traditional distinction between negative and positive rights, privacy
is a negative right insofar as it is a right to be free of government interference in the selfregarding domain. Equality is also a negative right to the extent that government does not
treat similarly situated persons differently. Either privacy or equality takes on the attributes
of a positive right when the government enlisted to assist individuals in protecting these rights.
The line between positive and negative rights, however, is less than clear. When a statesupported police force is used to prevent infringement of privacy-as when offenders are
arrested for a variety of crimes from battery to voyeurism, which violate the privacy of
others-there is a sense in which privacy becomes a positive right. And when the government
implements an affirmative action policy government to remedy past private discrimination, this
arguably also converts equality into a private right. We will overlook these difficulties here
in employing the negative/positive right distinction.
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negative rights. 12 More importantly, the justification for negative
rights depend upon some concept of the core self in a way that positive
rights do not. We can easily imagine a political system which, as a
matter of positive rights, guarantees its citizens a broad range of basic
primary goods on the basis of physical and psychological needs without
having to advert to the concept of a core self Negative rights, on the
other hand, say much more about the right-holder-that she is independent and that she is capable of making decisions about her life without
outside interference-that she constitutes an autonomous self
Before turning to these considerations, one more dimension must be
added to the developmental conception of the self that has been
elaborated here. In his classic of humanistic psychology, Toward A
Psychology of Being, Abraham Maslow put forth a theory of human
personality that views self-development to occur along a series of
hierarchically structured stages, each stage of which is characterized by
preoccupation with satisfying a certain kind of need.3 The ultimate
goal of the process is the state of self-actualization, a state of individual
development marked by increased spontaneity, creativity, self-acceptance,
autonomy, and the occurrence of peak experiences. 3 14 Whether
Maslow's hierarchy of needs is correct in all its essentials, he persuasively
makes the case that self-development is not simply a quantitative
process, but that there are discrete and distinctive qualitative stages that
mark the process of self-development.
The model of the self propounded in this piece draws liberally from
the psychoanalytic, social interactionist, and humanistic traditions within
modern psychology. The view proposed here is that the self is a dynamic
structure that builds upon itself as it interacts with and internalizes the
objects of experience. This Article has argued that self-identity and
personal autonomy are indissolubly linked, that freedom is an expression
of the desires, values, and identifications that make each individual a
unique person. The idea central to this model, and to the various
traditions of developmental psychology from which it is drawn," 5 is
that, implicit in the developmental structure of the self new sets of
capacities, talents, and needs are qualitatively manifested at each stage.

312. There are some recognized positive constitutional rights. The right of the criminal
defendant to assistance of counsel is one such right.
313. MASLOW, supra note 106, at 24-27 (discussing self-actualization).
314. Id. at 26 (listing the attributes of the self-actualized individual).
315. See generally MILLER, supra note 284 (comparing the theories of Freud, Piaget,
Erikson, Kohlberg and others on this point).
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Thus, the idea of emergence is important at the level of psychology as
well as ontology.
If this process of self-development leading to self-actualization is
accurate, then surely the most important goal of any political system
must be to facilitate the process-to protect, preserve, and nurture the
developing person-within the constraints imposed by a given society's
economic and technological capabilities. Modem liberalism has evolved
what are perhaps the two most powerful devices toward this end, the
rights of privacy and equality. Privacy, the right to pursue one's own
individual ends without external interference in the self-regarding
domain,3 ' is important not because privacy preserves autonomy, but
because autonomy cannot develop in the first instance in the absence of
privacy. Our self-regarding decisions are not sacrosanct because they are
invariably rational, well-motivated, or beneficial to self-they often are
not-but because it is only through making decisions, both wise decisions
and blunders, that one has any hope of coming to one's self-identity. As
this Article has earlier maintained, self-identity and personal autonomy
do not precede action; they are achieved through action. Privacy,
marked off within the limits of the self-regarding sphere, delimits the
scope of one's permissible self-expression and development.
For similar reasons, equality preserves the range of free action by
opening all opportunities to everyone, where distinctions are based not
upon race, class, or gender, but only upon natural ability. Moreover,
equality is so central a value to our system for a reason that has been
largely overlooked. This Article has followed a distinction drawn by
traditional philosophy between internal freedom and external freedom-freedom of the will and political and social freedom, respectively.
As important and fundamental as the distinction is, there is a link
between issues of external freedom and those of internal freedom. More
than any other right, this connection is obvious with issues of equality.
External inequality, as when certain opportunities are closed to those of
a specific class, replicates itself internally, as a hinderance to autonomy.
Through "adaptive preferences" and related processes, persons come to
disvalue that which they cannot possess anyway.3' 7 In this fashion, the
person places off-limits psychologically an entire range of external
possibilities. For this reason, inequality poses a pernicious, self-

316. This is Mill's formulation of privacy, not the right to privacy elaborated in the
constitution. These cases recognize a right far more limited in its scope.
317. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARv. L. REV. 826,
836 (1988) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1978)).
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replicating influence.
In contrast to prevailing trends in natural rights philosophy, the
justification of rights must be predicated not upon what we are
intrinsically, but upon what we might be. Or, to put the matter another
way, rights are not justified by reference to some concept of an intrinsic,
core self manifesting the capacity for rationality, free will, and authenticity; rather, in the absence of these fundamental rights, the fully-integrated, self-actualized autonomous self will never come to be.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This Article has explored a range of questions that demonstrate the
link between issues of self-identity and those of internal freedom. The
constraints imposed by limitations of space have prevented an examination of an equally important issue, the role of consciousness as an
organizing principle in human experience, identity, and freedom. Nor
has this Article discussed the way in which the progressive accumulation
of knowledge permits us to transcend various causal determinants of our
own behavior. As we learn more about what makes us behave as we do,
and what contributes to our developing into the type of persons we
ultimately become, we will come to be able to change these causally
antecedent factors, and to change ourselves in the process. In so doing,
we escape the bondage of particular causal determinants, while never
escaping the web of causal determinism itself. Freedom consists in our
progressive replacement of determinants which fall outside of our
control, with those that lie within our understanding and control.
Ultimately, should humanity ever reach the stage where we approximate
full understanding of these processes, we will have only our values to fall
back upon as determinants of the direction in which we are to take
human evolution. And then we will confront the real choices.

